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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three separate but interrelated studies examining the 
formation and management of tax policies.  The first study uses stakeholder theory (ST) to 
investigate the strategic management practices of the Transport for London (TfL) during discrete 
stages in the adoption, implementation, and amendments of the tax policy reform known as the 
London Congestion Charge (LCC).  Results indicate that TfL has utilized power, legitimacy, and 
urgency as its main policy management tactics with a significant emphasis on legitimatizing the 
LCC and its subsequent policy amendments. 
The second study draws on social exchange theory (SET) to reexamine the relationship 
between corporations and legislators during tax policy processes.  Data for the study come from 
publicly available political action committee (PAC) contribution activities surrounding the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA07).  By examining the endogeneity 
between legislators’ voting patterns and PAC contributions by corporations, this study aims to 
refine empirical work on corporate political strategy, especially as it relates to crucial tax 
provisions embedded within an intensely debated policy proposal.  Using simultaneous equations 
modeling (SEM), results are consistent with SET showing that an implicit and reciprocal 
relationship exists between corporations and legislators.  This relationship affects the 
interdependence of how legislators vote for public policies and the amount of corporations’ 
financial contributions to legislators. 
The third study investigates and aims to validate the empirical applicability of Dahan’s 
(2005) typology of political resources in explicating the political interactions between 
stakeholder groups and legislators in the development of EISA07.  I discuss how and why the 
mode of operations and various political resources employed by stakeholder groups affected the 
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final EISA07 language concerning domestic production deduction tax credits for the oil and gas 
industry.  Publicly available data show that both supporting and opposing stakeholder groups 
employ tactics consistent with Dahan’s (2005) typology.  However, both stakeholder groups tend 
to use an interactive or positive political approach to gain access and favor of legislators instead 
of an adversarial approach.  Ultimately, the tax credits were preserved.  Taken as a whole, the 
three studies advance the tax and public policy research literature in accounting by studying how 
and why relevant stakeholders affect the formation and ongoing management of public and tax 
policies. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 While research into public policy issues has traditionally been centered in the political 
science discipline, recognition of their impact on a broad array of stakeholders (Freeman 1984, 
Harrison and Freeman 1999, Bosse et al. 2009, and Freeman et al. 2010) has led to increases in 
research attention from other disciplines.  Empirical research on political interactions between 
legislators and stakeholders in both management (Hillman et al. 1999, Bonardi and Keim 2005, 
Keim and Hillman 2008, and Hillman et al. 2009) and accounting/taxation (Roberts et al. 2003, 
Dwyer and Roberts 2004, Roberts and Bobek 2004, Cho et al. 2006, and Thornburg and Roberts 
2008) reflects the growing understanding the impact of public policies has on stakeholder groups 
including corporations, interest groups, and the general public.  However, both streams of 
literature focus primarily on the means stakeholder groups used to actively participate in 
influencing public policy setting processes and outcomes.  Further, a significant number of 
studies draw on Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) typology of corporate political tactics as their primary 
theoretical framework.  The underlying assumption of this typology is that the relationships 
between stakeholder groups (corporations are often the proxy) and legislators are unidirectional 
where corporations attempt to influence legislators and policy outcomes.  Almost no studies 
examine the interactions from the perspective that these political activities may be mutually 
determined.  Moreover, Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) typology of political tactics concentrates on a 
positive approach from corporations towards legislators and overlooks the negative political 
tactics corporations may employ.  Finally, studies in both management and accounting/taxation 
have largely ignored the crucial aspects of policy management after public policies are enacted. 
Given the shortcomings noted above, it appears that extensions of political strategy 
research into stakeholder impacts are warranted.  More specifically, the relationships between 
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stakeholder groups and legislators need to be reconsidered through a typology using a more 
comprehensive model than those based on Hillman and Hitt (1999).  It is necessary to assume 
that stakeholder groups strategically plan their activities through both positive and negative 
interactions.  Further, beyond just focusing on the passage of legislation, understanding how and 
why policy setters and administrators strategically manage enacted policies to increase the act’s 
viability would also be of value.  Overall, this dissertation expands and validates theoretical 
conceptualization and application relative to issues of stakeholders influence over how and why 
public policies are set and managed.  Using three separate but interconnected studies, this 
dissertation provides empirical evidence that advances the political strategy literature in 
accounting and taxation.  Each of the three studies is discussed below. 
Study One:  The Dominant Stakeholder’s Strategic Management of the London Congestion 
Charge through Power, Legitimacy, and Urgency 
 My first study investigates the strategic management of a public/tax policy reform 
commonly known as the London Congestion Charge (LCC).  This charge, administered by the 
Transport for London (TfL), is examined during LCC’s inception, enactment, and subsequent 
amendment.  Prior studies (Shepherd and Sumalee 2004, Sumalee 2004, and Leape 2006) of the 
LCC focus on either the economic impact and/or policy feasibility of the legislation prior to its 
actual implementation.  Results of these studies are critical of the LCC due to its innovative 
policy reform nature.  However, no research has addressed how TfL strategically manages the 
LCC and why these strategic tactics affect the LCC throughout its legislative and administrative 
history.  This study provides insights into the often overlooked area by detailing TfL’s strategic 
management. 
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Analyzing publicly available data related to the LCC from 1997 to 2011 and using 
Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder typology under a qualitative case study format, this study 
finds that TfL actively manages the LCC by employing tactics (legality, justification, and 
consent) that enhance the policy’s legitimation in the view of relevant policy stakeholders.  
Furthermore, TfL uses its legislative, administrative, and judicial powers to silence stakeholders 
who oppose the LCC.  Finally, evidence also indicates that TfL has consistently exercised a fear 
tactic to try to convince stakeholders of the adverse consequences if the LCC is not implemented 
and continued.  These results shed light on the importance of post-policy management.  They 
show how policy administrators can strategically manage the policy by identifying relevant 
stakeholders and promoting tactics that are crucial to them. 
Overall, the first study contributes to the public/taxation policy literature in a number of 
important ways.  First, the study is one of the few that examines the ongoing management of a 
policy reform after its implementation.  Second, this study employs a less utilized 
methodological approach to investigate the “how” and “why” aspects of the LCC.  Results of the 
case study approach in this study reveals factors that may have remained hidden under the 
traditional quantitative, simulated methods of analysis.  Third, the study expands and further 
validates the applicability of Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder typology by testing qualitative 
data with Gilley’s (2006) legitimacy measurement indices.  This provides researchers with a 
framework and a measurement tool to test qualitative data that may be difficult to measure.  
Finally, this study offers practical insights to policy makers and administrators on the importance 
of ongoing policy maintenance in existing policies and future policy reforms.  By identifying 
relevant stakeholders and actively managing these stakeholders through deployment of effective 
tactics, policy makers and administrators may improve policy viability. 
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Study Two:  The Interdependence of Corporations and Legislators: A Simultaneous 
Equations Analysis 
 The second study examines the relationship between corporations and legislators from a 
more comprehensive perspective than undertaken in prior studies.  It assumes that the 
relationship may be interdependent instead of unidirectional.  The study adopts the theoretical 
lens of social exchange theory (SET) that suggests influences are mutually determined.  Using a 
simultaneous equations analysis, I investigate interdependence relating legislators’ voting 
outcomes to the amount of corporate political action committees’ (PAC) contributions they 
received during the legislative process of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
(EISA07). 
SET argues that individuals and groups give gifts to each other to establish an implicit, 
long-lasting, and reciprocal relationship.  The strength of a relationship is argued to be mutually 
determined: the value of the first gift impacts the value of the subsequent, returned gift and the 
value of returned gift affects the value of the second gift from the original party.  Based on 
arguments grounded in SET, I hypothesize that the corporations and legislators build 
relationships through exchanges of political resources such as voting outcomes and PAC 
contributions.  Specifically, I posit that legislators’ prior voting records will affect the amount of 
corporate PAC contributions and then the amount of corporate PAC contributions will affect 
legislators’ voting outcomes during the formation and passage of EISA07. 
In order to examine for a relational interdependence between legislators and PACs, I 
analyze publicly available data concerning EISA07 using a simultaneous equations analysis.  
Results indicate that political affiliation is the most consistent factor influencing the voting 
outcomes in both chambers of the 110
th
 Congress.  Also, the amount of predicted PAC 
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contributions appears to have significantly affected the voting outcomes concerning EISA07 
particularly in the House of Representatives, but not in the Senate.  These results are still 
consistent with SET.  Overall, the model results are consistent with SET arguments and indicate 
an interdependence relationship appears to exist between corporations and legislators relative to 
PAC contributions and voting outcomes.  This study extends the contemporary literature on 
corporate political strategy through its use of both a more appropriate theory and an innovative 
statistical analysis reflecting the theoretical underpinnings.  This study should be of interest to 
other political strategy researchers in that it validates an alternative theoretical lens for studying 
interactions between corporations and legislators in the political arena.  Results may also be of 
interest to public interest groups in that interdependence between corporations and legislators 
may not always serve the best interest of society.  Finally, corporations could potentially use the 
results of this study to improve their overall corporate strategic planning. 
Study Three:  The Legislative Divide on Tax Provisions for Big Oil: Evidence from the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
 
 The third and final study responds to Dahan’s (2005) call for validation of his theoretical 
typology of political resources through empirical testing.  Additionally, this study aims to expand 
Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) corporate political strategy typology by considering additional 
political approaches incorporated by stakeholder groups during the discrete stages of EISA07.  
Dahan’s (2005) political resource typology, similar to Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) corporate 
political strategy typology, includes three levels of political resources: primary, supporting, and 
complementary.  Differing from the Hillman and Hitt (1999) typology, however, Dahan (2005) 
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argues that different political resources will be employed to influence policy directions 
depending on the primary approach taken (interactive/positive vs. adversarial/negative). 
Using Dahan’s (2005) typology to analyze EISA07, this study shows (1) the existence of 
supporting and opposing stakeholder groups regarding the tax provisions embedded within this 
legislative act, (2) that both supporting and opposing groups used all three levels of political 
resources in their attempts to influence the tax provision outcomes, (3) that relational approaches 
affect how different levels of political resources are employed, and (4) there is an exception to 
Dahan’s (2005) typology in that both stakeholder groups prefer the positive relational approach 
and forgo the negative approach in their EISA07 political activities. 
Empirical results in this study validate Dahan’s (2005) political resource typology and 
have both academic and practical implications.  The findings suggest the application of Dahan’s 
(2005) typology to other types of research such as large-scale surveys and unscripted in-depth 
interviews in other controversial public policy settings would be warranted.  In addition, results 
also suggest that policy makers may benefit by knowing that stakeholder groups use different 
resources, relational approaches, and combinations of the two in their political participation 
during the legislative processes related to public policies.  This knowledge offers legislators the 
opportunity to improve their political interactions with various stakeholder groups. 
Overall Contribution 
Taken together, the three empirical studies in this dissertation make a significant 
contribution to the literature on corporate political strategy in accounting and taxation.  First, this 
dissertation provides empirical evidence for a relational framework between corporations and 
legislators.  In contrast to the conventional framework of a unidirectional relationship between 
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corporations and legislators, the simultaneous equation modeling shows that interdependence 
between the amounts of financial resources contributed to legislators by corporations and the 
voting outcomes of public policies that are important to these contributing corporations.  Second, 
this dissertation empirically examines and validates a recent political resource typology that 
considers how stakeholders use different political resources depending upon their overall 
political relational approach.  Finally, this dissertation advances knowledge on the less explored 
topic of why a public/taxation policy must be managed after its passage and how the 
management tactics affect the policy’s viability.  In all, this dissertation advances the political 
strategy literature in accounting and taxation by providing empirical evidence to validate, expand, 
and enhance theories and theoretical typologies by taking relevant stakeholders into 
consideration during the discreet stages of public policy enactment.  The remainder of this 
dissertation presents each of the three studies in detail. 
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STUDY ONE:  THE DOMINANT STAKEHOLDER’S STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
OF THE LONDON CONGESTION CHARGE THROUGH POWER, LEGITIMACY, 
AND URGENCY 
Abstract 
 
This study drew on Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder typology to examine a 
governmental agency’s strategic management of a public policy reform, known as the London 
Congestion Charge (LCC).  Specifically, this study investigated how and why Transport for 
London (TfL) strategically managed the LCC via stakeholders’ attributes of power, legitimacy, 
and urgency.  Extant assessments of the LCC are inconclusive.  The difficulties in identifying 
relevant stakeholders, their attributes, and methodological approaches may have contributed to 
the conflicting results.  Additionally, there lacked a theoretically grounded case study to examine 
factors beyond the common financial and quantitative analyses addressed in articles over the 
LCC.  Relying on Yin’s (2009) methodological approach in conducting case studies, I 
chronologically analyzed publicly available data to examine why TfL strategically managed the 
LCC and how TfL achieved its strategic management of the LCC over stakeholders. 
Results indicated that due to the exploratory nature of the LCC, TfL must constantly 
manage such innovative policy to ensure its success and viability.  Among the means of TfL’s 
strategic management, TfL primarily used tactics to maintain the legitimacy of the LCC and 
supplemented these tactics with authoritative power and fears of unproven urgency to influence 
stakeholders throughout the discreet stages of the congestion charging scheme.  These results 
have practical implications to policy makers contemplating new policy reforms and potentially 
help expand both empirical and theoretical understanding to researchers who are interested in the 
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latent factors in policy management and maintenance.  Summary and discussions with 
propositions for future research on policy reforms conclude this study. 
Key words: London Congestion Charge; Power, legitimacy, and urgency; Public administration; 
Public policy reform; and Stakeholder typology  
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I. Introduction 
Analyzing 2007 data on traffic congestion, Schrank and Lomax (2009) estimated that 
traffic congestion in 439 large U.S. cities potentially cost travelers an annual aggregate of about 
$87.2 billion in time and fuel losses.  Besides economic costs, externalities, such as traffic 
congestion and pollution, also have adverse social and environmental impacts (European 
Environmental Agency 2005).  Thus, externalities are potentially costly (Cook 2009) to a broad 
spectrum of stakeholders within a society.  A growing number of governments have attempted to 
attenuate these costs through tax policy reforms (i.e., taxes on CFC1 production, vehicles, and 
carbon emissions).  London was the first government to pass and implement an innovative tax 
policy reform on an unprecedented scale, specifically to address its chronic traffic congestion 
problems by taxing drivers for driving into the inner London congestion charge zone.  In 2003, 
the London Congestion Charge (LCC) became effective. 
The Greater London Authority (GLA) had asked researchers to conduct studies on the 
potential effects of the proposed LCC in order to understand whether it posed unforeseen 
negative impacts to stakeholders in London.  The assessment of the LCC before its 
implementations (Shepherd and Sumalee 2004, Sumalee 2004, and Leape 2006) was critical.  
Results of these studies aided policy makers to potentially reduce (1) the negative impact the 
LCC might have over the broad scope of society and (2) the costs associated with fixing the LCC 
if it failed to reach its objectives after implementation.  However, such studies focused mainly on 
the economic impacts of the LCC and ignored latent factors beyond economic considerations 
associated with the ongoing maintenance of the LCC.  Also, these studies generated results 
                                                          
1
 Chlorofluorocarbons, also known as CFCs, production and import were heavily taxed in the U.S. to minimize its 
use from the late 80s through 90s.  CFCs are known as one of the Ozone Depleting Chemicals, which accelerates the 
depletion of the ozone layer. 
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primarily through artificial data simulations due to the unavailability of empirical data prior to 
the LCC implementation.  Therefore, the reliability of these results may be inconclusive.   
Due to the inconclusive nature of these simulation studies on the LCC, there appeared to 
be a need to look beyond the economic considerations and investigate the latent factors behind 
the LCC’s ongoing policy management.  Also, analyzing actual data after the LCC’s 
implementation through an established theoretical framework will provide useful insights to 
complement the aforementioned simulation studies.  Thus, I drew on Mitchell et al.’s (1997) 
stakeholder typology to examine the commonly overlooked “how” and “why” areas of a policy 
administrator’s ongoing strategic management of the LCC’s relevant stakeholders.  Specifically, 
I investigated how Transport for London (TfL), a core and dominant stakeholder, exercised 
tactics and claims of power, legitimacy, and urgency to strategically manage the LCC throughout 
the discreet stages of the LCC.  Aided by Yin’s (2009) methodological approach in conducting 
case studies, I analyzed publicly available data concerning the LCC to discover how and why 
TfL actively used these tactics to influence and manage non-core stakeholders.  Understanding 
both how and why the public administration strategically manages stakeholders during a public 
policy reform is crucial to policy makers and academic researchers and may help prevent 
avoidable pitfalls during the formulation, implementation, and amendments of current and future 
tax policies. 
Prior studies in public policy and political science literature have mainly evaluated 
particular policies based on their economic impacts and effects.  For example, examining tax 
policy mechanism differences on waste management, Kinnaman (2010) found that under 
different economic models, the optimal waste management policy was achieved when the policy 
scheme taxed at the landfill instead of through either centralized recycling technologies or 
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curbside tax collection.  Nonetheless, due to the pure economic modeling assumptions, namely 
that public agencies on waste management only aimed to minimize costs, Kinnaman (2010, p. 
250) admitted that the efficacy of his models might be questionable if the main policy objective 
was not “cost minimization.”  Kinnaman’s (2010) self-assessment of his study demonstrates that 
relying solely on the assessments of economic outcomes may not adequately aid policy makers 
and administration in maintaining the indispensable ongoing strategic management of policy 
reforms as complex as the LCC. 
The congestion charging is a complex scheme.  The original congestion charge zone 
(February 17, 2003 to February 18, 2007) was eight square miles in size, representing 
approximately 1.3 percent of Greater London.  When the LCC first became effective in 2003, 
drivers of non-exempt
2
 status pay a daily charge of £53 for driving in the charging zone between 
7:00 a.m. and 6:30 p.m. on weekdays, excluding public holidays.  A network of Automatic 
Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras serve as the charging zone enforcement tools.  To 
discourage late and non-payment of charges, heavy fines4 and penalties are attached to ensure 
prompt vehicle registration and payment.  This scheme was applied to the western extension 
zone when it became effective on February 19, 2007.  See Figure 1 for the boundary of the 
original and western extension charging zones. 
                                                          
2
 136,000 charging zone residents (out of a total of about 7,000,000 in Greater London) receive a 90% discount for 
driving within the charging zone if they pay the charge for one or more weeks each time.  However, these residents 
still pay for a one-time administration charge of £10 in order to claim such exemption.  Also, alternative fuel cars, 
ambulances, bicycles, buses, fire trucks, minibuses of a certain size, police cars, taxis, and certain three-wheeled 
vehicles receive 100% discount if they are registered with TfL via Capita (later with IBM).  Registered business 
fleet vehicles pay £7 instead of the regular £5. 
3
 This amount was raised to £8 on July 4, 2005.  The £8 charge was applied to the Western Extension Zone on 
February 19, 2007.  Finally, the daily charge was raised to £10 on January 4, 2011. 
4
 A fine of £10 is imposed for all non-registered vehicles entering the zone in addition to a penalty of £120.  The 
additional penalty is reduced to £60 if paid in 14 days; otherwise, it increases to £180 for non-payment up to 28 days.  
Drivers are allowed to appeal the fine judgment.  Both drivers and TfL may present their evidence in front of an 
arbitrator or a judge for deliberation of each case.  These fines and penalties accumulate indefinitely until the 
balance is paid.  TfL has the rights to disable (via a clamp or a boot) or sell the vehicles of persistent non-payment. 
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 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
For the highlights in the history of the LCC, see Table 1.  The main objective of the LCC 
is to reduce traffic congestion in London by charging motorists a fee to drive into the chronically 
congested central London streets.  Championed by former London Mayor, Ken Livingstone, and 
enacted in 2003, the LCC underwent constant challenges and a number of amendments during 
the tenure of Livingstone and his successor, Boris Johnson.  Prior research on the LCC (Santos 
and Shaffer 2004, Santos and Bhakar 2006, and Quddus et al. 2007b) produced inconclusive 
results of whether a charging scheme is economically beneficial in several assessment 
approaches.  Furthermore, other studies (Blow et al. 2003, Prud’homme and Bocarejo 2005, 
Leape 2006, Quddus et al. 2007a) tended to focus on the economic outcomes and relied on 
artificial data simulations to examine the LCC. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Additionally, no prior studies have approached the LCC with a case study methodology.  
According to Yin (2009), case studies can complement other research methodologies and 
provide insights to the “how” and “why” questions of social phenomena.  Thus, to extend prior 
research, I relied on Mitchell et al.’s (1997) typology to examine how and why, TfL, the 
dominant stakeholder relied on the typology’s three stakeholder attributes to strategically 
manage other relevant, non-dominant stakeholders
5
 for the LCC. 
                                                          
5
 As will be discussed in more detail, the British Parliament, the London Assembly, the London boroughs, the 
businesses in London, various transportation users and environmental groups, and the residents of London, etc., are 
some of the relevant stakeholders 
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This study offered potential contributions to the tax
6
 policy reform literature by providing 
empirical insights to policy makers on policy reforms and the accompanying strategic policy 
management tactics.  First, by examining the impact of tactics used by TfL, the dominant 
stakeholder, to manage other relevant stakeholders over the LCC, this study addressed the 
importance of ongoing policy management in a tax policy reform.  Additionally, understanding 
policy issues through analyzing contextual data of policy reforms can offer alternative solutions 
that complement insights overlooked by other research methodologies.  Third, the results have 
broad policy implications, which allow policy makers to apply the same principles and 
mechanisms to deal with issues in a wide array of policy reforms.  Finally, results and 
discussions of this study potentially benefit academic researchers in gaining a better 
understanding of why an optimal public policy reform requires constant and ongoing policy 
maintenance by a dominant stakeholder through incorporating strategic tactics to ensure careful 
formulation, instrument choices, and inclusions of relevant stakeholders as well as how they are 
integral parts of successful policy reforms. 
Overall results from the analysis of the publicly available data indicated that due to the 
LCC’s innovative nature, TfL spent substantial resources to ensure the LCC’s success and 
viability via strategic management tactics.  Specifically, TfL relied primarily on creating and 
maintaining legitimation for itself and the LCC in its strategic management of stakeholders.  
Additionally, TfL drew on administrative, legislative, and judicial powers to strengthen its policy 
legitimation claims and silence opposing views.  Finally, TfL promoted a mostly exaggerated 
sense of urgency if the LCC’s implementation and amendments failed to pass.  Considering the 
                                                          
6 There are ongoing debates over the nature of the LCC whether it is a toll or a tax.  The London Mayors and TfL 
have insisted that the LCC is not a tax while others, such as the U.K. Constitution’s definition on taxation, scholars, 
and London businesses and residents, have consistently viewed the LCC as a form of social and environmental tax.  
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politically innovative nature of the LCC, I argue that in the broad scope of policy reform, TfL 
has been successful, albeit inconsistent, in maintaining its stakeholder management strategies.  
Furthermore, without TfL’s active management of relevant stakeholders, the LCC would not 
have been implemented, let alone considered successful by some.  The LCC’s viability would 
have been in jeopardy when facing multiple challenges in its brief history. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section reviews Mitchell et 
al.’s (1997) theoretical typology and develops research questions pertinent to the LCC.  After 
that, the methodological approach is detailed and the contents of publicly available data on the 
LCC are analyzed.  Following the analysis, results reflecting upon the constructs of power, 
legitimacy, and urgency of relevant stakeholders and the impact they have on the strategic 
management of the LCC and TfL are reported.  Finally, the last section summarizes and 
concludes with future academic research directions. 
II. Stakeholder Typology and Research Questions 
Stakeholder Typology 
 Stakeholder theory (ST) is well established within management literature (Freeman 1984, 
Harrison and Freeman 1999, Bosse et al. 2009, and Freeman et al. 2010).  Many ST studies 
focused on the role of firms’ management in attracting and retaining stakeholders (Jones 1995 
and Turban and Greening 1996), reducing regulatory exposures (Patten 2002), or achieving 
acceptable corporate social performance (Graves and Waddock 1994 and Godfrey 2005).  
Researchers (Riccucci 1995, Mintzberg et al. 1998, Friedman 2000, and Bryson et al. 2002) 
argue that “public policies, organizations, communities, or even countries will fail” unless 
relevant stakeholders are “at least minimally” satisfied (Bryson et al. 2002, p. 571).  In order to 
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avoid confusion and inconsistency in defining and identifying stakeholders, I applied Freeman et 
al.’s (2010, p. 60) definition of stakeholders “as groups and individuals who can affect, or are 
affected by the strategic outcomes of” an organization or institution. 
Some studies position public policy administrators, like the management of firms, at the 
center of a wheel with non-core stakeholders at its spokes (Rowley 1997, Barringer and Harrison 
2000, and Brugha and Varvasovsky 2000).  Simply put, public policy administrators are 
dominant stakeholders among all relevant stakeholders in the management of a public policy.  
Both Bryson (2004) and Freeman et al. (2010) noted the lack of in-depth and comprehensive 
studies to expand and push the boundaries of Freeman’s (1984) original ST.  Responding to what 
he calls a “deficit” in addressing “how to systematically identify and analyze stakeholders” in the 
public policy literature, Bryson (2004, p. 22) reviewed prior studies of failed public policies and 
attempted to clarify some of the relevant stakeholders for public policy administration.  Bryson 
(2004, p. 47) concluded that, “linking stakeholder analyses to developments in political theory, 
management theory and ethics . . . deserves serious research attention.”  Furthermore, Freeman et 
al. (2010) indicates that public policy legislators and administrators must understand how and 
why certain stakeholders influence the outcome of policies due to the unavoidable 
interconnectedness between policies, public administrators, and for profit corporations.  Freeman 
et al. (2010) devote an entire chapter of their book to emphasizing the need for additional 
research on stakeholder theory in public policy and administration. 
Freeman et al. (2010, p. 60) predict firms that actively manage “stakeholders can enjoy 
sustainable competitive benefits.”  This statement suggests an inseparable link between the 
practice of managing stakeholders and firms’ sustainable competitiveness.  Applying this linkage 
to the public policy setting, I argue that ST holds the key to understanding how and why “public 
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managers” (Gerber and Gibson 2009) as dominant stakeholders may impact the sustainability of 
a public policy reform via strategic management of non-dominant, yet relevant stakeholders.  
Thus, policy administrators must actively employ tactics to ensure they pay sufficient attention to 
stakeholders in order to successfully manage relevant stakeholders and policies. 
Brugha and Varvasovszky (2000, p. 239), studying ST in public policy settings, 
concluded that, “Policy development is a complex process which frequently takes place in an 
unstable and rapidly changing context, subject to unpredictable internal and external factors.”  
Based on prior ST research, Mitchell et al. (1997) proposed a typology of three stakeholder 
attributes to describe stakeholders and their salience.  Mitchell et al. (1997) believe that these 
attributes would allow the management or the administration to improve the effectiveness of 
overall strategic management and its accompanying tactics.  According to Mitchell et al. (1997, 
pp. 865-868), the three stakeholder attributes are power, legitimacy, and urgency. 
Following Mitchell et al.’s (1997) three typological attributes allowed me to conduct in-
depth contextual analyses of the publicly available data to assess the LCC.  However, 
considering that ST is specifically developed for the management literature, a reconciliation of 
construct differences and operationalization of power, legitimacy, and urgency between 
organizational and policy/political science literature is critical to facilitate the proper 
examination of the LCC.  The succeeding paragraphs attempt to reconcile the differences 
between both disciplines regarding power, legitimacy, and urgency. 
Power 
 
Power dominated political science literature dating back to the 1950s.  Lasswell and 
Kaplan (1950, p. 75) claim that, “the concept of power is perhaps the most fundamental in the 
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whole of political science: the political process is the shaping, distribution, and exercise of 
power.”  However, debates over the definition of power rage on despite such recognition (see 
Arts and van Tatenhove 2004 for a summary on the definition and operationalization of power).  
To avoid detracting from the aim of this paper, I rely on Mitchell et al.’s (1997) definition of 
power.  Quoting Salancik and Pfeffer (1974), Mitchell et al. (1997, p. 865) described power as 
“the ability . . . to bring about the outcomes they [(the organizations)] desire” (Salancik and 
Pfeffer 1974, p. 3).  Their definition is parallel to how other sociologists define power (Presthus 
1964, and Gerth and Mills 1991).  Mitchell et al. (1997, pp. 865-866) identify three types of 
power: coercive, utilitarian, and normative.  Coercive power is obtained and exercised through 
physical means such as violence.  Utilitarian power is exercised and maintained via material or 
financial resources such as monetary rewards or fines.  Normative power involves the symbolic 
control of individuals, organizations, and groups with notions of love and acceptance by the 
society. 
Bryson et al. (2002) purport that stakeholders’ power comes from either “access to or 
control over” both support and sanction mechanisms where money and votes fall under support 
for regulatory authority and no confidence votes (Bachrach and Baratz 1975 and Eden and 
Ackerman 1998) are sanctions.  In order to pass and amend a policy, policy makers must tend to 
and balance the needs of relevant stakeholders to secure their support.  Thus, in order for the 
proposed LCC to pass, TfL most likely would have relied on all available powers to earn 
stakeholders’ endorsement on the LCC. 
Assuming TfL understood how and why this exercise of power by voters affected the 
viability of the LCC, TfL would likely have employed certain tactics to increase favorable votes 
for the LCC’s passage and amendments.  On the contrary, voters could have also exercised their 
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power of sanctions by voting against amendments to the LCC.  With this assumption, the TfL 
would likely have deployed certain tactics to convince voters of the benefits of those proposed 
changes in order to secure votes.  The following research questions examine the strategies TfL 
employed to increase support for the LCC: 
RQ1.1:  What sources of power did TfL draw on to convince stakeholders to support the 
enactment, implementation, and amendments of the LCC? 
RQ1.2:  How did TfL use these sources of power to strategically manage stakeholders 
throughout discreet stages of the LCC? 
Legitimacy 
 
Political science researchers (e.g., Easton 1975, Przeworski 1986, and O’Kane 1993) 
have placed legitimacy in the center of the entire political science discourses.  Albeit important, 
legitimacy is “a tricky concept to measure and apply” (Gilley 2009, p. xiii).  Levi (2006, p. 13) 
avoids using the term “legitimacy” and claims, “Legitimacy is a complex concept that includes 
many elements, but no one—including Weber himself—has successfully sorted out which of the 
various elements are necessary or how to measure indicators or their interactions.”  Similar to 
political science researchers, ST researchers also experience such challenges in defining and 
framing legitimacy.  Not only does the ST literature struggle to find the precise definition of 
legitimacy, but extant attempts at such explanations also remain “inconsistent with other 
literatures” (Phillips 2003, p. 25).  Legitimacy has been such an abstract notion that even 
Freeman (1984, p. 45), the pioneer of ST, avoided defining legitimacy in his original paper on 
ST.  Coicaud (2002, p. 10) defined legitimacy as “the right to govern” after politicians receive 
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and uphold “consent, law, and norms” in a political system.  Nevertheless, Coicaud (2002) did 
not operationalize these three legitimacy constructs. 
Observing the difficulties of conceptualizing and measuring “legitimacy,” Gilley (2009) 
attempted to articulate and provide operational measurements to his conceptualization on 
legitimacy.  He believed, “Legitimacy . . . is rightful rule, where rightfulness entails meeting the 
shared moral standards of a political community.”  Corresponding to Coicaud’s (2002) 
unoperationalized concepts of “consent, law, and norms” Gilley (2009) conceptualized 
legitimacy as a construct that contains three distinct yet interconnected dimensions of 
subconstructs: legality, justification, and consent. 
Legality 
 
By legality, Gilley (2009, p. 6) “means that the state has acquired and exercised political 
power in a way that accords with a political community’s laws, rules, and customs.”  Echoing 
Weber (1947), Gilley (2009, p. 6) posited that a public policy earned its legality when actions 
related to such policy “are deemed consistent with these rules” (Gilley 2009, p. 6).  From this 
perspective, TfL would likely have promoted the LCC’s legality to relevant stakeholders.  I 
argue that TfL used tactics to create and promote the LCC’s legality when challenged to silence 
opposing views.  Understanding the TfL’s tactics in promoting the LCC’s legality can provide 
answers on the importance of policy legitimation overlooked by other studies. 
Due to its latent nature, measuring legality has been difficult.  Fortunately, Gilley (2006) 
has provided the measurement indicators of legality based on prior studies.  Building on the 
approaches purported by Bollen and Lennox (1991) to measure latent constructs, Gilley (2006, p. 
505) operationalized the three subconstructs of legitimacy.  For a complete list of indicators, see 
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Table 2.  Gilley (2006) measured political legality by observing whether demonstrations or social 
movements had been initiated or promoted concerning political legitimacy.  In order to increase 
the LCC’s legality, the TfL would likely have promoted positive social movements toward the 
LCC.  This leads to the following research question: 
RQ2:  What social movements did the TfL promote to strengthen the LCC’s legality for  
its passage, enactment, and subsequent amendments? 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Justification 
 
The second subconstruct is justification.  Habermas (1975, pp. 100 – 101) described 
justification as an “independent” check to assess the legitimacy of states and policies.  Barker 
(1990, p. 62) believed that a policy’s legality alone was “inadequate or irrelevant” unless it was 
also justified.  In parallel, Gilley (2009) esteemed justification in legitimacy since the legality of 
public policies guaranteed no automatic legitimacy.  Thus, TfL likely strived to convince 
stakeholders of the LCC’s justification with all available means.  Gilley (2006) measured 
political justification by an indicator of the voters’ attitudes on authoritarian leaders’ popularity. 
The popularity of the then Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, who championed the 
LCC as his focal political campaign objective was evident by the Mayoral election outcomes and 
the comments from both politicians and news media.  I argue that Livingstone’s popularity might 
have enhanced the justification of the LCC’s passage, enactment, and subsequent amendments.  
On the opposite side of that same token, the explicit attitude of Livingstone’s successor, Boris 
Johnson, who publicly opposed the LCC might explain the western extension zone (WEZ, see 
Figure 1) abolishment as he was equally popular when he received the unprecedented popular 
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voting of more than one million first choice votes during the 2008 Mayoral election.  This leads 
to the next research question: 
RQ3.1:  How and why did the popularity of the Mayor of London influence the 
justification of the passage, enactment, and amendments to the LCC? 
In addition to a political leader’s popularity, Gilley (2006) included the effectiveness of a 
public institution as another measurable indicator to determine a policy’s justification.  Most 
likely TfL would have highlighted its effectiveness in administrating the LCC to promote its 
legality.  Understanding the tactics TfL used to enhance the LCC administration’s effectiveness 
could benefit policy makers with knowledge of how to increase a policy’s justification.  Thus, 
the next research question asks: 
RQ3.2:  How and through what means did TfL promote its administrative effectiveness in 
order to justify the passage, enactment, and amendments to the LCC? 
Gilley’s (2006) third indicator is the public survey of support or alienation of a policy.  
This indicator intends to measure the attitude in judging a policy’s legitimacy.  Considering how 
messages portrayed in the media and official publications significantly influence surveys and 
polls, TfL likely had taken advantage of available venues to increase stakeholders’ support and 
minimize dissent or alienation.  This leads to the next research question: 
RQ3.3:  How and through what means did TfL increase stakeholders’ support for the 
LCC and minimize dissent during its passage, enactment, and amendments? 
Gilley’s (2006) last applicable indicator is the anti-system movement.  Generally 
speaking, opposing views exist among citizens/voters regarding public policy.  In order to 
maintain a policy’s legitimacy, proactive and ongoing management tactics must be employed.  
Opposing views and anti-LCC movements existed throughout various stages of the LCC.  
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Without interventions by TfL to diffuse these opposing views, the LCC and TfL might have 
risked losing its legitimacy claims.  Therefore, the final research question under the legitimacy 
construct is as follows: 
 RQ3.4:  How and why did the tactics employed by TfL reduce the negative impacts of  
anti-LCC movements and legitimize the policy during its passage, enactment, and 
amendments? 
Consent 
 
Gilley (2009, p. 7) defines consent as “positive actions that express a citizen’s 
recognition of the state’s right to rule and an agreement, at least in general, to be bounded by the 
decisions that result.”  This final subconstruct is important as citizens often lack an opportunity 
to properly examine the legality of and accept the justification of their state and public policies.  
By consenting, citizens implicitly grant legality and justification of the policies imposed on them.  
Voluntarily paying taxes levied by authorities is one of the actions that exemplify an implicit 
“consent” among citizens.  By paying taxes, citizens might not completely understand the 
legality of tax policies or be convinced of their justification; nevertheless, “they are acting in 
ways that display an acceptance of the state’s right to rule” (Gilley 2009, p. 7).  Without 
receiving “consent,” it would have been impossible for TfL to pass the LCC and ensuing 
amendments.  Understanding the means TfL deployed to receive consent for the LCC from 
relevant stakeholders thus provides answers to the LCC’s present enforcement mechanism.  One 
of Gilley’s (2006) measurement indicators is the compliance of tax payments due to its voluntary 
nature.  The assumption behind this indicator is that stakeholders implicitly grant policy consent 
when they pay taxes.  In order to receive stakeholders’ consent in charging fee increases, TfL 
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must have strategically incorporated tactics to increase compliance of the LCC payment, which 
is a form of taxation as this paper has argued.  Thus, the research question on consent to the LCC 
is as follows: 
RQ4:  Why did the compliance of the LCC payments influence its subsequent fee 
increases? 
Urgency 
Mitchell et al. (1997) complete the typology with the concept of urgency in addition to 
power and legitimacy.  Urgency, according to Mitchell et al. (1997, p. 867), is “the dynamics of 
stakeholder-manager interactions.”  Mitchell et al. (1997, p. 867) argued that urgency “exists 
only when two conditions are met: (1) when a relationship or claim is of time-sensitive nature 
and (2) when that relationship or claim is important or critical to the stakeholder.”  Applying this 
relational understanding between organizations and stakeholders to public policy administration, 
policy administrators or “public management” must create a sense of urgency in policy reforms.  
Without this sense of urgency, policy makers and administrators will potentially fail to maintain 
their power and legitimacy in policy reforms.  However, creating a sense of urgency alone is 
insufficient.  Other elements are also critical to attract the attention of relevant stakeholders to 
view issues surrounding policies as compelling, imperative, or time sensitive.  In order to prevent 
losing both power and legitimacy of the LCC, TfL would likely have created a sense of urgency 
on why the LCC was an indispensable policy for Londoners and those who enter London for 
various reasons in order to pass and maintain the LCC.  Thus, the final research question is as 
follows: 
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RQ5:  What strategic means did the TfL employ to convey a sense of urgency to 
stakeholders on the passage, enactment, and amendments to the LCC? 
III. Method, Data, and Evidence 
Method 
 According to Yin (2009, p. 2), “case studies are the preferred method when (a) “how” or 
“why” questions are being posed, (b) the investigator has little control over events, and (c) the 
focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context.”  Questions posed by the 
current study and the setting of the LCC fit all three of the aforementioned conditions.  Further, a 
case study approach also has the potential to complement knowledge gained in other research 
methodologies.  Yin (2009, p. 18) pointed out “the case study inquiry relies on multiple sources 
of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion.”  This data convergence 
requires clear constructs and research questions with the availability of all public data resources.  
Once the core questions are posed, a focused data collection process would follow to allow a 
triangulation of observations via an applicable framework to the current study. 
Data 
Due to the case study’s unique feature of using “multiple sources of evidence” (Yin 2009, 
p. 98), I relied on LCC-related primary and secondary data to investigate why TfL, a dominant 
stakeholder’s attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency shaped the LCC.  Secondly, 
understanding the “why” aspects allowed further examining of TfL’s management tactics or the 
“how” aspects in its strategic management of stakeholders.  I followed Yin (2009, pp. 118 to 122) 
and used archived data sources to compile a database for this study.  The time frame for this 
analysis begins when the U.K. Parliament passed the 1999 Greater London Authority Act 
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(GLAA) on November 7, 1999 allowing the enactment of transportation-related charging 
schemes and ended with most recent data in 2011.  Selecting a specific time frame for this study 
attenuates the common research risk of “death by data asphyxiation” (Pettigrew 1990, p. 281). 
Similar to prior case studies (Chenhall et al. 2010, Rahaman et al. 2010, and O’Dwyer 
2011), I collected and analyzed the LCC-related data from several archived sources including 
both primary7 and secondary8 documents of all publicly available venues.  I also relied on 
internet search engines such as Google and Yahoo! to conduct key word9 searches for relevant 
data.  For a summary of database sources for this case, see Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 First, I chronologically organized evidence of data sources to match the historical events 
of the LCC.  Second, I matched TfL’s tactics to the attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency 
as stated in the research questions.  Finally, I interpreted the results of selected LCC events as 
they reflected how and why the attributes of TfL, a dominant stakeholder exercised its strategic 
management tactics in behalf of the LCC.  The data collection is an iterative process until it 
reaches a saturation condition where additional documentation yielded no further insights. 
Evidence 
First, I chronologically gathered all data related to the LCC from the sources identified in 
Table 3.  Second, I highlighted and coded statements that aligned with the constructs of power, 
legitimacy, and urgency by Mitchell et al. (1997).  Third, I built a spreadsheet based on those 
                                                          
7
 Publications and documents from TfL, the London Assembly, the Greater London Authority, and the British 
Parliament are considered primary sources. 
8
 News articles, broadcasting commentaries such as interviews on British Broadcasting Company (BBC), 
publications of interest groups, and online blog entries are secondary data sources. 
9
 Key words and their combinations such as The London Congestion Charge, The London Congestion Tax, London 
Charging, The congestion charging in London, The Transport for London, The Greater London Assembly, The 
Greater London Authority Act of 1999 and 2007, etc. 
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constructs and transcribed relevant statements in chronological order.  Finally, after determining 
the matching between statements and their respective constructs, a tally of each construct’s 
frequency is displayed in Table 4.  Table 4 details the annual and grand frequency of TfL’s 
strategic tactics in its stakeholder management over the LCC.  Below each of the research 
questions is addressed. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Power 
 RQs 1.1 and 1.2 asked what power sources TfL drew on and how these power sources 
were used to manage the LCC.  Overall, TfL primarily relied on the legislative, administrative, 
and judicial authorities to bolster its administration power over the LCC.  In 1998, prior to the 
official election of an executive London Mayor, former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, “promised 
that the mayor [of London] will be ‘a post with teeth’” who “will be directly in charge of 
transport for London” (U.K. Parliament records 1998).  The legislative power under the 1999 
GLAA allowed Livingstone to initiate legislative processes toward a congestion-charging 
scheme in London. 
First, the 1999 GLAA established the Greater London Authority, the London Assembly, 
and TfL under the Mayor of London10 to administer the proposed LCC.  This Act strengthened 
the Mayor’s administrative powers for the proposed LCC.  Additionally, the 1999 GLAA 
allowed Livingstone to borrow money from the U.K. Treasury to study the proposed LCC.  
Without the initial infusion of monetary capital, the overall London Mayor’s strategic planning 
                                                          
10
 There was no directly elected executive Mayor of London prior to the 1999 GLAA.  The 1998 Greater London 
Authority Referendum established a Greater London Authority, composed of a directly elected Mayor of London, 
and a London Assembly to oversee the Mayor's office.  This executive London Mayor has actual administrative 
power different from the purely ceremonial role of the Lord Mayor of the City of London. 
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could have been severely limited.  Finally, both former Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown proclaimed that the 1999 GLAA granted the Mayor power in all LCC matters. 
In addition, triumphs of TfL over legal challenges brought forth by some London 
boroughs solidified TfL’s judicial powers over the LCC.  For instance, the Kennington 
Association and Westminster Council in 2002 attempted to postpone the implementation of the 
LCC through a court injunction.  Justice Kay of the high court ruled in favor of TfL.  With this 
judicial triumph, Mayor Livingstone commented, “We [TfL] now look forward to being free to 
proceed with addressing the problems of congestion in London without the distraction of legal 
proceedings” (Tempest 2002). 
In addition to legislative and judicial powers, polling survey results prior to elections also 
indicate how voters grant or strip politicians’ powers to enact or abolish a public policy and 
“bring about the outcomes they desire” (Salancik and Pfeffer 1974, p. 3).  Milne (2000) reported 
on January 8, 2000, prior to the official London mayoral election that “the first trade union ballot 
result, announced on Wednesday, [showed that] Transport and General Workers’ Union 
members gave Mr. Livingstone 86% [of support].”  This high support rate represented a 
confidence vote for the Mayor and his proposed congestion-charging scheme.  Also, according to 
Preston (2001), “19 unspecified organisations supported it [the LCC] and only three came out 
against.”  In addition to these 19 organizations, he continued, “147 organisations listed as 
“supporting, with caveats.”  It appeared that many of the organizational stakeholders along with 
their members had granted the London Mayor and TfL additional power to enact and manage the 
proposed LCC.  Livingstone’s powers and popularity carried him over to a second term until the 
current Mayor, Boris Johnson, defeated him in 2008.  His favorable attitude towards the charging 
scheme facilitated the passage of the LCC and a number of subsequent policy amendments. 
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Interestingly, these powers are a double-edged sword to the LCC.  The power transferred 
from Livingstone to Johnson signaled an adversarial force to the LCC.  According to Johnson’s 
campaign manifesto, he believed that the LCC should be completely abolished.  Two years after 
Johnson was elected, the WEZ was abolished in January 2011.  In this instance, the Mayor’s 
legislative, administrative, and judicial powers were detrimental to the LCC.  Instead of 
managing stakeholders in behalf of the LCC and TfL, Mayor Johnson used those powers to 
significantly reduce the scope of the LCC.  Regardless of the adversarial power exercised by 
Mayor Johnson on the WEZ abolishment, these powers remain critical to TfL’s overall strategic 
management of stakeholders over the LCC.  Taken as a whole, the initial success of the LCC in 
traffic decongestion, the judicial triumph over legal challenges, the compliance to the legislative 
act in managing the LCC by mayors (Livingstone and Johnson) and TfL had increased the 
LCC’s political viability. 
Legitimacy 
 There are three subconstructs in Gilley’s (2006) description of legitimacy: legality, 
justification, and consent (as detailed in Table 2).  In the three following subheadings, I address 
and answer the research questions discussed and raised in the section addressing the three 
constructs of legality, justification, and consent. 
Legality 
 
A pattern emerged in analyzing data through the lens of legality: There were opposing 
views regarding the LCC enforcement and both supporting and adversarial social movements 
toward the LCC.  RQ2 asks what social movement TfL promoted to strengthen the LCC’s 
legality.  Overall, TfL significantly depended on creating favorable opinions of the LCC’s 
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enforcement among stakeholders to maintain its legality.  Additionally, TfL’s publication 
reported supporting social movements towards the LCC and used unsuccessful anti-LCC 
movements as evidence to convey the LCC’s legality.  These two major approaches in TfL’s 
strategic stakeholder management can be consistently observed throughout the history of the 
LCC. 
TfL publicly assured stakeholders that the LCC would carry out the Mayor’s transport 
objectives to meet or exceed the LCC users’ expectations and improve the life of those who enter 
the charging zone for various reasons.  For example, the U.K. Parliament supported the proposed 
LCC by highlighting many benefits of the LCC.  When some argued in 2001 that the existing 
fuel and vehicle excise duties would be sufficient to reduce congestion, Gordon Brown, former 
Prime Minister declared, “Congestion charging will have a much greater impact on congestion 
level than either fuel duty or vehicle excise duty” (Begg 2001).  In the same article, Brown 
affirmed that these two duties alone would not reduce congestion and “a more integrated 
transport system will have to kick in.”  Brown’s statement effectively legitimized the LCC as the 
crucial component to reduce congestion in addition to the existing fuel and vehicle excise taxes. 
In addition to portraying the LCC as indispensable to the overall traffic decongestion 
policy, White (2001) concurred with TfL that the LCC would be effective because it would be 
aided by a “better than expected” video-based monitoring system.  Echoing White’s (2001) 
comments, Stuart Miller, technology correspondent for The Guardian, believed that the 200-plus 
installed cameras for LCC enforcement purposes should stand “the chances of success” in 
monitoring and enforcing the LCC.  These aforementioned endorsements from both the U.K. 
Parliament and news media appeared to have influenced stakeholders’ views on the LCC and its 
benefits.  Results from a survey of 500 drivers conducted by Motoring Towards 2050 showed 
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people’s attitude towards the LCC was favorable, “with more than 70% of drivers accepting 
them [enforcements] as part of a package of a transport improvement” (Hall 2002). 
Although the general public had a positive attitude towards the LCC’s legality, other 
opposition remained.  For instance, some questioned the legality of the LCC and argued that the 
LCC was a form of stealth, regressive tax that would significantly hurt the disadvantaged sector 
of London society.  The tax argument was raised by foreign embassies as well who argued that 
they should be exempt from the LCC since it was a local tax.  Going on the defense, Mayor 
Livingstone in his interview with BBC’s Breakfast with Frost, explained that, “this [the LCC] 
isn’t a tax, and that’s quite clear, it is road pricing” (Livingstone 2002).  Throughout the LCC’s 
history, the Mayor of London (both Livingstone and Johnson) insisted that the LCC had legal 
ground.  This consistent stand on the nature of the LCC enabled both the Mayor(s) and TfL to 
create and maintain the LCC’s legality. 
Besides these legality-maintaining tactics over the LCC, TfL actively addressed negative 
views of the LCC’s enforcement with (1) explanations to keep those opposing views 
neutral/beneficial or (2) taking action to fix existing issues.  Soon after the LCC was 
implemented in 2003, TfL supported its contracted enforcement companion, Capita.  According 
to TfL’s first annual LCC Impacts Monitoring Report in 2003, TfL praised Capita’s enforcement 
noting it met all of the LCC policy objectives.  In the same report, TfL emphasized Capita’s 
ongoing efforts in improving its enforcement regime and stressed its determination in addressing 
charging evasion issues.  Furthermore, based on statistical data, TfL announced that the number 
of appeals against the LCC payments and fines were declining due to improved enforcement 
processes.  By painting an effective and improving outlook to stakeholders, TfL increased the 
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LCC’s claims of policy legality.  Subsequent annual LCC impact monitoring reports have 
repeated similar claims. 
Upon learning stakeholders’ dissatisfaction with Capita’s enforcement practices, TfL 
publicly addressed those concerns swiftly.  In 2003, when reports of delays in answering calls at 
Capita’s call center and complaints of incorrect citations arose, TfL and the Mayor were quick to 
point out that such delays and errors would not be tolerated.  Mayor Livingstone promptly 
ordered a full audit of Capita (Clark 2003c).  The Mayor’s action aimed to calm threats of legal 
actions against TfL from drivers who received duplicate fines after they had paid the initial fines.  
The Mayor’s action resulted in Capita’s public admission of check processing failure and refunds 
to approximately 450 drivers who had paid the same fine twice.  By acting promptly to address 
issues derived from Capita’s enforcement errors, TfL was able to maintain the LCC’s legality 
and reduce potential future legal challenges by dissatisfied stakeholders. 
Besides strategically managing stakeholders’ views on the LCC’s enforcement, TfL 
actively cited positive social movements to maintain the LCC’s legality.  Although both 
supporting and adversarial social movements towards the Mayor, TfL, and the LCC existed 
throughout the recent history of the LCC, TfL generally reported and published positive 
movements and downplayed the negative ones.  As early as 1999, results of an independent 
study by the Government Office for London hinted a social movement among Londoners.  Study 
results showed that 53 percent of Londoners favored the charging scheme and that support went 
up to 67 percent when net revenues generated by the proposed policy were earmarked to improve 
London’s overall transportation.  The same study indicated a wide support for the charging even 
among business communities (Grayling 1999). 
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Moreover, the LCC also received broadly supportive social endorsements from political 
parties, transport experts, and the general public.  In 2000, when the Conservative Party moved 
“to rule out congestion charging,” the newly formed political alliance among the Labour, Liberal 
Democrat and Green Parties voted down the motion.  This effectively constituted a social 
movement that supported the Mayor’s proposed LCC (guardian.co.uk 2000).  Just like the 
political support given by politicians, transport experts in 2001 favorably endorsed the LCC and 
advocated its likelihood of success in reducing traffic congestion in London (Miller 2001).  Phil 
Goodwin, professor of transport policy at University College London viewed favorably the 
efficacy of the LCC in reducing traffic congestion stating “To say ‘it cannot work’ would be a bit 
like saying ‘charging for parking cannot work’ or ‘charging for phone calls cannot work.’  Think 
how many different ways we pay for phone calls.  If there’s a motive to collect money, there is 
always a way” (Miller 2001).  Finally, the general public launched a social movement to 
encourage bicycle riding as an alternative form of transportation in London.  An interesting news 
article published by The Guardian (2003a) even reported ten alternatives to beat or avoid the 
congestion charging scheme.  Although the initial intent was to mock the LCC, such article 
actually demonstrated supporting social movements welcomed by TfL.  The second Mayor of 
London, Boris Johnson, went as far as encouraging Londoners to ride a bicycle to work instead 
of driving after he was elected in 2008.  Drawing on these supporting movements, TfL was able 
to successfully maintain the LCC’s administrative legality. 
Contrary to reporting positive and supporting social movements toward the LCC, TfL 
also downplayed the severity of opposing social movements.  Depending on the nature and 
strength of anti-LCC social movements, TfL occasionally used them as evidence to signal the 
wide support of the LCC.  For instance, actress Samantha Bond hired a public relation firm to 
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promote the regressive tax nature of the LCC.  She argued that the LCC would hurt the poorest 
sector of the Londoners.  TfL quickly pointed out that the poorest Londoners generally do not 
own cars and relied heavily on public transportation for their activities in London.  TfL further 
argued that the LCC would, contrary to Ms. Bond’s belief, actually benefit the disadvantaged 
sector of London since the revenues from the LCC had been legally earmarked for the 
improvement of London’s public transportation systems. 
TfL followed the same approach to defuse anti-LCC social movements and used them as 
evidence to strengthen the LCC’s legality.  Two similar examples occurred on the first day of 
both the original charging zone and WEZ implementation.  First, many predicted massive 
protesting where thousands would march on February 17, 2003, the first day of the original LCC 
to demonstrate their civil disobedience.  On the “C-Day” as nicknamed by the anti-LCC groups, 
only approximately 200 people gathered for an on-site protest of the newly enforced charging 
zone.  Williams (2003) called such a turnout “amusingly small” and believed many protesters 
were not London residents.  Similar poor turnout was observed when the WEZ became effective 
on February 19, 2007: Only about 175 protesters showed up to publicly protest WEZ. 
To discourage future anti-LCC movements, TfL used such dismal displays of protesters 
as evidence that bolstered the LCC’s legality and indicated support for social movements that 
favored the LCC.  All in all, TfL proactively addressed issues relating to the LCC’s enforcement 
by publicly admitting faults and passing the faults onto Capita.  Also, by promoting supportive 
social movements towards the LCC and using failed attempts of anti-LCC movements as 
evidence in support of the LCC, TfL was able to create and maintain the LCC’s legality. 
Justification 
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 RQs 3.1 to 3.4 asked what resources and tactics TfL drew on to strategically manage the 
LCC.  The data showed that TfL relied significantly on claims of the LCC’s and TfL’s 
effectiveness to maintain the LCC’s policy justification.  In addition to publicly promoting TfL’s 
administrative effectiveness and the LCC’s efficacy in reducing traffic congestion, TfL justified 
the LCC with stakeholder support in surveys and the Mayor’s popularity. 
The predicted effectiveness of the LCC to reduce traffic congestion in London was 
promoted prior to the London mayoral election.  For instance in 1999, David Begg, a transport 
supremo affiliated with the U.K. Parliament, studied the effects of a charging scheme in reducing 
London’s traffic congestion.  Begg’s results emphasized the LCC as a vital part of an “integrated” 
transport system to reduce traffic congestion.  Using an analytical model, Begg found that, 
“Road congestion in London could fall by 42% by 2010 if motorists were charged £5 per journey 
in and out of the capital” (Harper 1999). 
TfL reported similar results claiming the proposed LCC’s effectiveness in congestion 
reduction in 2000.  Besides the decongestion efficacy, the second study also indicated financial 
benefits: “congestion charging in London . . . would cut traffic by about 10% and raise about 
£250 m[illion] a year” (Graying 2000).  The claims of effective traffic decongestion (by about 
15%) and substantial amount of revenues (approximately £120 million, £200 million total 
revenues, and £80 million for operation and management) exceeding operating costs were 
reported in all subsequent years.  Mayor Livingstone confidently rallied behind the effectiveness 
of the LCC by promising that, “Congestion charges in the capital will be scrapped if they fail to 
make an impact after a two-month trial period” (Guardian.co.uk 2002).  It appeared that TfL had 
promoted the LCC’s traffic decongestion effectiveness to justify the LCC. 
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Such promotion of the LCC’s decongestion effectiveness also continued in official 
publications and news media after the LCC’s 2003 implementation.  According to the first (2003) 
annual LCC impacts monitoring report, TfL expected “immediate and obvious impacts  
. . . producing lower levels of delay and improved journey time reliability” (p. 10).  Evidence in 
the same report indicated that the LCC improved public transportation on bus patronage and 
reduced delivery delays for businesses in the charging zone.  These results, as purported by TfL, 
seemed to support their efficacy claims that the LCC had produced an array of benefits in 
addition to the primary traffic congestion reduction objective. 
The following are some of the quantitative evidence TfL gave to justify the LCC.  For 
instance, soon after the LCC’s implementation, TfL claimed that traffic volume “was 25% lower 
than usual” as observed by the Royal Automobile Club (RAC, similar to the American 
Automotive Association, or AAA) that there could have been “a 60% fall [of traffic entering 
London]” (The Guardian 2003b).  The LCC’s effectiveness in traffic decongestion even won 
praises from critics of the LCC.  For example, one critic admitted, “there was overwhelming 
evidence yesterday morning that the congestion charge would be an astonishing success” 
(Williams 2003).  Even The Telegraph, a conservative news media, praised Livingstone as a true 
policy pioneer who championed the LCC for its apparent success (MacInness 2003).  TfL 
continued reporting traffic decongestion figures to reaffirm the LCC’s effectiveness claims (30% 
in 2004, 18% in 2005, 18% in 2006, and 8% in 2007).  TfL maintained such claims even after 
the new Mayor, Boris Johnson, took office in 2008.  By claiming policy effectiveness in traffic 
congestion reduction, TfL and both Mayors were able to manage stakeholders and alter the 
direction of the LCC. 
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Besides using the LCC’s effectiveness in traffic decongestion to manage stakeholders, 
TfL also justified the LCC with supporting survey results.  The VoteMonkey survey concluded, 
“65% [surveyed] want congestion charges introduced for driving into central London” (Jeffery 
2000).  Building on this support, TfL played down the negative impacts of the LCC on 
businesses by stating that the impact was minimal.  Additionally, TfL provided factors such as 
overall economic downturn and the influence of the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks in the US as 
alternative explanations for London’s economic downturns.  Additional TfL survey results called 
the LCC’s impact “not expected to alter significantly the overall economy or competitive 
position of London” (TfL 2004, p. 17).  TfL’s active management of business stakeholders 
subsequently produced favorable survey outcomes “with just over 50 percent of small firms 
expecting the scheme to be successful in reducing congestion as opposed to nearly 70 percent of 
large firms” (p. 19).  Support for the LCC appeared in all of TfL’s annual reports indicating 
consistent support for the LCC (60% in 2004, 82% in 2005, 85% in 2006, 79% in 2007) from 
stakeholders until Boris Johnson took office. 
As soon as Johnson was elected the Mayor of London, he widely surveyed stakeholders 
about the LCC’s original zone and the WEZ.  According to the attitudinal survey of London 
businesses in 2008, half of all London businesses favored removing the WEZ.  The removal 
support went as high as 89% among businesses within the WEZ.  In addition to businesses, TfL’s 
surveys found that over 69% of the general public surveyed favored the removal.  Backed by the 
overwhelming support for removal, the WEZ was then justifiably abolished. 
Furthermore, TfL had strategically relied on the popularity of both Mayors Livingstone 
and Johnson to gain stakeholders’ support and justify the LCC.  Despite his opponents’ negative 
campaigns against Livingstone and his congestion-charging proposal, he won the 2000 election 
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by a wide margin.  The official election results of the first Mayoral election revealed that Ken 
Livingstone received 776,427 popular votes or 57.9% of all votes counted.  Livingstone’s 
popularity helped justify the LCC, which was the focal policy agenda in his election campaign 
manifesto.  Livingstone’s popularity was recognized among business communities regarding the 
LCC saying that, “if congestion charging is all he [Livingstone] manages in his first term, that 
will be a significant achievement” (Rayner 2000). 
Livingstone’s popularity even won praises among critics of him and the LCC.  Ashley 
(2003), who had “never been wholly convinced by Ken Livingstone” conceded, “he [Livingstone] 
has more political guts than all the present members of the cabinet put together.  As mayor of 
London, Livingstone is conducting an exercise in bold political leadership of a kind that has 
become very rare.”  A spokesman for Transport 2000, a pro-environment transport group 
affirmed that, “Nothing in this [the LCC] scale has been tried before in Europe . . . Livingstone’s 
got a lot of courage” (Beckett 2003).  After the LCC was implemented with convincingly 
positive traffic decongestion results, Mayor Livingstone’s popularity reached a new high: the 
Political Studies Association of the U.K. named him “Politician of the Year” in 2003, 
specifically for his involvement in introducing the LCC.  This award de facto sealed 
Livingstone’s political popularity and provided the justification the Mayor and TfL needed to 
convince Londoners of the LCC. 
Livingstone’s popularity continued to climb and carried him through the second mayoral 
election in 2004 beating his opponents by more than 11% of the total tallied votes (55.4% to 
44.6%).  This voting outcome prominently demonstrated stakeholders’ support for the LCC.  
Riding on the Mayor’s popularity, TfL increased administrative support for the LCC to further 
persuade the general public that a daily charging fee increase from £5 to £8 in 2005 was justified. 
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Surpassing Livingstone’s popularity, Johnson broke an unprecedented electoral record by 
receiving more than one million votes (1,043,761) in 2008.  Examining the three election 
outcomes in Table 5, it appeared that Livingstone had been losing popularity as Mayor of 
London.  In fact, Table 5 revealed that there was more than an 11 percent drop between the 2000 
and 2008 election in overall votes for Livingstone, albeit the lowest percentage of votes was still 
close to 50 percent.  Furthermore, the record-breaking votes Johnson received (more than 11 
percent and nearly 10 percent more than that for Norris in 2000 and 2004 respectively) also 
signaled that voters were more likely to endorse Johnson’s proposals on future changes to the 
LCC as justified. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 After Johnson became the second London Mayor, he widely consulted the public 
concerning the effectiveness of the WEZ and the original charging zone in reducing traffic 
congestion.  Backed by his political popularity, Johnson’s intent to abolish the LCC conveyed his 
determination in fulfilling his campaign manifesto, which questioned the effectiveness and 
justification of the LCC.  Johnson successfully convinced Londoners that it was in their best 
interest to end the WEZ.  On the same day the WEZ was abolished, TfL relied primarily on the 
consultation data that deemed the charging scheme ineffective in reducing traffic congestion to 
warn Londoners that if the daily fees did not increase from £8 to £10 in the original charging 
zone, the traffic congestion would revert back to the prior-LCC condition.  This warning 
successfully justified the proposed fee increase and it became effective the day the WEZ was 
abolished.  Both amendments to the LCC successfully passed and became effective on January 4, 
2011.  The tactics used to claim the LCC’s effectiveness, influence survey support, and rely on 
leaders’ popularity worked well for both Mayors (Livingstone and Johnson) and TfL in 
 
 
42 
justifying the LCC and its various amendments.  Policy makers and researchers should bear in 
mind that TfL employed these tactics simultaneously in its overall management of the LCC. 
Consent 
 
 Out of the five measurement indicators on consent by Gilley (2006, see Table 2) tax 
payments11 appeared to match the justification attribute in Mitchell et al. (1997).  RQ4 asked why 
and how the compliance of LCC payments influenced the passage of subsequent fee increase 
amendments.  Data in the aggregate revealed that TfL strategically managed stakeholders over 
the LCC and gained their consent through both incentives and penalties related to the LCC 
payments.  No data on charging fees and fines were available prior to the implementation of the 
LCC.  Before February 17, 2003, people had mixed attitudes towards the LCC.  For example, 
some objected to the LCC for they were “taken aback at the idea of paying for something they 
have previously enjoyed for nothing” (Parker 2001).  It appeared that some stakeholders had yet 
to grant consent to the LCC and TfL.  A survey result showed that some 30 percent of people 
who usually drove in central London “said they would not buy a license [for registering and 
paying the LCC fees]” (Miller 2001). 
Contrary to this non-consenting attitude, news articles meanwhile reported that 
stakeholders gave their consent shortly before the LCC became effective.  Supporters of the LCC 
believed that the LCC was inevitable and necessary voicing statements such as, “Even though 
this [LCC] will hit me directly in the pocket, I don’t have a fundamental problem with paying 
something [that is supposedly beneficial]” (The Guardian 2003a).  In addition to support from 
the general public, six weeks before February 17, 2003, some academicians rallied behind an 
                                                          
11
 As mentioned earlier in this paper, the debate of whether the LCC is a form of road toll or road tax is still ongoing.  
However, I have argued that charging payments function similarly to tax payments as one of the measurement 
indicators in Gilley (2006). 
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actual road charge to battle London’s chronic traffic congestion.  For instance, Glenn Lyons, a 
professor of transport at the University of the West of England, applauded the LCC saying that, 
“In transport, we’re very good at . . . developing complex models . . . Without . . . Livingstone  
. . . we could have pontificated for years whether charging would work” (Clark 2003a).  In 
addition to researchers, the YouGov poll also showed nearly half (48 percent) of Londoners 
supported the idea of paying for road usage while only 39 percent were still against. 
One crucial indicator of whether the LCC and TfL had received consent from 
stakeholders was vehicle owners’ pre-registration with TfL to pay the LCC fees.  Some 
politicians predicted that a large number of late registrants would not only indicate that (1) the 
stakeholders did not consent to the LCC, but also would cause either (2) a massive clog in TfL’s 
call center system or (3) drivers’ deliberate non-compliance to the LCC payments.  As an 
incentive to encourage pre-registration for the LCC license, TfL decided to waive the one-time 
£10 registration fee for vehicles with complete registration by January 26, 2003.  Fortunately, 
TfL recorded more than 6,000 registrations and pre-payments for the LCC one week before the 
implementation.  Additionally, The Guardian (2003) reported that approximately 21,000 vehicle 
owners registered via text messaging right before the initial implementation.  TfL predicted that, 
“of the 100,000 eligible motorists expected to drive into town today [February 17, 2003], 26,000 
had paid the charge and 50,000 had registered to pay on the day by text message” (Clark 2003b).  
The final number showed that 80,000 (later revised to 87,000) had paid £5 and there was no 
apparent “sign of a last-minute rush to pay the congestion charge” (Vasagar 2003). 
TfL further utilized additional incentives to manage stakeholders in succeeding years 
after 2003.  For example, to retain stakeholders’ consent over the increase from £5 to £8 for 
regular vehicles and from £5.50 to £7 for fleet cars in 2005, TfL offered several incentives, such 
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as a 100% discount for registered Blue Badge holders and free charging days between Christmas 
Day and New Year’s Day.  Also, TfL offered 15% discounts for monthly and annual installment 
charge payers if they registered before the fee increase and a 90% discount was available for 
residents within the charging zone.  The majority of charging zone residents found the increase 
affordable after discount. 
TfL also relied on the LCC’s revenues to increase stakeholders’ consent.  TfL and Mayor 
Livingstone promised stakeholders that the net charging revenues would be earmarked to 
improve London’s public transport such as bus and rail systems.  Based on the annual TfL 
reports, the LCC generated positive net revenues12 to improve transport in London, which 
coincided with the Mayor’s overall transportation strategies.  Instead of direct financial payments, 
stakeholders enjoyed improved public transportation as the Mayor and TfL had promised.  
Although fee increases, the expansion of the WEZ, and inflation might be behind the rising 
charging revenues, the steady increase in annual revenues still signaled a positive correlation 
between stakeholders’ consent to the LCC and its accompanying charge payments. 
Alongside the financial incentives of discounts and revenues, TfL simultaneously 
managed stakeholders by imposing penalties for noncompliance ranging from an additional £5 to 
a hefty £80 penalty.  As an added measure against those who refused to pay, the £80 penalty 
could be accrued for all outstanding fine balances.  For car owners who repeatedly refused to pay 
and fell under the “three strikes rule (holding more than three unpaid fines and penalty notices),” 
the court bailiffs would seek out the offenders.  The bailiffs would, upon locating the vehicles, 
clamp, tow, impound, and in extreme cases, crash for scrap value to pay for the outstanding fines 
and charges (Gregoriadis 2002). 
                                                          
12
 £50 million in 2003/2004, £90 million in 2004/2005, £122 million in 2005/2006, £123 million in 2006/2007, and 
the final impacts monitoring report issued by TfL logged a staggering £137 million in 2007/2008. 
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TfL’s tactic in allowing incentives and imposing penalties appeared to work well in 
garnering stakeholders’ consent toward the LCC as the charging payment pattern quickly 
stabilized for the remainder of its first year implementation.  For example, the second day of 
implementation showed drastic improvement that out of the 92,000 who paid the charges, 75,000 
of those payments were made before four p.m.  A steady charging payment pattern was soon 
established: 34,000 paid the daily charge by eight a.m. starting on week two and such pattern 
persisted throughout the year with about 80,000 to 90,000 daily payments received by TfL on 
any working day.  TfL reported that it received approximately 550,000 congestion payments 
weekly with around 400,000 by non-residents of London, 90,000 by Londoners, and 60,000 by 
business and others. 
The Penalty Charge Notices (PCNs) payments were another source of the overall 
congestion fees that met Gilley’s (2006) consent measurement indicator.  The PCNs payment 
rate demonstrated additional consent from stakeholders who challenged the LCC and TfL.  
According to TfL data, an increasing percent of PCNs has been recovered “from a ‘low’ of 
around 35% payment of PCNs issued in February and March 2003 to a current ‘high’ around 
70% payment in September 2003” (TfL 2004, p. 115).  This pattern of PCNs payment increase 
conveyed a subtle attitudinal shift from non-compliance to consenting.  According to TfL’s 2007 
annual report regarding the PCNs payments, “Representations and appeals against Penalty 
Charge Notices continue to reduce, with 14 percent of the Penalty Charge Notices now being 
subject to a representation and 1 percent subject to appeal” (p. 97).  Additionally, rates of penalty 
payments held steady at about 72 percent with some discounted amount granted by the 
enforcement office of TfL.  These steady payment rates and low appealing/representing rate 
suggested that the stakeholders had given their consent to the LCC’s legitimacy. 
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Urgency 
 RQ5 questioned how TfL conveyed a sense of urgency to stakeholders in order to 
strategically manage the passage, enactment, and amendments of the LCC.  Results indicated 
that TfL significantly relied on stakeholders’ sense of fear to convey dire urgency if the LCC 
failed to pass and be implemented.  TfL used the same scare tactic in the LCC’s subsequent 
amendments.  For instance, TfL consistently emphasized how traffic congestion would 
significantly and negatively impact commerce without the charging scheme in place.  Prior to the 
LCC, some “concerned” Londoners were disgusted that “the average speed of vehicles in our 
cities is now about 10 to 12 mph (the same as that of the horse-drawn cab a century ago)” 
(Harper 1999).  Adding another layer of urgency and quoting the government’s official studies 
on the trend of traffic growth, the same newspaper predicted, “If no action were taken, then 
congestion [in London] would increase by 35%” (Harper 1999).  The government heavily 
promoted the argument that the LCC would reduce traffic congestion significantly, decrease 
delay costs in deliveries for commerce, and the quality of living for London residents would 
improve notably. 
However, some opposing Londoners doubted whether the LCC was needed.  They argued 
that charges for road users and workplace parking would be sufficient to deter traffic and thus 
reduce congestion concerns.  To silence this argument, a former Deputy Prime Minister insisted 
that without the LCC, “traffic will increase by 35% between 1996 and 2010” (Wintour and 
McSmith 1999).  Nevertheless, whether traffic would indeed have increased at such a high 
percentage, as the government claimed is debatable due to the lack of concrete evidence. 
Prior to the LCC, the government employed another tactic by tying traffic congestion 
with fear of monetary losses for London businesses.  For example, the Confederation of British 
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Industry (CBI) estimated that traffic congestion would cost approximately £15 to £20 million 
annually for the U.K. economy.  Their estimate relied on the assumption that traffic volume 
would double between 2000 and 2005 (Addley 2000).  Again, in 2001, the same organization 
reiterated its figure of traffic congestion-related financial cost to £18 [million] without providing 
additional explanations as to how such a figure was calculated. 
In 2002, echoing CBI’s estimate of financial loss in commerce, Dirk Peterson of the 
London Chamber of Commerce proclaimed that the annual costs to the economy due to traffic 
congestion would be around £4 million.  Six weeks before the LCC became effective, Mayor 
Livingstone suggested that the time lost in traffic cost “the capital’s economy £2 m[illion] to £4 
m[illion] a week” (Clark 2003a).  Interestingly, the Mayor did not provide any scientific 
evidence for his bold projection.  Not only did various loss predictions differ significantly, there 
lacked follow-up reports to verify the accuracy of these predictions.  Soon after the LCC’s 2003 
implementation, both Mayor Livingstone and TfL ceased making public projections of negative 
economic impacts as if the LCC was the panacea for all negative congestion induced monetary 
impacts to businesses.  Contrary to the “all is well” attitude regarding the LCC’s effectiveness, 
Johnson ordered consultation and surveys to study the effectiveness of the WEZ soon after he 
took office.  According to the 2008 and final TfL annual report on the LCC, TfL conceded, “the 
western extension is currently experiencing no material congestion relief.”  Although the same 
report showed that there were no material impacts from this stagnant level of traffic congestion; 
nonetheless, the survey results were sufficient for Mayor Johnson to successfully remove the 
WEZ.  From the aforementioned reports, TfL was able to create an exaggerated sense of urgency 
via all available media and publications to strategically manage stakeholders. 
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Besides the threat of negative economic impacts, TfL also warned Londoners of the 
potentially negative impact traffic congestion would have on their overall living quality.  Out of 
all potential areas of impact, air quality remained the focal concern.  For instance, Brown and 
Harper (2000) reported, “Air quality in the UK during 1999 showed the worst deterioration since 
modern records began.”  They further quoted Friend of the Earth, an environmental advocate 
group, which reported that, “the number of days last year [1999] on which air pollution exceeded 
official health standards rose by 20% in urban areas” in 1998.  By naming traffic congestion as 
the primary cause of air quality deterioration and subsequent damages to health and quality of 
living, the government was able to scare Londoners into considering the need for a congestion 
charging policy such as the LCC.  Once the government succeeded in creating fear of the 
possibly devastating effects traffic congestion would have on the economy, health, and living 
quality, TfL was able to manage stakeholders in behalf of the LCC.  On the same token, Mayor 
Johnson and TfL also relied on similar scare tactics to abolish the WEZ and later raise the daily 
charge by scaring stakeholders that the traffic congestion in the original zone would suffer the 
same fate of worsening traffic congestion as WEZ if the daily fee remained unchanged. 
IV. Summary and Discussions 
 This case study intended to develop and refine both the empirical and theoretical 
understanding of policy reform and how and why active and long-term strategic management is 
indispensable in discreet stages of an innovative policy.  Study results supplemented the gap yet 
to be examined and investigated by extant research work on the LCC, an innovative public/tax 
policy of unprecedented scale in implementation and management.  Researchers conducted and 
published a number of simulations and modeling studies prior to the LCC’s implementation.  
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These research results, albeit simulated, were extremely important as they offered a first look at 
the potential outcomes of the proposed charging scheme. 
In addition to these simulation studies, another set of research focused primarily on the 
financial impacts of the LCC within and around the charging zone.  These studies, like the 
simulation projects, offered direct assessments on the LCC’s financial ramifications after its 
implementation and once economic data became available.  These papers provided policy 
makers with important data to better evaluate the financial impacts of the LCC.  The general 
approaches and assumptions of these studies were that causal relationships existed between the 
LCC and the economic outcomes.  As appealing as these studies were in attempting to explain 
and predict how the LCC might have contributed to financial conditions at their time of 
examination, often it was difficult to reach a definitive conclusion linking the LCC to those 
economic impacts. 
Although these two sets of studies have contributed to additional knowledge as to the 
“what” aspects of the LCC before and after its implementation, there lacked studies examining 
the ongoing strategic management, or the “how” and “why” aspects of the LCC.  In order to shed 
more light on the tactics exercised by policy administration and to understand the rationales the 
administration employed in its overall strategic management of stakeholders, this case study 
strived to explain the two most often overlooked areas in regards to the LCC. 
I applied Yin’s (2009) research methodological approach to conduct this case study on 
TfL’s strategic management of stakeholders over the LCC.  I relied on Mitchell et al.’s (1997) 
typology of stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency to pose theoretically based 
research questions on how and why TfL used various tactics in its overall strategic management 
of stakeholders.  Mitchell et al’s (1997) stakeholder typology enabled me to identify the salient 
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stakeholders who had significant influence over the LCC.  After identifying the LCC’s relevant 
stakeholders, I was able to match Gilley’s (2006) construct measurement indicators to the 
theoretical constructs of Mitchell et al.’s (1997) typology.  The matching subsequently allowed 
me to analyze data and provide answers to the research questions posed according to Mitchell et 
al.’s (1997) typology as operationalized through data related to the LCC.  I iteratively collected 
and analyzed data until the results reached the stage of saturation.  That is, when additional data 
revealed no new knowledge, the data collection ceased.  Also, the entire data collection and 
analyses took an iterative cycle until no new pattern was observed from the extra analysis. 
TfL primarily managed relevant stakeholders through the creation and maintenance of the 
LCC’s legitimacy.  First, TfL spent a significant amount of resources to promote the LCC’s 
effectiveness in reducing traffic congestion.  TfL’s second tactic was to actively influence 
stakeholders’ views in an attempt to create positive perception of TfL and the LCC.  Also, the 
political popularity of Mayor Ken Livingstone, who championed the LCC, allowed TfL to claim 
the LCC’s legitimation in its traffic decongestion objective.  TfL’s final tactic was aggressively 
intervening with anti-LCC movements to slow their momentum and trivialize the magnitude of 
the opposition to claim the stakeholders’ support of the LCC. 
In addition to the tactics, TfL effectively used powers bestowed by administrative 
mandates, legislative acts, and judicial triumphs to convince stakeholders of the LCC’s 
legitimation during the discreet stages of the LCC.  With these powers, TfL was able to enhance 
the LCC’s legitimacy.  Furthermore, TfL’s powers also effectively silenced stakeholders who 
opposed the LCC and made future attempts to challenge TfL and the LCC extremely difficult, if 
not infeasible.  Finally, TfL skillfully invented and promoted a sense of dire urgency regarding 
economic, social, and environmental impacts if the LCC failed to materialize and succeeding 
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amendments were not enacted.  A pattern from data analyses also emerged concerning the tactics 
employed by TfL, which indicated that limited scientific evidence supported the claims of 
urgency.  Scaring stakeholders without evidentiary support into favoring the LCC and TfL’s 
administration seemed to be successful and likewise played an integral part in gaining relevant 
stakeholders’ support.  Without creating such a sense of urgency, the stakeholders might have 
indefinitely delayed their support even after TfL had secured power and legitimation through the 
aforementioned tactics. 
Findings of this case study provided beneficial insights of practical strategic management 
application to policy makers.  Additionally, results enhanced academic researchers’ theoretical 
understanding of stakeholder identification and typology through empirical study of the LCC.  
This advancement of both practical and theoretical understanding allows policy makers to 
effectively evaluate policy reforms that have been implemented and incorporate successful 
strategic management of new and future policy reforms.  Furthermore, academic researchers 
could potentially apply this case study as an exemplar framework for future investigation of 
policies in a wide array of disciplines.  Based on the current study, key or executive stakeholders, 
such as the Mayor of London, appeared to have impacted the overall administration of the LCC.  
One conceivable future project may involve the comparison of tactics used by key stakeholders, 
such as the Mayor of London, especially with those who align with different personal and 
political ideologies to influence the direction of controversial policy reform like the LCC. 
Also, researchers may want to examine the direct influence on policy by powerful 
stakeholders such as corporations, unions, and other political coalitions when policy makers 
actively seek resources (financial, knowledge, or endorsement) owned by these influential 
stakeholders.  Finally, these aforementioned influential stakeholders likely have their own 
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strategic tactics to affect policy makers, executive stakeholders of policies, and other 
stakeholders in innovative and often controversial policy reform.  Results from these 
recommended future studies would most likely enhance the overall understanding of a policy 
reform, its management, and the impact of different stakeholders throughout policy stages. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 Historical Highlights of the LCC 
Date/Year Event 
1999/2007 The U.K. Parliament passed the Greater London Authority (GLA) Act of 1999, which 
established the Greater London Authority, the London Assembly, and the Mayor of 
London.  Under GLA, the Mayor of London has the legal authority overseeing the 
transportation of London.  The Mayor exercises his/her authority and power over 
transportation through TfL.  The Greater London Authority Act of 2007 upheld the 1999 
Act. 
May 4, 2000 Running as an independent candidate, Ken Livingstone became its first executive Mayor 
of London through voters’ support in 2000 by defeating candidates of both the Labour and 
the Conservative Parties worked to uphold his campaign manifesto regarding traffic 
congestion in London. 
2000 Mayor Ken Livingstone published his Transportation Strategy that enabled the 
implementation of the LCC. 
2001 TfL published its first Draft Scheme Order to establish the procedures and mechanism for 
the implementation of the LCC. 
February, 2002 Mayor Ken Livingstone finalized and published his revised Scheme Order to confirm the 
scheme of the LCC. 
February 17, 2003 The first day for the LCC to become effective with a £5/vehicle per day charge within the 
charge zone between the hours of 7 a.m. and 6:30 p.m.  This charge scheme is enforced 
Monday through Friday and excludes public holidays. 
June 10, 2004 Ken Livingstone was reelected to a second-term as the Mayor of London.  He ran as a 
nominee for the Labour Party against the Conservative Party’s Steven Norris. 
July 4, 2005 The LCC daily fee was increased from £5 to £8. 
February 19, 2007 The Western Extension zone charges became effective and the revised charging hours 
ends at 6 p.m. 
May 4, 2008 Running as the Conservative Party candidate, Boris Johnson defeated Ken Livingstone 
(Labour Party) and succeeded Livingstone as the second Mayor of London.  Johnson 
received over one million votes (more than 42% of all votes counted) in this Mayoral 
election, which surpassed the voting records of all politicians in British history. 
January 4, 2011 The Western Extension zone was deemed ineffective and abolished after broad 
consultations ordered by Mayor Boris Johnson.  On the same day, the daily congestion 
charge was raised from £8 to £10. 
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Table 2 Measurement Indicators of Legitimacy based on Gilley (2006, p. 505) 
 Legality Justification Consent 
Attitudes * Surveys about legality * Surveys of political support or 
alienation 
N/A 
 * Surveys about corruption * Effectiveness of political institutions  
 * Acceptance of electoral 
outcomes 
* Popularity of authoritarian leaders or 
parties 
 
 * Views of law enforcement and 
civil servants 
  
    
Actions * Social movements over legal 
issues 
* Political violence * Election turnout  
 * Importance of laws in political life * Size of secret police * Voter registration 
 * Dissonance over election results * Political prisoners * Military recruitment  
  * Anti-system movements * Tax payments 
  * Mass emigration * Popular mobilization in 
authoritarian states 
  * Crime level  
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Table 3 Summary of Database Sources 
Type of Archived 
Data 
Data Source 
History The British Parliament; The Greater London Authority; the 
London Assembly 
Assessment reports Transport for London; The Greater London Authority 
Secondary sources, 
including popular press 
articles, newspaper 
columns, and news 
media coverage 
BBC News; BBC Parliament; The Guardian; The Daily Telegraph; 
The Financial Times; The Observer; The Herald; The Scotsman; 
The Independent; blogs on the LCC 
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Table 4 Frequency of Stakeholder Management Tactics Exercised by TfL, 1998-2011 
 Tactics 
 Power Legitimacy Urgency Total 
Year  Legality Justification Consent   
1998 0 1 2 0 0 3 
1999 4 1 4 0 9 18 
2000 19 16 19 0 6 60 
2001 16 14 9 2 18 59 
2002 29 31 4 0 11 75 
2003 45 103 110 31 12 301 
2004 5 68 56 15 1 145 
2005 5 41 23 16 0 85 
2006 17 34 45 24 0 120 
2007 24 52 58 19 0 153 
2008 13 36 49 10 2 110 
2009 8 2 1 1 0 12 
2010 4 0 1 1 0 6 
2011 0 1 2 1 0 4 
Total 189 400 383 120 59 1151 
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Table 5 Results of Three London Mayoral Elections in 2000, 2004, and 2008 
 2000  2004  2008 
 Livingstone Norris  Livingstone Norris  Livingstone Johnson 
1
st
 
Choice 
Votes 
667,877 464,434  685,541 542,423  893,877 1,043,761 
% of 
Votes 
39.00 27.10  35.70 28.20  36.38 42.48 
2
nd
 
Choice 
Votes 
178,809 188,041  250,517 222,559  303,198 257,792 
% of 
Votes 
12.60 13.20  13.00 11.60  12.34 10.49 
Final 
Votes 
776,427 564,137  828,380 667,178  1,028,966 1,168,738 
% of 
Votes 
57.90 42.10  55.40 44.60  46.73 53.17 
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Figure 1 Boundary of London Congestion Charge’s Original Zone and the West Extension 
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STUDY TWO: THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF CORPORATIONS AND LEGISLATORS: 
A SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS ANALYSIS 
Abstract 
 
I empirically test the applicability of social exchange theory (SET) in explicating the 
interdependent relations between corporations and legislators.  Contrary to the unidirectional 
equations traditionally incorporated in prior corporate political strategy literature, this study 
extends prior research by explicitly considering the endogeneity of such relations with a 
simultaneous equations modeling (SEM) approach.  Results indicate that PAC contributions and 
voting outcomes mutually affect each other between corporations and the House of 
Representatives as predicted by SET, but not in the Senate.  Also, legislators’ political party 
affiliation significantly influences the voting outcomes in both chambers of Congress, a finding 
that is consistent with prior studies’ results.  Furthermore, SEM increases the methodological 
precision of analysis relative to the traditional unidirectional multivariate equation approaches 
(ordinary least squares and multivariate linear regressions).  This paper contributes corporate 
political strategy literature by examining political interactions through an often overlooked 
framework and through the use of an innovative statistical analysis.  Theoretical application, 
methodological analysis, and results of this study can benefit future research into corporate 
political strategy in the tax accounting policy arena. 
 
 
 
Key words: Corporate political strategy; Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007; 
Simultaneous Equations Approach; and Social exchange theory  
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I. Introduction 
Based on arguments from social sxchange theory (SET), I examine the relations between 
corporations and legislators using a simultaneous equations modeling (SEM) approach.  As such, 
I both broaden SET’s theoretical application and improve methodological precision in the tax-
related corporate political strategy literature.  The aim is not to disprove findings of prior 
corporate political strategy research in accounting and taxation, but rather to explicitly consider 
the complex relations with an extended methodological approach.  Corporate political strategy 
literature over the past decade relies primarily on the Hillman and Hitt (1999) model (HH 
hereafter).13  This model assumes unidirectional relations between corporations and legislators 
where corporations utilize various means to gain access to legislators, influence legislators’ 
voting patterns, and alter public policy outcomes that affect corporate interests.  However, HH’s 
assumptions of a unidirectional relation between corporations and legislators may only reflect 
partial relational structures in the overall political landscape. 
Results of prior corporate political strategy studies (Chappel 1982, Wayman 1985, 
Wilhite and Theilmann 1987, Langbein and Lotwis 1990, Dow and Endersby 1994, Wawro 2001, 
and Yeung 2008) examining the influences of political financial contributions on legislators’ 
voting behaviors are inconsistent.  Gordon (2005, p. 21) argues that this inconsistency is due to 
“a misunderstanding of the true relationship between interest groups and legislators.”  Rather 
than viewing the exchange of contributions and votes as a market relationship, where one is 
traded for the other, Gordon (2005, p. 30), following Clawson et al. (1998), believes that the 
relation “between donors and recipients of campaign contributions resembles a gift relationship.”  
The interactions and relations between corporations and legislators are implicitly formed, 
                                                          
13
 See Roberts et al. (2003) for a one-page table summary of the Hillman and Hitt (1999) model. 
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maintained, understood, and reciprocated.  Empirical accounting and taxation studies (Roberts et 
al. 2003, Dwyer and Roberts 2004, Roberts and Bobek 2004, and Thornburg and Roberts 2008) 
examining corporate political strategies often rely on simple linear regressions to test their 
hypotheses.  However, this conventional statistical methodology may have contributed to 
potential biases in the empirical analysis and findings.  For instance, some studies report that the 
amount of corporate campaign contributions delivered to politicians via political action 
committees (PACs) appears to influence legislators’ voting patterns while others observe the 
influence going in the opposite direction.  These results suggest that financial contributions and 
voting patterns are likely to affect each other in a circular manner. 
Based on the paradoxical observations that appear to contradict HH’s unidirectional 
assumptions, I argue that (1) a gift exchange scenario provides a more appropriate theoretical 
framework than the conventional market setting to study the relations, (2) the relations between 
political actors created by contributions and votes are symbiotically dependent where bilateral 
influences or interdependence exist simultaneously, and (3) simultaneous equation modeling 
may eliminate the biases in results derived from the multivariate regressions used in prior studies. 
Given the potential problems of prior research in the corporate political strategy literature, 
I rely on SET arguments to empirically analyze publicly available data on the relations between 
PAC contributions and voting patterns during the formulation of the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007 (EISA07).  Further, I use two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation to 
control for the potential endogeneity (e.g., Fleisher 1993) between corporate PAC contributions 
and politicians’ voting records. 
Results indicate that, consistent with SET arguments, PAC contributions and voting 
outcomes mutually affect the relation between corporations and members of the House of 
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Representatives (House hereafter).  However, the SET expectations do not hold relative to the 
Senate (Senate hereafter).  Consistent with prior research, legislators’ political party affiliation 
significantly influences voting outcomes in House during the formulation and passage of EISA07.  
However, it is not significant in the Senate.  In contrast to expectations, House representatives 
from states with a high concentration of stakeholders having oil and gas industry ties were 
statistically more likely to vote for elimination of the tax provisions in EISA07.  Such 
observation does not exist in the Senate.  Finally, it appears that 2SLS analysis increases the 
methodological precision relative to OLS in that the statistical significance for the House models 
is stronger, while results for the Senate models are qualitatively similar. 
The results of my analysis have both methodological and theoretical implications for 
research in the corporate political strategy literature.  My findings may induce future corporate 
political strategy researchers to rely on a more appropriate statistical approach, such 2SLS, to 
enhance the explanatory precision in disentangling the complex, interdependent relations 
between corporate PAC contributions and legislators’ voting outcomes.  Additionally, my 
findings suggest SET may be a more appropriate lens to frame and study interactions and 
relations between corporations and legislators in the future, and as such, they provide additional 
insights to the ongoing debate with respect to the reliance on traditional market views of political 
contributions. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows:  Section II reviews and discusses 
pertinent corporate political strategy literature, SET and develops the hypothesis.  Section III 
presents EISA07, Section IV addresses the methodology matters on model building, and analytic 
procedures, and Section V reports the statistical results and interpretations of the EISA07 data.  
The final section VI summarizes and concludes with suggestions for future research. 
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II. Literature Review on Corporate Political Strategies 
Political Economy Studies 
 Clawson et al. (1998) argue that market exchanges form the social underpinnings of 
modern capitalist society and this notion is “so pervasive that its language, forms, and modes of 
thought come to dominate many aspects of life” (Clawson 1998, p. 31).  Indeed, they further 
claim that society believes “virtually all social phenomena can be purchased, even those, such as 
congressional votes” (Clawson et al. 1998, p. 31).  This market view of purchase and exchange 
has led to a stream of research investigating whether corporations’ political financial 
contributions influence legislators’ votes.  However, despite the general perception that 
businesses buy votes from policy makers with campaign contributions (see, e.g., Welch 1982), 
corporate political strategy studies examining the impact of campaign contributions on 
legislators’ votes have produced mixed empirical findings.  Several studies report a statistically 
significant, positive correlation between campaign contributions and legislators’ voting.  For 
instance, Wilhite and Theilmann (1987) examined the effects of labor PAC money in the form of 
campaign contributions on a series of labor-related legislation.  Their results suggest that labor 
PACs influenced congressional voting patterns on labor specific legislation.  Using state-level 
data, de Figueriredo and Edwards (2005) investigated the effects of campaign contributions from 
competing interest groups of the state telecommunications industry on public policy outcomes 
and report a significant positive correlation.  Finally, based on his investigation of the influence 
of campaign financial contributions on the votes for four amendments related to the 1996 Farm 
Bill, Yeung (2008) concluded that the spending significantly affected the voting outcomes on 
each amendment. 
 
 
71 
In contrast to the positive relations between PAC spending and legislative voting noted 
above, other studies’ results are less conclusive.  Chappell (1982) analyzed the influence of 
campaign contributions made by interest groups on roll call voting by House members for the 
1974 to 1977 Congresses.  He was neither able to document that financial contributions impacted 
voting decisions nor was he able to “unambiguously conclude that contributions have no effects 
on voting” (Chappell 1982, p. 83).  Similarly, Wayman’s (1985) multiple regression results 
indicated that, after controlling for the effects of ideology, PAC contributions had a statistically 
insignificant impact on U.S. Senate support concerning the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks II 
during the Cold War.  In a further study, Langbein and Lotwis (1990) investigated whether 
campaign contributions made by opposing groups on the gun control related McClure-Volkmer 
bill affected policy outcomes.  Their results were only marginally significant.  Dow and 
Endersby (1994) tested whether campaign contributions had any impacts on legislative voting 
outcomes in the California Assembly, where there was no limit on the amount of allowable PAC 
contributions.  They found that neither spending by businesses nor by labor groups had any 
“major influence on legislative roll call voting” (Dow and Endersby 1994, p. 334).  Finally, 
using panel data pertinent to PAC contributions on salient legislative issues as identified by 
interest groups, Wawro (2001) found that contributions were inconsistent in determining the 
voting patterns for the legislative bills examined. 
Accounting and Taxation Studies 
 Similar to the mixed results reported in political economy studies of the relation between 
campaign contributions and voting outcomes, examination of corporate political spending in the 
accounting and taxation domain are not unequivocal.  Roberts et al. (2003) examined how the 
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U.S. public accounting profession used political strategies to influence the outcomes of the 
Private Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (The Reform Act hereafter).  Using regression analysis 
based on the HH model, Roberts et al. (2003) show that, in both the House and the Senate, a 
legislator’s voting record is positively and significantly correlated with the amount of PAC 
contributions made by the accounting profession.  Dwyer and Roberts (2004, p. 881) concluded 
that PAC contributions made by the accounting profession were intended to “influence Congress” 
during the 1997-1998 federal election cycle for the House.  Roberts and Bobek (2004) also relied 
on the HH model to examine insurance and airline industry contribution activities during the 
development and passage of The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.  Their results indicate a positive 
and significant relation between past voting record and insurance industry PAC contributions in 
both the House and the Senate.  In contrast, the relation between prior voting and airline industry 
PAC amounts is only marginally significant for the House and is not statistically significant 
relative to Senate contributions.  Finally, Thornburg and Roberts (2008) in their investigation of 
PAC contributions related to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 report that differences in PAC 
contributions to members of the House and Senate were consistently related to past voting 
records.  However, their examination of roll call votes on various provisions of the bill yielded 
mixed results with respect to whether PAC amounts explained voting behavior. 
In sum, studies of the relation between corporate campaign spending and voting outcome, 
both in the political economy and accounting and taxation literatures, have failed to find 
consistent evidence that prior voting influences PAC contributions or that the spending 
influences subsequent votes.  Roscoe and Jenkins (2005) suggest the mixed findings are due to 
problems with the underlying theoretical assumptions of the giving relation as well as 
methodological choices of the researchers.  As such, I attempt to overcome these concerns by 
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introducing social exchange theory (SET) as a better theoretical basis for corporate political 
strategy investigations and by controlling for potential endogeneity in the giving/voting relation 
via the use of simultaneous equations analysis. 
Social Exchange Theory 
 Social exchange theory (SET) has its roots in the anthropology literature and can be 
traced back to at least the 1920s (e.g. Mauss 1925 on gift-giving).  Over the 1950s and the 1960s, 
SET became prominent in the disciplines of sociology and social psychology.  Organizational 
behavior researchers regard SET as “one of the most influential conceptual paradigms” 
(Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005) in organizational theory.  Cook and Rice (2003, p. 53) purport 
that SET enables researchers to understand “the micro-level processes of exchange and the 
macro-structure they create in society.”  Homans (1958; 1961; 1974), Thibaut and Kelley (1959), 
and Blau (1964) are all major contributors to the development of SET and its application to 
organizational behaviors. 
SET is “radically different” (Emerson 1987, p. 11) from the traditional neoclassical 
economic theory of exchange.  The latter views all actors, whether they are individuals, groups, 
or corporate firms/organizations, as exchanging resources in order to survive.  The actors are 
considered rational and it is the market that determines the price of exchange.  As such, it is the 
construct of the market, not the actors within it, that sits in the center of economic exchange 
theory, and it is the market that dictates the behaviors and transactions of exchange.  Under the 
market-based theory, resources of equal value are exchanged instantaneously and the relationship 
between actors ceases at the completion of the trade. 
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In contrast to traditional neoclassical economic exchange theory, the central construct of 
SET views actors in exchange situations as the determinants of all exchange activities.  Although 
debates surrounding SET are ongoing, proponents of the theory “agree that social exchange 
involves a series of interactions that generate obligations” (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005, p. 
874).  The social interactions of resource exchanges are viewed as “interdependent and 
contingent on the actions of another person” (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005, p. 874, italics in 
original).  Furthermore, these interactions create expectations of reciprocity where one actor or 
party is expected to repay “in kind” after receiving resources or gifts from the other.  Because of 
these exchanges, the nature of the relationship between two individuals/parties evolves and alters 
the interactions and substance of exchange.  Unlike market-based exchange where no long-term 
interactions take place between actors and relationships end as the act of resource exchange is 
completed, social exchange based on interaction fosters “rapport” between actors and creates 
enduring relationships.  Although reciprocity or the return of a favor/gift is expected, this 
expectation is implicit and neither a definitive date nor identification of specific resources needs 
to be negotiated prior to the act of reciprocity.  Finally, the exchange of resources or gifts is 
deemed equal through the reciprocate processes where both parties are subliminally aware of 
whether such equilibrium has been achieved. 
Emerson (1976), in agreement with Curry and Wade (1968), purports that SET offers a 
suitable framework to explain political behavior.  If corporate organizations and legislators 
engage in the social exchange of resources, according to SET, they will develop a lasting 
relationship.  This is similar to HH’s (1999) argument on relational tactics employed by 
corporations in their political involvement to shape legislative outcomes.  Instead of buying votes 
directly from the legislators, corporations make PAC contributions to establish their presence 
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and gain access to Congressional staffers and members of the Congress (Clawson et al. 1998, 
Suárze 2000, and Gordon 2005), and thus create potentially enduring relationships with 
legislators.  These relationships, in turn, allow legislators to ask for additional resources such as 
PAC and campaign contributions from corporations.  Welch (1982) illustrates this relation in his 
study of (1) the effects of dairy industry PAC contributions made in 1974 to the House members 
on the milk prices set by the 1975 congressional votes and (2) the impact of the 1975 votes on 
the amount of 1976 campaign financial contributions.  Using an “exchange” conceptual 
framework, he found that House members who received the 1974 PAC contributions voted to 
favor higher milk prices in 1975 and those who voted favorably for the dairy industry in 1975 
were more likely to receive financial support from the dairy PACs in 1976. 
Although legislators are not obligated to cast votes benefiting their contributors in every 
legislative act, evidence (e.g., Roberts et al. 2003, Roberts and Bobek 2004, and Thornberg and 
Roberts 2008) suggests they strategically vote in favor of their contributors’ interests on acts that 
significantly and directly impact the contributors’ bottom line.  More specifically, reciprocating 
favors are implicitly expected when votes are critical as both parties are assumed to be keenly 
aware of whether the act of reciprocity has been repaid in satisfaction of the obligation under the 
normative rules of social exchange (Befu 1977).  However, voting in the contributor’s interests is 
expected to foster a renewed expectation of support from the corporation to the legislator.  Thus, 
votes and PAC contributions should impact each other in a circular fashion, given that, as argued 
by SET, these relations are interdependent.  I investigate this issue relative to the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007. 
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III. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA07) was intended “to move the 
United States toward greater energy independence and security, to increase the production of 
clean renewable fuels, to protect consumers, to increase the efficiency of products, buildings, and 
vehicles. . . and for other purposes.”  However, the preliminary bill submitted to the House of 
Representatives by Representative Nick Rahall, a Democrat from Virginia, also contained a 
clause targeting the elimination of tax deductions allowed for oil and gas industry firms related 
to their domestic production.  The legislation, labeled H.R. 6, passed the House (264 to 163 votes) 
on January 18, 2007, six days after its introduction.  However, when H.R. 6 was sent to the 
Senate for ratification, a new Senate bill, S. 1419, was offered as an alternative.  The Senate bill, 
introduced on May 17, 2007, did not eliminate the oil and gas industry tax breaks. 
Supporters of H.R. 6 lauded the proposed tax deduction elimination as a means to 
increase renewable energy research and production and to end the windfall “oil subsidies” for big 
oil and gas companies.  Opponents of H.R. 6, including  Americans for Tax Reform, the 
American Petroleum Institute, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, argued that such unfair tax 
burdens on the oil and gas industry would “increase Americans’ reliance on foreign sources of 
energy by making new domestic exploration and production more costly” (Josten 2007).  To 
counter this argument, H.R. 6 supporters questioned whether the oil and gas industry actually 
produced more oil and gas than the amount they imported from non-U.S. countries.  Defending 
the tax benefits exceeding billions of dollars, opponents again raised the fairness issue that H.R. 
6 singled out the oil and gas industry by enacting a reversed rifle shot tax provision.  When these 
two proposed bills were sent to the Senate for a resolution vote, Senator Mary Landrieu of 
Louisiana ensured defeat of H.R. 6 by invoking Senate clout requiring a super majority of 60 
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votes for a bill to pass the Senate.  After H.R. 6 was voted down, the joint conference committee 
deleted the House-passed tax provision that sought tax deduction elimination and sent the final 
bill to both chambers of Congress.  The final bill with the tax deduction for the oil and gas 
industry intact was passed by the Senate on December 13, 2007 (86 to 8 votes) and then by the 
House on December 18, 2007 (314 to 100 votes) before it was signed into law by President 
George W. Bush on December 19, 2007 as Public Law 110-140. 
I argue that oil and gas companies had an incentive to attempt to influence voting on 
EISA07 through the use of PAC contributions.  However, as noted above, I also expect that prior 
voting behavior is expected to be associated with difference in the allocation of PAC dollars 
across members of Congress.  That is, I anticipate that the relation between voting behavior and 
corporate PAC contributions are interrelated.  I state my hypothesis as: 
H1:   Ceteris paribus, legislators’ voting outcomes and the amount of corporations’ 
PAC contributions are mutually determined. 
IV. Method and Modeling 
In this study, I attempt to determine whether oil and gas industry PAC contributions to 
members of Congress in the period covering the passage of EISA07 were influenced by the past 
voting records of the legislators and whether voting behavior on EISA07 appears to have been 
influenced by oil and gas industry PAC contributions.  Based on SET, I believe the relations 
between PAC spending and Congressional voting may be reciprocal in nature.  Several studies in 
auditing (e.g., Copley et al. 1994, Copley et al. 1995, Deis and Hill 1998, Copley and Douthett 
2002) and accounting disclosure (e.g., Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004, Field et al. 2005, and Hossain et 
al. 2005) argue that factors they examine affect one another in a simultaneous fashion, and thus 
they rely on simultaneous equations regressions and modeling for their tests.  For example, 
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Copley et al. (1994) noted that prior auditing research failed to recognize the endogeneity 
between audit fees and audit quality, and adopted a simultaneous equations approach for their 
study “of the audit procurement practices of entities receiving federal financial assistance” 
(Copley et al., 1994, p. 244).  Their study documented that audit fees and audit quality were 
mutually dependent, and they argue their methodological application strengthened the statistical 
interpretations of their results.  Also relying on a simultaneous equations approach, Copley et al. 
(1995) examined the relations between the supply of, and the demand for differentiated audits 
and found that audit demand affects audit fees and vice versa.  Finally, Copley and Douthett 
(2002) used two stage least squares analysis to investigate the association among auditor choice, 
retained ownership, and earnings disclosure for firms undergoing initial public offerings.  They 
concluded that all three variables affect one another, suggesting that auditor choice and favorable 
earnings disclosure can substitute for retained ownership as signals to investors. 
In addition to the auditing papers, several recent financial accounting studies also 
embrace the simultaneous equations modeling methodology.  For example, Al-Tuwaijri et al. 
(2004) analyzed the interrelations between environmental disclosure, environmental performance, 
and economic performance with estimations from modeling ordinary, two-stage, and three-stage 
least squares (OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS) simultaneous equations and concluded that positive inter-
correlations exist among the three factors.  Field et al. (2005, p. 487) used simultaneous 
equations to test “the endogeneity between [earnings and financial] disclosure and litigation.”  
Their evidence indicated that voluntary disclosure of bad financial information actually 
attenuates the risk of litigation, especially for class-action lawsuits.  Similarly, Hossain et al. 
(2005), using a simultaneous equations analysis, determined that firms’ investment opportunity 
sets and the voluntary disclosure of prospective information mutually affect each other.  In sum, 
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studies from both the auditing and financial disclosure arenas have adopted simultaneous 
equations modeling to better capture what the authors argue are interdependent relations. 
The prior political strategy studies in accounting and taxation relying on the HH model 
all employ one stage multiple regression analysis where several independent variables are 
assumed to be associated with differences in either voting outcomes or PAC contributions to 
legislators.  Interestingly, in some cases (e.g., Dwyer and Roberts 2004, Roberts and Bobek 2004, 
and Thornberg and Roberts 2008) PAC amounts are the dependent variable and voting records 
are used as an explanatory variable, while in others (e.g., Roberts et al. 2003) it is the voting that 
is set up as the dependent variable with PAC amounts on the right-hand side of the equation.  
This would appear to indicate the relation between these factors may be mutually determined, 
and if so, consistent with the audit and financial disclosure studies noted above, simultaneous 
equation modeling would appear to be warranted. 
Model 
 In this study, I assume that corporations employed other endogenous and exogenous 
financial tactics to influence EISA07 outcomes.  If factors such as PAC contributions and 
legislators’ voting records exist interdependently and inform each other, simultaneous equations 
modeling can aid and improve statistical significance and explanatory power over traditional 
regression models.  Assuming factors affecting the amount of corporate PAC contributions in 
corporations’ political strategy formulations are latent, it is feasible to represent the 
interdependent nature of potential factors identified in the proposed hypothesis by estimating the 
simultaneity among variables in theoretical equations.  Based on prior political strategy research 
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in accounting and taxation, I propose the following theoretical equation for both the House and 
the Senate concerning EISA07: 
Voting outcomes = f (predicted PAC contribution amounts and other variables) 
 In order to empirically examine this construct, I develop two sets of separate structural 
equations where (1) the PAC contribution amounts are predicted by prior voting records and 
other predetermined variables separately for members of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, and (2) predicted PAC contribution amounts (based on first stage estimation) and other 
explanatory variables determine the voting outcomes on EISA07.  As such, my empirical 
equations are stated as: 
House of Representatives 
PAC$house = δ0 + δ 1 VOTREC + δ 2 STAKE+ δ 3 LEADTEAM + δ 4 INDCOMM + δ 5 
TAXCOMM + ξ1 
 
VOTEhouse = γ 0 + γ 1 PREPAC$ house + γ 2 PARTY + γ 3 STAKE + ξ2 
Senate 
PAC$senate = δ0 + δ 1 VOTREC + δ 2 STAKE+ δ 3 LEADTEAM + δ 4 INDCOMM + δ 5 
TAXCOMM + δ 6 ELECT + ξ1 
 
VOTEsenate = γ 0 + γ 1 PREPAC$ senate + γ 2 PARTY + γ 3 STAKE + ξ2 
All variables are defined in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 I include the explanatory variables LEADTEAM, INDCOMM, and TAXCOMM used in 
the first stage regressions (and also ELECT for the Senate) based on the results of prior studies 
(e.g., Roberts and Bobek 2004).  Ideally, I would like to capture legislators’ prior voting 
behavior relative to oil and gas industry interests.  Unfortunately, no comprehensive measure of 
this voting exists.  As such, and similar to Roberts and Bobek (2004), I proxy for pro-business 
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voting (in this case, pro-oil and gas industry voting) using the League of Conservation Voters 
ratings on environmental voting.  The rating by the League of Conservation Voters evaluates 
legislators’ pro-environmental voting records on environmentally related legislation.  In that, the 
majority of legislative acts affecting the oil and gas industry tend to be environmentally related, 
the voting rating appears to be an appropriate proxy for legislators’ voting propensity towards the 
oil and gas industry.  However, it should be noted that the direction is opposite to industry 
interests.  That is, higher voting scores signify lower support for the oil and gas industry.  Finally, 
the purpose of the stakeholder (STAKE) variable is to consider and control for potential factors 
that might influence the amount of contributions made by the oil and gas industry to specific 
legislators due to the presence of the industry in their home states. 
For the second stage of the regressions, the predicted amount of PAC contributions 
(PREPAC$) from the first stage is used to predict the potential voting outcomes based on the 
underlying assumptions of 2SLS.  Based on prior research that shows Democrats are less likely 
to support pro-business legislation, legislators’ political party affiliation (PARTY) is used as a 
control variable.  Similar to the regressions in stage one, the stakeholder (STAKE) variable is 
retained to control for other factors potentially influencing voting behavior. 
Data Description 
 Table 7 summarizes descriptive data on the variables used in my analyses (Panel A for 
House and Panel B for Senate), while Table 8 presents Pearson product-moment correlations for 
the variables, with statistics for the House analyses variable in Panel A and Senate correlation 
statistics in Panel B.  For members of the House, the mean (median) amount of actual PAC 
contributions was $30,112 ($19,500), with a range from $0 and $331,850.  The mean (median) 
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for the voting outcomes measure was 0.52 (0.33).  Voting record scores range from zero to 100 
with a mean (median) of 53.66 (70.00).  Finally the stakeholders count ranged from zero to 48.  
The mean (median) score was 8.36 (2.00).  Panel B shows that the actual PAC contributions to 
the Senators ranged from $014 to $276,594 with a mean (median) of $47,746 ($16,500).  Voting 
outcome average scores were 0.47 (with a median of 0.33), whereas voting record scores 
averaged 52.31 (median of 63.50) on a range from zero to 100.  The stakeholder counts were the 
same as for the House. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Table 8 presents Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for the variables used 
in my analysis.  For both the House and the Senate, political party affiliation and predicted PAC 
contributions are significantly correlated (p<.001) with voting outcomes in the model.  Table 8 
also reveals that voting record and political party affiliation are highly correlated (p.<.001 in the 
House and the Senate).  However, these variables are not included in the same regression models 
(voting record is used in the first stage regression and party affiliation in the second). 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Statistical Analysis 
 I employ two-stage least squares (2SLS) to control for the anticipated endogeneity 
between voting and PAC contributions.  According to Wooldridge (2003, p. 525), OLS may 
induce biased results when it is “applied to an equation in a simultaneous system” (also see 
                                                          
14
 Senator Robert Byrd, West Virginia, returned $1,000 to the donor as the amount exceeded the legally allowed 
PAC contribution limit.  Byrd received no other positive source of PAC contributions to offset the $1,000 he 
returned, thus a negative $1,000 is the minimum of all PAC contributions in the data set.  Due to this potential 
outlier, I replaced the negative number and assigned a value of zero (0) to reflect a more realistic scenario of PAC 
contributions where a legislator receives no contributions from corporations and stakeholder groups involved in the 
legislative process of EISA07. 
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Goldberger 1991).  Similarly, Fleisher (1993, p. 398) in his article on the politics of national 
defense issues states, “Failing to consider simultaneous influences could lead to an 
overestimation of the effects of PAC contributions” on voting outcomes.  In order to better assess 
the value of my 2SLS analysis, I also estimate voting equations using OLS. 
V. Empirical Results 
 Overall results of the regression analyses appear to indicate the 2SLS approach is 
superior to OLS in explaining Congressional voting on EISA07, although the effects differ 
across estimations for the House and the Senate.  Each is discussed in more detail. 
House 
 As shown in Table 9, model fit (based on F-statistics) is highly significant for both the 
2SLS and OLS models.  The 2SLS estimation explains slightly more of the variation in the 
voting on EISA07 than is explained by the OLS model.  The adjusted R
2
 for the 2SLS model 
is .340 in contrast to the .308 measure for the OLS estimation.  Both 2SLS and OLS results 
indicate that members of the House voted predictably along their respective political party lines.  
That is, Democrats were significantly more likely to vote for removing the tax deductions for the 
oil and gas industry relative to the Republicans.  These results (significant for 2SLS at p. = .002 
and OLS at p <.001) show the powerful effects of political party on a legislative voting.  In 
contrast to expectations, the stakeholder variable is negatively, and significantly (p. <.001) 
associated with voting outcomes in the 2SLS analysis.  While it is also negatively signed in the 
results from the OLS estimation, under the latter approach the variable is not statistically 
significant (p. = .095).  It is not clear why this relation is opposite to what was anticipated.  Most 
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importantly, 2SLS estimation leads to different inferences from OLS regarding the relation 
between PAC spending and House member voting on EISA07.  While the respective variable 
(PAC contributions in OLS and Predicted PAC Contributions under 2SLS) are both positively 
signed, under OLS the relation is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p = .321, two 
tailed).  In contrast, the Predicted PAC Contributions variable is statistically significant (p<.001 
level, two-tailed) under 2SLS.  Controlling for the endogenous relations between PAC spending 
and voting records thus reveals relations not apparent under the traditional OLS approach. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Senate 
 Similar to the House model results, Senate models under both 2SLS and OLS are also 
statistically significant (F = 8.798 and 8.973, respectively).  However, results from the Senate 
analyses, presented in Table 10 are less clear than those for the House.  While the OLS approach 
explains variances in voting behavior slightly better (.219 vs. .216) than the 2SLS approach, both 
approaches reflect insignificant results on the relation between PAC spending on EISA07 voting 
and the statistical significance is slightly lower for the 2SLS analysis (p = .157 for the Predicted 
PAC Contributions in 2SLS and p = .120 for PAC contributions in OLS).  Similar to the House 
results, political party affiliation is significantly related to EISA07 voting outcomes under OLS 
(p. = <.001).  However, political party affiliation is statistically insignificant in influencing 
voting outcomes under the 2SLS (p. =.266) analysis.  Finally, unlike the negative correlation 
between stakeholder variable and voting outcomes in the House results, the stakeholder variable 
is significantly (p =.035) and positively related to voting outcomes in the Senate under the 2SLS 
analysis.  It is insignificant under OLS. 
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[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Sensitivity Test: 
 In order to provide additional evidence that 2SLS analysis attenuates the potential biases 
generated by traditional multivariate regressions, I estimate additional multivariate regressions 
controlling for variables used in other political strategy studies (e.g., Fleisher 1993, Roberts et al. 
2003, Dwyer and Roberts 2004, and Roberts and Bobek 2004).  I estimate only OLS regressions 
for these sensitivity tests.  The additional variables include: 
LEADTEAM: A dummy variable indicating the legislator holds a leadership position (1 = Yea; 0 
= Otherwise); 
INDCOMM: A dummy variable indicating a legislator’s membership on a non-tax, industry-
specific committee (1 = Yea; 0 = Otherwise); and  
TAXCOMM:  A dummy variable indicating a legislator’s membership on committees that deal 
with tax legislation (1 = Yea; 0 = Otherwise); 
Table 11 reports results of the sensitivity tests.  Models for both the House and Senate 
voting on EISA07 exhibit significant statistical fit (F = 31.602 and 4.321).  The only statistically 
significant independent variable is the legislators’ political party affiliations (p. = <.001 for 
House and p. =.001 for Senate).  All other variables including the actual amount of PAC 
contributions are statistically insignificant.  Thus, inclusion of additional explanatory variable 
into the OLS regressions does not appear to change the prior finding that 2SLS estimation of the 
relation between PAC contributions and legislative voting on EISA07 is superior to OLS. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
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VI. Summary, Suggestions, and Conclusion 
This paper examines the formation and passage of EISA07 considering the potential for a 
reciprocal relationship between corporations and legislators.  In contrast to prior political 
strategy studies in the accounting and taxation domain, I explicitly control for the joint 
determination of the relationship between corporations’ PAC contributions and legislators’ 
voting outcomes relative to the passage of EISA07.  I test the relational endogeneity by 
analyzing publicly available data on EISA07 through 2SLS estimation.  Departing from the HH 
unidirectional prediction, where the amount of PAC contributions is argued to affect voting, I 
motivate this study by considering SET arguments for an interdependent relationship between 
corporations and legislators.  I conjecture that the inconclusive results regarding political 
contributions and voting outcomes in prior studies may be a result of overlooking this 
endogenous relationship.  In this study, I posit that the amount of corporate PAC contributions 
and the legislators’ voting outcomes are mutually determined, and I apply 2SLS analysis to 
directly test the potential simultaneity between the PAC contribution and voting outcomes 
surrounding EISA07. 
Results indicate that political affiliation is the dominant factor influencing voting 
outcomes on EISA07 in both the House and the Senate when an OLS analysis is employed.  
However, legislators’ political affiliations are statistically insignificant in influencing voting for 
the House members under a 2SLS approach.  Most of the results are consistent with the results of 
Roberts and Bobek (2004).  Controlling for other independent variables, the empirical results 
under 2SLS analysis indicate that PAC contributions and voting outcomes were mutually 
determined during the formation and passage of EISA07 for the House, but not in the Senate.  
That is, legislators’ prior voting records are useful in predicting the amount of PAC contributions 
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received and the amount of received PAC contributions appears to influence subsequent voting 
in the House.  This is consistent with SET arguments.  The contrasting results derived from 
traditional multivariate regressions (OLS) and those from 2SLS analysis underscore the 
theoretical and methodological importance of considering endogeneity in tax accounting political 
strategy research designs. 
In summary, my study views the relationship between corporations and legislators as 
interdependent, and this relational interdependence affects how corporations strategically 
manage their political activities with respect to the legislative process.  I specifically focus on 
how corporations rely on legislators’ prior voting records to determine the value of a political 
“gift” in the form of PAC contributions to legislators in an attempt to influence legislative 
outcomes.  Subsequently, these political gifts affect the votes cast by legislators.  Empirical 
results are consistent with prior studies in that legislators’ political party affiliation significantly 
affected voting outcomes in the formation and passage of EISA07.  Furthermore, these results 
provide evidence supporting SET’s postulation of an interdependence relation between 
corporations and legislators cultivated through exchanges of political resources through gifts in 
the form of PAC contributions and votes. 
Future research examining the relationship between corporations and legislators to 
determine how and why this relationship influences the development, formulation, and passage 
of tax accounting laws should also consider other forms of “gifts/resources” such as lobbying for 
access to legislators and providing expert opinions during policy formulation, in addition to PAC 
contributions and votes, exchanged between the two interacting parties.  Also, research could 
examine whether corporations always use positive “gifts” to build a relationship with legislators 
or whether corporations use a combination of both positive and negative “gifts” to achieve their 
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objectives in the legislative process.  Future research should examine whether negative pressures 
such as adversary campaigns against a particular legislation or legislator or the threats of reduced 
PAC contributions, affect the formulation and passage of policies.  Moreover, qualitative data 
may potentially provide latent evidence overlooked by extant quantitative studies to enhance 
understanding of the interdependent nature between corporations and legislators.  By 
incorporating qualitative data and examining the characteristics of political resources or gifts, 
studies of tax accounting policies will substantively increase our knowledge of corporate 
political strategies and how they affect public policies. 
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Tables 
Table 6 Description of Variables 
Variable  Descriptions  Data Source 
PAC Contributions  PAC contributions for EISA07 in dollar amount  Center for Responsive Politics 
Voting Outcome 
 The weighted average of the three votes related to EISA07.  Each 
vote is assigned either a 1 (for tax credit) or 0 (against tax credit) 
with the total number divided by 3 
 Library of Congress 
Committee Leadership 
 A dummy variable, 1 for legislators who hold leadership position 
in a committee, 0 otherwise 
 Library of Congress 
Industry Committee 
Membership 
 A dummy variable, 1 for legislators who hold leadership position 
in a committee over the oil and gas industry, 0 otherwise 
 Library of Congress 
Joint Taxation 
Committee 
 A dummy variable, 1 for legislators who are members of the joint 
tax committee, 0 otherwise 
 Library of Congress 
Up for Election 
 A dummy variable, 1 for legislators who were up for reelection, 0 
otherwise 
 Library of Congress 
Political Party 
Affiliation 
 A dummy variable, 1 for legislators whose political party is 
Democratic/Independent, 0 Republican 
 Library of Congress 
Voting Record  Historical voting rating ranging from 0 to 100  League of Conservation Voters 
Stakeholders 
 A total number of all stakeholders (corporate headquarters of the 
top 20 oil and gas companies, number of chapters of the 
American Petroleum Institute, and number of refineries) in the 
specific state for the legislator 
 
Corporate Website and American 
Petroleum Institute 
Predicted PAC 
Contributions 
 Potential PAC contributions in dollar amount as predicted by a 
legislator’s prior voting records 
 
2SLS prediction based on prior 
voting records 
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Table 7 Descriptive Statistics for Variables  
Panel A: House 
Variable Median Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
    Minimum Maximum 
PAC Contributions 19,500.00 30,112.53 35,896.36 0.00 331,850.00 
Voting Outcomes .33 .52 .26 0 1.00 
Committee Leadership .00 .01 .10 0 1.00 
Industry Committee Membership .00 .20 .40 0 1.00 
Joint Taxation Committee .00 .01 .10 0 1.00 
Political Party Affiliation 1.00 .55 .50 0 1.00 
Voting Record 70.00 53.66 38.74 0 100 
Stakeholders 2.00 8.36 13.41 0 48.00 
Predicted PAC Contributions 27,968.38 30,111.53 22,169.66 6,406,49 97,658.45 
N = 435 
 
Panel B: Senate 
Variable Median Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
    Minimum Maximum 
PAC Contributions 16,500.00 47,746.30 63,721.94 0.00 276,594.00 
Voting Outcomes .33 .47 .28 0.00 1.00 
Committee Leadership .00 .02. .14 0.00 1.00 
Industry Committee Membership .00 .21 .41 0.00 1.00 
Joint Taxation Committee .00 .20 .40 0.00 1.00 
Up for Election .00 .51 .50 0.00 1.00 
Political Party Affiliation 1.00 .35 .48 0.00 1.00 
Voting Record 63.50 52.31 35.28 0.00 100.00 
Stakeholders 2.00 3.86 7.81 0.00 48.00 
Predicted PAC Contributions 185.02 47,746.30 149,348.96 -207,779.37 295,154.65 
N = 100 
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Table 8 Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Panel A: House 
 PAC 
Contributions 
Voting 
Outcomes 
Committee 
Leadership 
Industry 
Committee 
Membership 
Joint 
Taxation 
Committee 
Political 
Party 
Affiliation 
Voting 
Record Stakeholders 
PAC 
Contributions 
        
Voting 
Outcomes 
.033        
Committee 
Leadership 
-.003 -.037       
Industry 
Committee 
Membership 
.100
*
 .013 -.048      
Joint 
Taxation 
Committee 
-.005 -.037 -.009 .013     
Political 
Party 
Affiliation 
.037 -.546
**
 .039 .009 .039    
Voting 
Record 
-.007 -.552
**
 .047 -.005 .047 .857
**
   
Stakeholders .051 -.040 -.044 .067 .118
**
 -.055 -.160
**
  
Predicted 
PAC 
Contributions 
.038 .435
**
 -.001 .034 -.001 -.741
**
 -.903
**
 -.031 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)  
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*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)  
Panel B: Senate  
 PAC 
Contributions 
Voting 
Outcomes 
Committee 
Leadership 
Industry 
Committee 
Membership 
Joint 
Taxation 
Committee 
Political 
Party 
Affiliation 
Up for 
Election 
Voting 
Record Stakeholders 
PAC 
Contributions 
         
Voting 
Outcomes 
.266
**
         
Committee 
Leadership 
.153 -.072        
Industry 
Committee 
Membership 
.169
*
 -.053 -.074       
Joint 
Taxation 
Committee 
-.089 -.012 .107 .110      
Political 
Party 
Affiliation 
-.261
**
 -.415
**
 -.003 .014 -.010     
Up for 
Election  
.559
**
 .282
**
 .045 -.069 -.105 -.245
**
    
Voting 
Record 
-.296
**
 -.438
**
 -.009 -.032 .055 .845
**
 -.254
**
   
Stakeholders .166
*
 .208
*
 -.034 -.054 -.132 -.113 .043 -.214
*
  
Predicted 
PAC 
Contributions 
.254
**
 .387
**
 .019 .048 -.018 -.831
**
 .247
**
 .254
**
 .387
**
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Table 9 110th Congressional Voting on EISA07: A Comparison between OLS and 2SLS Estimates, House of Representatives 
House of Representatives 
  2SLS  OLS 
Independent Variable  Coefficient  SE  Sig.  Coefficient  SE  Sig. 
Constant  .430***  .057  <.001  .693***  .019  <.001 
Predicted PAC 
Contributions 
 <.001**  <.001  <.001  N/A  N/A  N/A 
PAC Contributions  N/A  N/A  N/A  <.001  <.001  .321 
Political Affiliation  -.126**  .040  .002  -.287***  .021  <.001 
Stakeholders  -.014**  .003  <.001  -.001  .001  .095 
F 74.006***      63.821***      
R
2
 .340      .308      
N = 435             
*p<.05; **p<.01; and 
***p<.001 
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Table 10 110th Congressional Voting on EISA07: A Comparison between OLS and 2SLS Estimates, Senate 
Senate 
  2SLS  OLS 
Independent Variable  Coefficient  S.E.  Sig.  Coefficient  S.E.  Sig. 
Constant  .478***  .072  <.001  .525***  .046  <.001 
Predicted PAC Contributions  <.001  <.001  .157  N/A  N/A  N/A 
PAC Contributions  N/A  N/A  N/A  <.001  <.001  .120 
Political Affiliation  -.107  .095  .266  -.202***  .052  <.001 
Stakeholders  .007*  .003  .035  .005  .003  .122 
F 8.798***      8.973***      
R
2
 .216      .219      
N = 100             
*p<.05; **p<.01; and 
***p<.001 
            
 
  
 
 
95 
Table 11 110th Congressional Voting on EISA07: OLS, House of Representatives and Senate 
 
 House  Senate 
Independent Variable  Coefficient  SE  Sig.  Coefficient  SE  Sig. 
Constant  .683***  .018  <.001  .504***  .017  <.001 
PAC Contributions  <.001  <.001  .168  -.188  <.001  .376 
Political Affiliation  -.285***  .021  <.001  -.286**  .053  .001 
Stakeholder  -.001  .001  .071  .005  .003  .121 
Committee Leadership Position  -.049  .109  .651  -.192  .186  .291 
Industry Committee Membership  .011  .026  .685  -.042  .066  .525 
Joint Taxation Committee 
Membership 
 -.020  .109  .857  .032  .065  .627 
Up for Election  N/A  N/A  N/A  .082  .066  .219 
F 31.602***      4.321***      
R
2
 .307      .247      
N = 435 for House and 100 for 
Senate 
            
*p<.05; **p<.01; and ***p<.001             
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STUDY THREE:  THE LEGISLATIVE DIVIDE ON TAX PROVISIONS FOR BIG OIL: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT OF 2007 
Abstract 
I analyzed discrete discourses concerning the tax provisions differences in the House 
version and the Senate version prior to the passage of the Energy Independence and Security Act 
of 2007 (EISA07).  Based on Dahan’s (2005) corporate political resource typology, I 
investigated how and why the strategic modes of political resources employed by the oil and gas 
industry affected EISA07’s final texts on specific tax provisions that were crucial to the oil and 
gas industry. 
Overall results based on available data indicated that Dahan’s (2005) political resource 
typology was useful in data analysis and applicable to the current case.  The oil and gas industry 
along with their advocacy groups and lobbying representatives employed all political resources 
as delineated in Dahan (2005) throughout the discreet stages of EISA07’s legislative 
development.  Specifically, they simultaneously incorporated both interactive (positive) and 
adversarial (negative) strategies through the means of primary, supporting, and complementary 
political resources in their political involvement to influence the final texts of the controversial 
tax provisions and successfully preserved tax benefits for the oil and gas industry.  Moreover, 
results from this case study potentially offered contemporary and empirical evidence in response 
to Dahan’s (2005) call for empirical validation to the conceptualization contributions of his 
corporate political resource typology.  Based on these results, Dahan’s (2005) typology merits 
further validation through studies in other research methodology such as large-scale surveys of 
and in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders.  Finally, this study, via its results, offered 
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insights, some cautionary notes, and additional implications on corporate political strategic 
planning, tax policy setting, public interest, and future research. 
Key words: Corporate political strategies; Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007; Oil 
and gas companies; Tax provisions; and Typology of political resources 
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I. Introduction 
Recent corporate political strategy studies after Hillman and Hitt (1999, HH hereafter) in 
both management (Hillman et al. 1999, Bonardi et al. 2005, Bonardi and Keim 2005, Keim and 
Hillman 2008, and Hillman et al. 2009) and accounting (Roberts et al. 2003, Dwyer and Roberts 
2004, Roberts and Bobek 2004, Cho et al. 2006, and Thornburg and Roberts 2008) relied on the 
HH model15 to study corporate political strategies and their impact on public policy.  Although 
the HH model delineated the approaches, the level of participation, and the tactics of corporate 
political strategies, it did not specifically identify the political resources utilized in these 
strategies.  The broad scope of the HH model provided researchers a useful and organized 
framework to examine the macro impact of corporate political strategies on public policy 
outcomes.  However, examining the political resources employed by corporations and other 
stakeholder groups enables an investigation into micro, often latent, effects that these resources 
have on the formulation and passage of public policy.  Also, a micro-level investigation allows 
an assessment of how a stakeholder group’s political resources might be employed differently 
depending on its relational approach towards legislators. 
In this study I compare the proposed tax provisions concerning the U.S. oil and gas 
industry embedded within H.R. 6 and S. 1419 drafted separately by the U.S. House of 
Representatives (the House hereafter) and the U.S. Senate (the Senate hereafter) prior to the 
passage of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA07).  In order to discover 
how and why the political resources employed by corporations impacted EISA07 during its 
legislative processes, I relied on Dahan’s (2005) typology of political resources to conduct an 
                                                          
15
 See Roberts et al. (2003, p. 438) for a one-page table summary of the Hillman and Hitt (1999) model. 
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investigation and analysis of key publicly available data from the introduction of EISA07 in 
January 2007 to its final passage in December 2007. 
I found that important differences existed between these two versions: H.R. 6 explicitly 
sought to end tax deductions16 of domestic production activities for the five consolidated oil and 
gas companies while S. 1419 mentioned no such elimination.  The preservation of the 
aforementioned tax deduction credits effectively amounted to approximately 46 billion dollars 
(U.S. Office of Management and Budget 2011) of financial benefit for the five largest, 
consolidated U.S. oil and gas companies.  Due to the controversy17 surrounding the tax 
provisions of these two proposed bills, fierce debates took place in the Congress.  Additionally, 
throughout the brief, yet complex political evolution of EISA07 (See Table 12 for the legislative 
highlights of H.R. 6 and S 1419), both supporting and opposing interest groups were intensely 
involved in the legislative process (See Table 13 for some of the stakeholder groups).  In order to 
understand the discourses leading up to the passage of the EISA07, I investigated and analyzed 
data related to EISA07 in a case study format (Roberts and Bobek 2004, Trompeter and Wright 
2010, and Hageman 2011) in order to investigate how and why stakeholders employed political 
resources and relational approaches to attempt to significantly impact the formulation and 
passage of the proposed tax policy. 
                                                          
16
 H.R. 6 intended to insert a section iv under the subparagraph (B) into the original Internal Revenue Code 
§199(c)(4) to make “the sale, exchange, or other disposition of oil, natural gas, or any primary product thereof” part 
of the exception of the domestic production tax deduction rules as stated in the original 1986 Internal Revenue Code.  
By adding this subsection to the exception, the oil and gas companies will be disallowed to take the deductions 
currently set at nine percent, albeit the rate is reduced by three percent of the least of (1) oil-related qualified 
production activities income (QPAI), (2) QPAI, or (3) adjusted gross income for an individual, estate, or trust 
(taxable income for all other taxpayers) figured without the domestic production activities deduction (IRS 
instructions for Form 8903, Domestic Production Activities Deduction, for tax years beginning after 2009). 
17
 In his 2010 State of the Union speech, President Obama vowed to end the tax provisions for the oil and gas 
companies (New York Times 2010 and Office of Press Secretary of the White House 2010).  Again in his 2012 
budget proposal, President Obama reiterated his intent in “Eliminating 12 tax breaks for oil, gas, and coal companies” 
(U.S. Office of Management and Budget 2011, p. 22). 
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[Insert Table 12 about here] 
[Insert Table 13 about here] 
 Results of this study indicate that Dahan’s (2005) political resource typology is useful in 
the analysis of secondary sources that document political activities of stakeholders and is 
applicable to the current case.  The oil and gas industry along with their advocacy groups and 
lobbying representatives employed all political resources as delineated in Dahan (2005) 
throughout discreet stages of EISA07’s legislative development.  Specifically, they deployed 
primary, supporting, and complementary political resources to execute both interactive (positive) 
and adversarial (negative) strategies to influence the final texts of the controversial tax 
provisions and, in doing so, successfully preserved the tax benefits for the oil and gas industry. 
Results from this case study also offer contemporary evidence in response to Dahan’s 
(2005) call for empirical and theoretical validation of his corporate political resource typology 
through case studies.  Additionally, the case study results potentially benefit management, public 
interest groups, and academic researchers.  Based on these results, Dahan’s (2005) typology 
merits further validation through studies in other research methodologies such as large-scale 
surveys of and in-depth interview with relevant stakeholders who had the first-hand experience 
with specific policy-making processes.  These results offer insights, some cautionary notes, and 
additional implications on corporate political strategic planning, public interest, and future 
research.  By understanding the various modes of operation and the “bundle” (Dahan 2005, p. 48) 
of corporate political resources, corporate management may improve the effectiveness of their 
overall corporate political strategic planning, protect their corporate interests, reduce regulatory 
uncertainties, and increase competitiveness.  On the other hand, these results may aid public 
interest groups in raising the public’s awareness and voicing their opposition on the influence of 
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corporate political resources over public policies that may disadvantage the welfare of minority 
or underprivileged sectors of the society.  Finally, findings in this study provide corporate 
political strategy researchers a less utilized, yet substantially rigorous alternative to mainstream 
political strategic models in investigating corporate political activities either through additional 
case studies or large scale surveys to gain additional insights of corporate political activities. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows.  Section II reviewed literature pertinent to the 
current study.  Section III discussed Dahan’s (2005) typology of political resources and 
developed relevant research questions to current case.  Section IV delineated the research method, 
data collection, and presented the results of the analysis.  Section V summarized and discussed 
potential future research directions. 
II. Literature Review 
A rich body of academic literature in both management (Hillman et al. 1999, Bonardi et 
al. 2005, Bonardi and Keim 2005, Keim and Hillman 2008, and Hillman et al. 2009) and 
accounting (Roberts et al. 2003, Dwyer and Roberts 2004, Roberts and Bobek 2004, Cho et al. 
2006, and Thornburg and Roberts 2008) has theoretically and empirically examined the impact 
of corporate political strategies on legislators, public policies, and society.  Prior to the 
development of these two streams of research, the strategic management literature focused 
primarily on core market strategies, largely neglecting the importance of corporate political 
strategies for firm survival and success.  Hillman and Hitt (1999, p. 839) argued, “a thorough 
understanding of political strategies is necessary” considering how public policies appear to 
affect corporations in nearly all aspects of firms’ operations.  Nevertheless, research concerning 
how corporations formulate their political strategies in order to effectively participate and 
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influence policy outcomes in the political arenas was lacking.  Specifically, Hillman and Hitt 
(1999, p. 838) noticed that “the literature on political strategies has been widely varied, no 
general model of political strategy formulation has been proposed, and no specific variables that 
may affect these choices have been identified.”  They observed that prior research had primarily 
(1) investigated the reasons why public policies affect profitability of firms (Keim and Baysinger 
1988, Shaffer 1995, and Schuler 1996), (2) examined the objectives of corporations’ 
participation in public policy setting processes (Weidenbaum 1980 and Baysinger 1984), and (3) 
studied the characteristics of corporations that are likely to participate intensively in political 
activities (Pittman 1976 and Zardkoohi 1985). 
Based on prior studies of corporate political management (Weidenbaum 1980, Keim 
1981, Baysinger 1984, Boddewyn 1993, Bettis and Hitt 1995, and Hitt et al. 1998), Hillman and 
Hitt (1999) concluded that corporate political strategies were proactive in nature.  Drawing from 
prior research, Hillman and Hitt (1999) developed a taxonomy detailing the corporate political 
strategy formulation.  Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) taxonomy was known as the HH model by some 
studies (Roberts et al. 2003, Dwyer and Roberts 2004, Roberts and Bobek 2004, Cho et al. 2006, 
and Thornburg and Roberts 2008).  The HH model is comprised of two general approaches to 
corporate political activity (transactional and relational), two levels of participation by firms 
(individual and collective), and three generic types of political tactics (information, financial, and 
constituency building).  Also, Hillman and Hitt (1999) provided testable propositions in each 
category of their model to aid in future empirical work.  The comprehensiveness of the HH 
model offered corporate political strategy researchers a theoretically sound and empirically 
testable framework to examine and analyze their particular cases, scenarios, and observations. 
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A surge in corporate political strategy research emerged after the advent of the HH model.  
Within this stream of studies, the articles published in the management discipline primarily 
attempted to expand the HH model theoretically while a set of accounting papers focused on 
empirically testing the HH model’s applicability in explicating their specific cases.  For example, 
Hillman et al. (2004) extended the HH model to theoretically establish a new model regarding 
the antecedents, the types, and the outcomes of corporate political activities.  Similarly, Bonardi 
and Keim (2005, p. 555) expanded the HH model and provided theoretical propositions 
concerning the appropriate corporate political strategies to “prevent the occurrence of such 
widespread [political issue] salience and how they [(corporations)] can respond once an issue has 
become widely salient.”  Furthermore, Bonardi et al. (2005, p. 408) applied the HH model in a 
“political marketplace” where “demanders of public policy interact with suppliers, much like 
economic markets.”  Theoretically, they argued and concluded that the market “attractiveness is 
an important determinant of why firms engage in political strategies” (Bonardi et al. 2005, p. 
408). 
Unlike aforementioned articles, though not specifically addressing the HH model, both 
Keim and Hillman (2008) and Hillman (2009) strived to broaden the HH model’s theoretical 
application.  Keim and Hillman (2008) prompted managers of businesses to become aware of the 
importance of corporate political strategies when contemplating international operations.  
Nevertheless, Keim and Hillman (2008) did not empirically test their recommendations to 
managers.  Hillman et al. (2009), similar to Bonardi et al. (2005), viewed the political 
environment as a market where corporations trade political resources in order to “produce a more 
favorable environment.”  Similarly, Hillman et al. (2009) did not conduct formal empirical tests 
to verify whether the postulations in the HH model were supported. 
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In contrast to the set of the management papers that theoretically expanded the HH model, 
accounting studies based on the HH model primarily aimed to test its theoretical efficacy.  For 
instance, examining the political strategies used by the U.S. public accounting profession 
concerning the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Roberts et al. (2003, p. 433, 
italics in original) explicitly stated that their paper “is the first to provide a detailed [empirical] 
analysis of how the US profession acted” during the 1995 federal security law reform.  They 
mapped and presented their findings according to the HH model.  Results of their statistical 
analysis were consistent with the HH model, thus empirically supporting the underlying 
conjectures of the HH model.  Dwyer and Roberts (2004) examined the potential influence of 
PAC contributions made on behalf of the U.S. accounting profession during the 1997 and 1998 
U.S. federal election cycle over legislators’ voting behaviors.  Even though they did not 
explicitly identify the HH model as their theoretical underpinnings, the PAC contributions is one 
of the financial tactics identified in the HH model.  Dwyer and Roberts (2004) found that the U.S. 
public accounting profession selectively and calculatedly made political financial contributions 
to support legislators whose political ideologies coincided with the interests of the profession and 
their clients.  Their empirical results supported one of the postulations in the HH model that 
corporations used financial support as their primary tactic to reify their corporate political 
strategies. 
Roberts and Bobek (2004) drew on prior research, including the HH model, to analyze 
corporate political strategies concerning tax provisions throughout the legislative interactions and 
history of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.  Their empirical results were consistent with the HH 
model in that corporations used PAC contributions to influence legislators, especially those who 
were in the leadership positions.  Drawing from multiple streams of literature, Cho et al. (2006, p. 
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139) empirically tested whether corporations that are poorer environmental performers spend 
more on political activities than their better-performing counterparts and whether there is an 
association between corporations’ spending on political activities and the extent of their financial 
reporting of environmental disclosures.  They found a significantly negative relationship between 
firms’ political spending and their environmental performance.  In addition, the statistical 
analysis indicated that there was a significantly positive correlation between the extent of 
environmental disclosures and the political spending by their sample corporations.  Cho et al.’s 
(2006) empirical results supported the arguments of the HH model that corporate spending and 
the extent of disclosures were financial and informal tactics used by firms to attenuate the 
potential public policy pressure and enhance their legitimacy.  Finally, Thornberg and Roberts 
(2008, p. 229) investigated “the rationality and effectiveness of political action committee (PAC) 
contributions paid to members of the US Congress by the US public accounting profession 
during the policy formulation period of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”  Evidence of their 
empirical analysis showed that financial tactics employed by PACs on behalf of the US public 
accounting profession allowed relationship building between the profession and legislators to 
influence public policy setting processes and the final policy outcomes.  These results were 
consistent with the HH model as those financial tactics were an indispensable part of firms’ 
corporate political strategic formulation. 
Three common themes from the preceding papers emerge: (1) the reliance of the HH 
model in corporate political strategy literature since its publication, (2) the partial 
operationalization of the HH model, and (3) the dominance of an archival methodological 
approach.  Overall results of these prior papers generally support the theoretical and empirical 
validity of the HH model.  However, these empirical studies usually operationalized and tested 
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only part of the HH model.  The lack of specific identification of political means or resources in 
the HH model might explain why most studies did not empirically explore and examine the full 
model.  Also, large sample empirical studies might provide important results that help us 
understand interactions among political stakeholders, but they do not convincingly explain the 
direction of causality in these interactions. Thus, although we have learned a great deal about 
corporate political strategies and activities through the application and refinement of the HH 
model, there are limits to the extent to which one theoretical model can explain complex 
phenomena.  Given the focus and consistent findings of existing research, I believe that a 
different typology of specific political resources and a different methodological approach (i.e., a 
case study) can be used effectively to investigate the less studied aspects of corporate political 
activities and help advance and expand the corporate political strategy literature. 
III. A Typology of Political Resources and Research Questions 
Dahan (2005) conceptualized and developed a new typology of political resources 
employed by corporations to execute their corporate political strategies.  Dahan’s (2005) 
typology of political resources mirrors to some extent the tactics delineated in the HH model.  
Building on prior studies (Fainsod 1940, Epstein 1969, Leone 1977, Oberman 1993, Boddewyn 
and Brewer 1994, Barron 1995, Attarça 1999 and 2000, Boddewyn 2000, and Jacomet 2000), 
Dahan’s (2005) typology of political resources includes expertise, financial resources, relational 
resources, organizational resources, reputation with other non-market actors (i.e., legislators and 
their aids), public image, support of stakeholders, and recreational skills.  See Table 14 for 
detailed comments on Dahan’s (2005) typology of political resources. 
[Insert Table 14 about here] 
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Although there are overlapping features between the HH model and Dahan’s (2005) 
typology, two distinct theoretical views from Dahan (2005) differentiate it from the HH model: 
(1) two modes in corporation-legislator relationships and (2) three roles of political resources.  
Table 15 presents Dahan’s views on the modes and roles of political resources.  Finally, as far as 
I am aware, this paper is the first study to answer Dahan’s (2005) call for case studies to 
empirically validate the conceptualization of his typology.  Thus, this study aims to empirically 
validate Dahan’s (2005) framework and broaden its application in corporate political strategy 
research. 
[Insert Table 15 about here] 
The Two Modes of Corporation-Legislator Relationships 
Dahan (2005) argues that there are two relational modes an organization develops in its 
interactions with legislators, and that the mode of corporate relationship with legislators is 
crucial in understanding how corporations utilize their political resources.  Dahan’s (2005) 
understanding about the mode of the corporation-legislator relation is theoretically different from 
that in the HH model.  The HH model assumes that political tactics or resources generally 
created interactive or positive relationships (e.g., Jacomet 2000) between politically involved 
corporations and legislators.  Under this positive mode, organizations and legislators exchange 
political resources critical to the survival of both parties.  For example, corporations use political 
resources such as PAC contributions or useful information valued by legislators to gain access 
and potentially influence legislators’ voting and policy outcomes.  In exchange for these valuable 
resources, the legislators tend to vote favorably on behalf of the organizations or make public 
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policy decisions such as tax subsidies or deductions that are desired by these politically active 
organizational groups. 
In addition to a positive relational mode, Dahan (2005) adds an adversarial or negative 
mode that is overlooked in the HH model.  Under the adversarial relational mode of operation 
(Birnbaum 1985 and Bourgeois and Nizet 1995), organizations pressure legislators by hinting at 
or threatening deleterious actions if the enacted public policy outcomes are unfavorable towards 
the organizations.  Fundamentally, these threats are connected to losing valuable political 
resources such as the loss of campaign contributions, public support, or actual votes during the 
next election.  Dahan (2005) believes that organizations might choose to use their political 
resources in a combination of both interactive (cooperative) and pressure (adversarial) strategic 
approaches when undertaking corporate political activities.  He purports “the type of relationship 
chosen by the firm has a fundamental bearing on the kind of resources which are going to be 
mobilized and how this will be implemented” (Dahan 2005, p. 49).  Finally, assuming these 
stakeholder groups (e.g., corporations and other interested organizations) choose a combination 
of political modes to implement their political strategies, the choice of mode(s) might help 
explain related public policy outcomes.  This leads to the first set of research questions: 
RQ1:  How and why did the mode of relationships chosen by the oil and gas industry and 
other organized interest groups affect the overall strategic utilization of corporate 
political resources during the formulation and passage of EISA07? 
 
RQ2:  How and why did the combination of modes of relationships chosen by the oil and 
gas industry and other organized interest groups affect the final outcome of the tax 
provisions in EISA07? 
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The Three Roles of Political Resources 
 Dahan (2005, p. 49) contends that political resources play differing roles as determined 
by the mode or the combinations of modes that comprise a stakeholder groups’ approach to 
forming relationships with legislators.  The three roles of political resources are (1) primary, (2) 
supporting, and (3) complementary.  Dahan (2005) perceives the primary resources as those that 
produce the most significant impact on legislators.  Under the interactive mode of strategic 
choice, the primary resources, such as financial support and expertise, are utilized to gain access 
to legislators, legitimize their preferred policies, and influence the final outcomes.  For example, 
corporations and other stakeholder groups could use their financial resources to attend 
fundraising events sponsored by legislators, thus gaining access to the legislators to discuss 
relevant policy issues.  On the contrary, under the adversarial mode, corporations and other 
stakeholder groups might use resources such as negative media coverage, public demonstrations, 
and petitions to undermine the legislators’ “public image and political reputation” (Dahan 2005, 
p. 50).  The supporting resources, according to Dahan (2005), are necessary vehicles that 
facilitate the flow of primary and complementary resources from these stakeholder groups to 
policy makers.  These supporting resources included (1) relational resources, (2) organizational 
resources, (3) political-administrative expertise, and (4) recreational skills.  Regardless of which 
mode of relationship strategy the stakeholder groups chooses as their approach to political 
activities, these resources are employed with the exception of using recreational skill when the 
approach is adversarial. 
Finally, complementary resources “reinforce the impact [on legislators] of the primary 
resources” (Dahan 2005, p. 50).  When the approach is a cooperative mode, corporations use 
complementary resources like political reputation, public image, and stakeholder support to 
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enhance the impact of their primary resources.  For example, a stakeholder group that is viewed 
positively by the public is more likely to gain access to legislators through primary resources 
such as a report of expert’s position on policy issues.  However, when corporations pursue a 
negative mode of political approach toward legislators, financial resources and expertise are 
more likely to be used as complementary resources that increase pressure on targeted legislators.  
In this instance, a stakeholder group could use its expertise (complementary resource) to increase 
voters’ support (primary resource) of the group’s position and pressure these legislators to 
support an alternative policy. 
Dahan (2005) posits that the modes, roles, and their combinations are embedded within 
the political strategic planning of organizations that actively participate in the legislative process 
when the outcomes of these legislative acts are critical to the viability and survival of these 
organizations.  Thus, Dahan (2005) hypothesizes that the modes, roles, and their combinations 
play a vital role in the development and passage of many public policies.  Drawing from the 
preceding discussions, I argue that the varying roles of political resources and the combinations 
of roles and modes of organizations’ overall political strategies and activities will impact policy 
makers’ voting patterns, and public policy outcomes.  This argument leads to the next set of 
research questions as follows: 
RQ3:  How and why did the roles of political resources affect the final outcome of the tax 
provisions in EISA07? 
 
RQ4:  How and why did the political resource combinations of modes and roles affect the 
final outcome of the tax provisions in EISA07? 
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IV. Method, Analysis, and Results 
Method 
According to Yin (2009, p. 13), a case study methodology is appropriate when the 
research poses “how” and “why” questions about a contemporary set of real-life events over 
which the researcher has little or no control.  The current study of EISA07 fits the conditions 
delineated by Yin (2009) to apply the case study methodology.  First, this study investigates 
“how” and “why” political resources utilized by corporations and other stakeholder groups 
influenced legislators to propose opposing tax provisions in the House and the Senate.  Second, I 
have no control over the legislative processes throughout EISA07.  Finally, EISA07 is a real-life 
social phenomenon in a contemporary setting.  Thus, a case study methodology is an appropriate 
approach for investigating the impact of political resources on the formulation and passage of 
EISA07. 
Data and Analysis 
Suárez (2000) conducted longitudinal studies on how a group of U.S. pharmaceutical and 
electronics companies operating from the 1970s to the 1990s in Puerto Rico executed their 
corporate political strategies to secure, renew, and prevent the repeal of important tax breaks.18  
Suárez (2000) observed the strategies, tactics, and rhetoric employed by U.S. pharmaceutical and 
electronics companies to defend their private interests.  Following the evolutions of the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC hereafter) §§ 262, 931, and 936 regarding possession tax credits and their 
                                                          
18
 The Possessions Corporations System of Taxation (PCST) was enacted as § 262 (later 931) of the Revenue Act of 
1921 and again as §936 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.  The PCST was eliminated under the Small Business Job 
Protection Act of 1996.  It exempted all possession-source income of individuals and corporations from U.S. 
taxation (Suárez 2000, p. xiii).  For the chronological evolutions of the PCST, see Chronology in Suárez (2000, pp. 
xiii to xvi). 
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revisions from 1921 to 1996, Suárez (2000) qualitatively disclosed how corporate organizations 
cope with political uncertainties via various political strategies.  Drawing on organizational 
learning theory (Cyert and March 1963 and 1992, Argyris 1977, Fiol and Lyles 1985, Levitt and 
March 1988, and Kang et al. 2007), Suárez (2000) chronologically detailed the tactics employed 
and adopted by both industries when facing political uncertainties.  She observed how firms 
learned from results of prior political activities and such learning subsequently affected their 
strategic approach when facing legislative insecurities in a series of tax acts.  Suárez’s (2000) 
sequential approach provided an organized template for this study to examine the effects of 
political resources utilized by corporations and other stakeholder groups facing political 
uncertainties related to EISA07. 
In addition to adopting Suárez’s (2000) chronological approach, I also follow Yin’s 
(2009) suggestions in data collection by relying on multiple sources of evidence to investigate 
and answer my research questions.  Data or evidence in case studies, according to Yin (2009, p. 
98), “may come from six sources: documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, 
participant-observation, and physical artifacts.”  In this study, I collected a broad array of 
primary and secondary archived documents and records throughout the discourses of EISA07.  A 
database composed of several electronic and archived sources in Table 16 was used for the 
analysis in order to provide relevant interpretations and insights to answer the research questions. 
[Insert Table 16 about here] 
Case Analysis and Results 
 The contentious section of EISA07 that is the focus of this study is IRC code §199.  It is 
this section of the act that would either include or omit language that continues tax subsidies for 
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the oil and gas industry.  Regardless of the positions towards the inclusion and exclusion of IRC 
code §199 as proposed in both the House and the Senate, the opposing stakeholder groups, such 
as the oil and gas industry, the pro-business organizations, the renewable energy manufacturers, 
and the environmental groups, all simultaneously employed both interactive/supportive and 
adversarial/negative modes of political strategies.  Also, these stakeholders incorporated the 
combination of all primary, supporting, and complementary political resources as postulated by 
Dahan’s (2005) in their attempts to influence the final tax provisions as passed in the current 
EISA07.  Although political resources and the means to deliver these resources either through 
interactive or adversarial modes of operations were available to both groups of stakeholders, 
there were apparent asymmetries of political resource affordability and availability between the 
opposing groups.  According to the publicly available data, the oil and gas industry, their 
constituent lobbying groups, and supporting pro-business organizations devoted substantially 
more financial resources to gain additional stakeholder support and expert statements concerning 
the benefits associated with preserving §199 production tax deductions in EISA07. 
Contrary to the rich political resources afforded by the oil and gas industry and their 
supporters, renewable energy producers and environmental groups were considered financially 
constrained in comparison with the vast financial, expertise, administrative, and stakeholder 
resources available at the oil and gas industry’s disposal.  The groups that supported the 
exclusion of §199 production tax deductions in EISA07 and advocated transferring the potential 
tax revenues from such deduction exclusion for the development of renewable energy sources 
found themselves constantly battling their opposing group with substantially less political 
resources.  In the end, the §199 production tax deductions in EISA07 were preserved and the oil 
and gas industry won over the renewable energy producers and the environmental groups.  In 
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order to systematically present the strategic modes, political resources, and their combinations 
used by these opposing groups in an organized fashion, sub-sections will include details of the 
strategic modes, political resources, and their combined use in order to provide answers to the 
research questions. 
Primary Resources 
Interactive Mode 
 According to Dahan (2005), two primary political resource roles are expertise and 
financial resources when an interactive or positive strategic approach is adopted.  For 
stakeholders who supported the elimination of the §199 production tax deductions for the oil and 
gas industry, they offered expert insights to strengthen their position.  The expert knowledge 
declared by these groups relied on assumptions of potential benefits of environmental 
improvements, less expensive energy costs for consumers, and job creation.  They also argued 
that there was a positive relationship between the amount of oil and gas subsidies granted by 
Congress and the level of foreign oil dependence.  For example, Wentworth (2007), from the 
Union of Concerned Scientists Clean Energy Program, believed that by passing EISA07 with the 
elimination of the §199 production tax deductions for the oil and gas industry, “Congress would 
give Americans three gifts: lower electric bills, cleaner air, and more homegrown energy.”  
Echoing Wentworth’s (2007) view, Carl Pope (2007), President of the Sierra Club made the 
following statement: 
“This bill [EISA07]—unprecedented in its support for clean energy and action to 
combat global warming—will take America’s energy policy in a dramatically 
different direction.  It will create hundreds of thousands of jobs, save consumers 
over $26 billion at the pump and $18 billion on their energy bills, give us greener 
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cars and clean electricity, put us on the road to energy independency, and make 
real progress in the fight against global warming.” 
 
Pope (2007), while praising EISA07, further condemned the existing policy on energy as flawed, 
saying, “Our environment, our climate, and the pocketbooks of hardworking American families 
are hurting after decades of failed energy policy” and called for reevaluation of the rationale 
behind the tax subsidies for the oil and gas industry.  Pope’s questioning of the failed energy 
policy appeared to have borrowed the same sentiment provided by other commentators on the 
issue of oil and gas subsidy policies.  Kretzmann (2007) proclaimed, “The truth is we’ve been 
increasing market subsidies since the 1980s, but our dependence on foreign oil has increased—
they [subsidies] are not working.  I don’t see many legitimate arguments against repealing oil 
and gas subsidies.” 
According to Dahan (2005), stakeholders who take an interactive mode in approaching 
policy makers typically provide financial support to legislators in addition to using their 
expertise resources.  Data on campaign contributions and lobbying expenses incurred prior to 
EISA07’s final passage support Dahan’s (2005) political resource typology.  For the 110th 
Congress, the overall campaign financial contributions via PACs to the Senate by the energy 
related industries alone were approximately four and a half million dollars ($4,474,630).  The 
same energy-related industries that donated approximately five million dollars in financial 
campaign contributions to the Senate contributed through their PACs more than 25 million 
dollars ($25,516,555) to House members in the 110
th
 Congress. 
Energy-related industries spent substantially more resources on lobbying expenses than 
on PAC contributions.  Publicly available data released by the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate on corporations’ lobbying reports shows that the 
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oil and gas industries, non-renewable and renewable energy-related producers, environmental 
groups, pro-business private organizations, and their lobbying firms spent approximately 190 
million dollars (over six times of the amount on PAC financial contributions) on lobbying issues 
critical with H.R. 6, the proposed Congressional bill that later became the EISA07.  The 
combination of total PAC financial contributions and lobbying expenses related to EISA 07 
alone amounted to about two hundred and twenty million dollars ($220,000,000). 
Kretzmann (2007) views the practice of allocating large amounts of financial resources 
over a policy as a wise investment and stated that the returns for the oil and gas industry accruing 
from their investments were substantial.  He, after calculating the estimated annual subsidies the 
oil and gas industry would have received over the financial resources spent, found that the 
returns on investment for the oil and gas industry were respectively 65,000 percent and 8,000 
percent for the money they spent on PAC financial contributions and lobbying expenses.  If the 
financial resources of campaign contributions and lobbying expenses were great investments, 
why did the renewable energy industry and environmental groups fail to sway legislators in 
repealing the tax subsidies they deemed a failed policy and detrimental to the overall energy 
supply dependence concerns they raised?  After all, there were no limits on lobbying expenses 
for all stakeholder groups. 
The answer might lie in the different levels of financial resources between the 
stakeholder groups supporting or opposing the oil and gas tax subsidy that was eventually 
included in EISA07.  The non-renewable energy industry, the pro-business organizations, the 
labor unions, and the oil and gas industry had substantially more financial resources and they 
outspent their opposing counterparts of renewable energy producers and environmental groups 
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by a large margin.  The former group ($180,613,566)19 spent approximately 20 times of the latter 
group ($9,602,955) in their lobbying expenses targeting issues related to H.R. 6 prior to its 
passage as EISA07.  It appeared that the wide gap between both groups’ financial political 
resources impacted the final tax provision outcomes regarding the applicability of §199 to the oil 
and gas industry.  Not only did the vast array of the oil and gas subsidies remain untouched, the 
110
th
 Congress passed the EISA07 bill at the end of 2007 and left the entire package of all 
subsidies intact. 
Adversarial Mode 
Given the differential in financial resources between the stakeholder groups who 
supported oil and gas tax subsidies and those who opposed it, it is understandable that 
stakeholder groups who did not support the tax subsidies relied primarily on opposition and 
public image tactics as the basis of their political strategies.  The short, eleven month period 
under which EISA07 was debated and passed may explain why more extended, political 
reputation strategies were not used. 
Stakeholders’ Opposition 
 
All stakeholder groups, whether supportive or opposed to the oil and gas tax subsidies, 
utilized oppositional strategies.  Immediately after H.R. 6 was sponsored in the House, Matusic 
(2007a) of the American Petroleum Institute (API), a lobbying group for the major U.S. oil and 
gas industry, equated the success of the U.S. oil and gas industry with a guarantee to the financial 
                                                          
19
 Not all lobbying expenses were solely for the preservation or abolishment of the production deduction tax credits 
in the IRC §199.  Lobbyists and their firms might have incurred the reported expenses while lobbying for several 
IRC §199 related and non-related issues simultaneously.  However, the total amount of lobbying expenses were 
tallied from reports that had included either H.R. 6 or other versions of the proposed bills related to EISA07.  All 
other reports without identifying H.R. 6 as one of the lobbying items were not included in the final amount of 
lobbying expenses. 
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security of “Millions of hard-working Americans [who] have a stake in the success of U.S. oil 
and natural gas companies through their stock ownership.”  She claimed that individuals “with 
retirement or pension accounts, including many state and local pension fund participants, hold 41 
percent of the shares of the U.S. oil and gas companies.”  Matusic (2007b) echoed her previous 
assumption that the success of the oil and gas industry would translate into financial success of 
the investing public.  Along this line of reasoning, she linked punishing the oil and gas industry 
under the proposed tax provisions as synonymous with punishing the significant portion of the 
general population, especially the retirees and senior voters who often actively participated in 
voting and elections. 
In an official statement, John Bisney (2007), tax policy analyst of API, insisted that by 
repealing “the Sec. 199 manufacturing deduction for the major oil and natural gas companies” 
Congress would reduce job creation since the specific code “was designed to broadly create U.S. 
jobs.”  He continued that the same code section had been helping the oil and gas industry 
maintain its global cost competitiveness.  Bisney (2007) saw the need to keep the §199 tax 
credits intact because they increase domestic energy production and decrease dependence of 
imported foreign oil and energy.  The Council for Citizens against Government Waste stated: 
“On behalf of the undersigned organizations20 representing hundreds of thousands 
of taxpayers, small businesses, shareholders, consumers and senior citizens, we 
strongly urge you and your colleagues to reverse the increasingly dangerous . . . 
[and] punitive energy policy that would punish the economy by raising taxes, 
raising energy prices and driving a death nail into domestic energy production . . . 
                                                          
20
 A total of 26 groups signed this petitioning letter.  Groups included local, state, and national organizations that 
had diverse objectives such as 60 Plus Association, A non-partisan, conservative seniors advocacy group, American 
for Tax Reform, an anti-tax increase group, Independent Women’s Forum, a pro-market and limited government 
non-for-profit organization, Maryland Taxpayers Assocation, Taxpayer Association of Oregon, and Tennessee Tax 
Revolt, three local and state organizations on tax matters, and U.S. Business & Industry Council, a non-for-profit 
lobbying group for small and family-owned business.  Due to space constraint, these examples are not exhaustive.  
However, they demonstrated the wide diversity among the overall signing organizations. 
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[with] the new taxes targeted at the U.S. oil and gas industry [under] Titles I & II 
of H.R. 233721.” 
 
 In addition to the letter by the Council for Citizens against Government Waste stating 
their opposition to the tax treatments to the House, both API and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
(USCC) voiced their objections through the organizations’ letters to legislators.  On December 5 
and 6, 2007, before the final vote of EISA07, API and the U.S Chamber of Commerce separately 
sent a letter of opposition to Congressional members (API to both the House and the Senate 
while the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to the House only) concerning the proposed tax provisions 
on the treatment of the §199.  All three letters urged the legislators to vote against the House 
version of the tax provisions that would eliminate the domestic production deduction tax credits 
for the oil and gas industry.  These letters characterized EISA07 as “punitive, overly burdensome 
tax” (Josten 2007) legislation that unfairly targeted the major oil companies.  In addition, these 
letters projected that if the tax deductions were eliminated or restricted, there would be 
significant job losses (Cavaney 2007a). 
In its opening statement, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (USCC) stressed its position as 
“the world’s largest business federation representing more than three million of businesses and 
organizations of every sizes, sector and region” (Josten 2007).  In the letter, the USCC described 
the tax credit elimination as an unjustified attempt by the House to “single out the oil and gas 
industries for punitive treatment” (Josten 2007).  The letter continued to point out that the USCC 
openly opposed “any denial or limitation of the section 199 deduction for oil and gas companies.”  
The USCC anticipated that if the tax credit were eliminated, it would “discourage domestic 
energy investment, result in the loss of U.S. jobs” (Josten 2007). 
                                                          
21
 H.R. 2337 was one of the several preceding versions of H.R. 6. 
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Besides the foreseen reduced financial benefits, loss of employment, and increased 
competitive disadvantages, all three letters pointed out that such policy direction would also 
decrease domestic energy supply capability and stability due to the disincentive for domestic 
energy exploration, refining, and production.  Cavaney (2007b) warned, “Were the Senate to 
follow in the House’s footsteps [to eliminate tax credits under the §199], the ability of American 
consumers to get the energy they need, when they need it, could be profoundly impacted.”  In the 
letter dated one day earlier, Cavaney (2007a) pressed the Congress to show “leadership in 
arriving at a balanced energy policy” to truly reduce the foreign energy dependence toward 
“greater energy security.” 
These letters and comments from various stakeholder groups opposing the proposed 
elimination of tax provisions are consistent with the concept of collective unity reinforcement 
action advocated by Jacomet (2000): A unity action is “purely collective by nature, as opposed to 
individual resources which become collective because they are simply shared” (Dahan 2005, p. 
46).  Drawing on Jacomet (2000), Dahan (2005) believed that although stakeholder groups do 
not own the unity action as a political resource, there is a positive association between the weight 
of such unity action and its political weight.  Specifically, Dahan (2005, p. 46) explained that the 
political weight of a collective unity reinforcement action depended on (1) the number of 
members, groups, and coalitions, (2) the unity of interests, and (3) the diversity of stakeholders.  
Dahan (2005) assumed that a greater number and diversity of groups opposing a legislative 
action would achieve the most effective political action without being accused of self-interest.  
As the final texts on tax provisions in EISA07 showed, the stakeholder groups that opposed the 
elimination of tax provisions had successfully used the collective unity reinforcement action as 
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one of their powerful and effective resources to preserve the tax deduction credits worth billions 
of dollars for the oil and gas industry. 
Public Image 
 
 When stakeholder groups take an adversarial or pressure approach, Dahan (2005, p. 50) 
posits that attacking an opponent’s public image can become a political resource that is “far more 
important in a pressure strategy than resources such as expertise or financial support.”  In the 
case of EISA07, there is considerable evidence that conservative and pro-business groups 
attacked legislators who held liberal ideology by painting them as the villains to a sensible 
energy policy.  On the other hand, environmental groups and liberal political parties portrayed 
pro-business and conservative legislators as selfish and shortsighted lawmakers who lacked 
common sense in safeguarding the future of the country. 
My analysis of the data uncovered three examples of stakeholder groups publicly creating 
a negative impression of legislators who opposed their own stances on the §199 tax credits for 
the oil and gas industry.  All three examples questioned the true intent of policy makers on 
targeting the five major U.S. oil and gas producers and equated the elimination of a tax 
subsidiary to a tax increase.  First, Grover Norquist, President of Americans for Tax Reform, 
suggested the House proposed and passed elimination of the §199 tax credits for the oil and gas 
industry as the first wave of many tax hikes initiated by the then Democratic House Speaker, 
Nancy Pelosi.  By hinting that the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives during the 
110
th
 Congress legislators were for tax increases, Norquist (2007) effectively painted a negative 
public image for the Democrats.  He further predicted “disastrous consequences” that such “oil-
tax increase will, by the laws of economics, decrease domestic energy production and provide a 
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boost for OPEC producers—thereby increasing our energy dependence” (Norquist 2007, italics 
original).  Sharing the same unfavorable view of the Democratic lawmakers, Jerry Taylor and 
Peter Van Doren, senior economics fellows at the CATO Institute (a conservative, free-market 
based public policy research organization) followed Norquist’s attack on the ideologically liberal 
Democrats and questioned their legislative intent, stating that “eliminating—or at least, cutting 
back on—federal subsidies to the oil and gas business is a fine idea.  But that’s not exactly what 
the Democrats have in mind” (Taylor and Van Doren 2007).  With a statement like this, these 
two economists insinuated Congressional members who favored altering the existing tax code 
were hiding a broader, ideologically motivated tax agenda.  Finally, Andrew (2007) labeled the 
legislative debates over the tax provisions as personal and political.  He remarked, “Privately, 
some Democrats say it is payback time: the oil [and gas] industry’s political contributions have 
overwhelmingly gone to Republican lawmakers and President Bush, and many Democrats say 
they have little sympathy for the industry now.” 
Two news articles that supported the reversal of the originally “temporary” production 
tax credits focused their attention on a pro-oil and gas industry Senator to create the adversarial 
pressure during the legislative process.  Kachan (2007) of CleanTech accused the oil and gas 
industry of playing the victim card, “Far from being big beneficiaries [of oil tax subsidies], some 
oil companies claim they are net victims.  They point to gasoline taxes and environmental 
regulations, such as fuel-efficiency standards for new vehicles.”  Kachan (2007) seemed to 
indicate that the oil and gas industry intended to divert the true debates over the production tax 
credits to other items that were unfavorable to the industry in order to garner some sympathy 
from a less informed audience. 
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Instead of attacking the oil and gas industry, business columnist of the Washington Post, 
Steven Pearlstein, boldly called out the Democratic Senator Mary Landrieu from Louisiana and 
publicly accused her of being a traitor to her own political party.  Specifically, Pearlstein (2007) 
believed, “that it was Democrat Mary Landrieu of Louisiana who broke ranks and gave President 
Bush and the Republican leadership the one-vote margin they needed to defeat the Democratic 
version of the energy bill last week.”  He further refuted Landrieu’s rationale of opposing the 
House-passed tax provisions by calling the tax provisions “one-sided policymaking [leaving] 
Louisiana industry footing the bill” as “laughable.”  Pearlstein (2007) concluded by labeling 
Landrieu’s defection as “simply putting her own and her state’s selfish interests before the 
national interest.”  Although it was too late for Pearlstein’s (2007) comments to alter the final 
outcomes of the tax provisions in EISA07; nevertheless, he had managed to create pressures on 
Senator Landrieu and potentially other legislators to avoid publicly defending the oil industry in 
the future policy making process.  Both supporting and opposing sides of the tax provisions used 
public image creation as a political resource to pressure legislators when stakeholders had 
determined that an adversarial relational approach would be an effective political strategy.  In 
this case, final text concerning the tax provisions in EISA07 indicate that the corporations and 
stakeholder groups against alterations of the existing §199 tax code were more effective in using 
public image as a primary political resource to help reverse the direction of this particular policy. 
Supporting Resources 
 Relational and organizational resources, recreational skills, and political-administrative 
expertise are supporting resources according to Dahan (2005, see Table 14).  Supporting 
resources alone, Dahan (2005, p. 50) claims, are “not valued by public decision makers.”  Instead, 
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these supporting resources function as an important means for carrying out the use of primary 
political resources.  Different from primary and complementary resources where strategic or 
relational modes determine which resources will be deployed to express either cooperation with 
or threats against legislators, Dahan (2005, p 50) states, “With the exception of recreational skills 
(only used within cooperative context), supporting resources do not vary with the relationship 
mode adopted.”  Since the resources will be the same regardless of the relational approach 
adopted, the succeeding discussion includes only resources that are applicable to the current case 
study with recreational skills discussed first under the interactive approach, then both relational 
and organizational resources discussed under the adversarial mode of operation. 
Interactive Mode 
 Recreational skills, such as sponsoring retreats or travel for legislators and their staff, are 
employed frequently so members of the sponsoring organization can interact with policy makers 
in an exclusive setting.  Historically, data regarding the details of the use of these interactive 
political resources are private.  However, in 2005, both the House and the Senate granted 
American Public Media, Northeastern University’s Medill News Service, and the Center for 
Public Integrity access to disclosure documents for approximately 23,000 privately sponsored 
trips taken by Congressional aides and members between January 2000 and June 2005.  Prior to 
the publication of the key findings of this joint project, Lathrop (2006), data editor of the project 
team, detailed the pain-staking processes of nearly nine months of intense engagements and the 
methodology project researchers used to arrive at their conclusions and key findings.  Due to the 
unavailability of public data regarding the actual trips the oil and gas industry and their 
supporters sponsored for Congressional aides and legislators prior to and during the legislative 
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processes of EISA07, only inferences can be drawn from the data collected and analyzed under 
their joint research project. 
Key findings of this joint project provide insights into the use of stakeholder groups’ 
recreational skills (Dahan 2005) that were used to gain exclusive access to Congressional staffers 
and legislators.  A number of patterns emerged from the results of this project.  First, 
Congressional staffers took a significant portion of all the trips among the approximately 23,000 
trips analyzed in this project.  The rationales of offering trips to exotic locations and with 
planned, lavish leisure activities22 to Congressional staffers were to build a long-term rapport 
with them.  Generally speaking, legislators often hire Congressional aides and assistants in order 
to delegate the overwhelming demands placed on legislators.  These staffers often have expertise 
in a field that is particularly beneficial to legislators who sit on specific Congressional 
committees.  By building close relationships with Congressional staffers, stakeholder groups 
gain access that allows them to provide information to Congressional members that aids in 
debating and voting on relevant policy issues.  It can be inferred that privately sponsored trips 
were also used by the oil and gas industry and their supporting coalitions to secure access, 
provide expertise information, and influence the final version of the EISA07 tax provisions 
regarding the §199 domestic production deductions. 
Some researchers argue that these types of recreational activities create an implied 
obligation to the sponsors because stakeholder groups strategically target committee leaders who 
oversee policy decisions that are crucial to these special interest groups.  For example, the joint 
                                                          
22
 As long as the staffers and legislators gave a one-hour speech or participate in at least one half day of tours on 
some educational or investigative sites, trips were considered legitimate and purposes fulfilled.  Some of the leisure 
activities in addition to the limited engagements of education and investigation, the project found, included a $180 
round of golf, $49 for a ticket to a St. Louis Cardinals game, a limousine ride of more than $100, and a helicopter 
tour of more than $250 over several islands of Hawaii. 
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project discovered that the office of Republican, Joe Barton, then chairman of the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, during the one-year period prior to June 30, 2006 
accepted a total of 54 trips.  Congressman Barton took one trip himself and his staffers took the 
rest of the trips.  According to the disclosure reports filed by Barton’s office, these trips were 
worth about $87,000.  Energy-related industries were among the sponsors of these trips. 
In addition to sponsoring recreational activities for industry-related Congressional 
committee members and their staffs, stakeholder groups also helped sponsor similar activities for 
legislators sitting on the Congressional Ethics Committee who are responsible for evaluating the 
legitimacy of Congressional travel.  According to disclosure documents filed by Congressional 
offices, trips taken by the ten House members who were in charge of its Committee on Standards 
of Official Conduct and their staffers were valued at $966,000.  See Table 17 on the breakdown 
of total trip amount by each committee member according to the results of the joint project. 
[Insert Table 17 about here] 
This project also brought an interesting strategy used by the lobbying firms for these 
stakeholder groups to light.  Representatives from lobbying groups were often invited 
participants in trips sponsored by non-lobbying stakeholder groups.  As long as the lobbying 
groups did not financially pay for trips, their active participation in trips taken by Congressional 
members and their office members is legal, although the ethicality of these trips is questionable.  
Based on my analysis of the findings of the joint project, I conclude that stakeholder groups used 
the sponsoring of retreats and other forms of travel as recreational skills that help to gain access 
to and attention of lawmakers.  Through incorporating this supporting political resource in their 
overall strategic political activities, stakeholder groups successfully ensure policy directions and 
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legislators’ voting patterns match the desired outcomes of these groups. The key findings 
reported by this joint project are included in Table 18. 
[Insert Table 18 about here] 
Adversarial Mode 
 As mentioned previously, stakeholder groups that opposed any proposed revision to the 
existing tax provisions under the §199 domestic production deduction tax credits used primarily 
a negative relational approach.  Under this strategic approach, they pressured non-market actors 
or policy makers using relational and organizational political resources. Thus, adversarial 
resources assisted the stakeholder groups to reach their ultimate goal of influencing the final 
version of EISA 07.  For example, Andrews (2007) reported how the oil industry “carefully 
positioned themselves, picking their fights on selected issues that attract fairly little popular 
interest but affect potentially large amounts of money.”  In order to win these strategically 
selected “fights,” the oil industry mobilized its adversarial resources they had accumulated over 
many years of political involvement: “Exxon, Shell and trade group like the American Petroleum 
Institute have hired former Democratic lawmakers and Democratic lobbyists to help press their 
case.”  Considering it was primarily a Democratic objective to eliminate the IRC §199 domestic 
production deduction tax credits for the five major oil and gas companies, hiring former 
colleagues and lobbyists who had established relationships with Democratic lawmakers to 
advocate opposition of the elimination appeared to be successful when it came to the final 
EISA07 bill. 
Echoing the same view on how the oil industry had consistently maintained the power to 
influence federal policymakers, Kretzmann (2007) quoted President Franklin Roosevelt stating 
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that, “The trouble with this country is that you can’t win an election without the oil bloc, and you 
can’t govern with it.”  From Roosevelt’s statement, it can be inferred that the gas and oil industry 
had a historically deep-rooted formal relation with the elected officials in the U.S.  The oil and 
gas industry understood and used such relational resources to safeguard their own interest.  
Observing the drastic differences between the proposed and House-passed version eliminating 
the entire §199 domestic production deduction tax credits for the oil and gas industry and the 
final texts of both Titles I and II as passed in the Congress that left the tax credits intact, it can be 
argued that the oil and gas industry achieved their goal of preserving the preferential tax 
treatment through the use of the relational resources they had established throughout the long 
legislative history with legislators. 
Besides relational resources, the oil and gas industry, through supporting lobbying groups 
and other pro-business coalitions, also employed organizational resources to pressure lawmakers 
and influence policy outcomes.  Again, stakeholder groups that were opposed to eliminating the 
oil and gas tax subsidies took on the role of advocate for consumers and members of certain 
organizations.  For instance, Grover Norquist of Americans for Tax Reform (ATR) argued that 
not only would the proposed H.R. 6 “raise taxes on domestic energy production . . . and 
American consumers,” but “hinder American energy independence” (Norquist 2007).  Other 
organizations also made similar claims on the negative impact the tax treatment reversal would 
have on consumers.  President & CEO of FreedomWorks, Matt Kibbe, speaking on behalf of 
“850,000 FreedomWorks members and supporters nationwide” urged Congressional members to 
vote against removing the tax subsidies because it “will only increase the cost of energy for 
consumers.”  As an added pressure and incentive to legislators, FreedomWorks also hinted that 
the legislators’ votes would impact the calculation of the FreedomWorks Economic Scorecard.  
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These adversarial political resources seemed to have influenced the direction and outcomes of 
the proposed tax treatment of the IRC §199.  Instead of eliminating the existing tax benefits, the 
final version of EISA07 mentioned no such tax subsidy elimination.  By using both the relational 
and organizational resources, the oil and gas industry successfully pressured the legislators to 
revise their original proposal and pass EISA07 by leaving the domestic production tax credits 
intact for the industry. 
Complementary Resources 
 Stakeholder groups used expertise, financial resources, public image, political reputation, 
and stakeholder support/opposition as their political resources in their public policy engagement.  
How these resources were planned depended on the choice of these stakeholder groups’ strategic 
mode of operation.  When these tactics were used as primary political resources, expertise and 
financial resources would be employed under an interactive mode of approach.  These primary 
resources differed when an adversarial or opposing approach was planned.  Under this negative 
relational approach toward policymakers, stakeholder groups would most likely use public image, 
political reputations, and stakeholder support as their complementary political resources to 
achieve their attempt in influencing legislators and possibly policy outcomes.  Opposite to how 
primary resources were used, the complementary resources planned and deployed under an 
interactive mode of operation would be the opposite under the two different approaches: 
stakeholder groups would use public image, political reputation, and stakeholder support under a 
supporting relational approach to gain favor of legislators whereas expertise and financial 
resources would most likely be deployed as the adversarial tactics to impose pressures on policy 
makers during the legislative processes. 
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Interactive Mode 
 For groups that supported the IRC §199 deduction credits elimination for the oil and gas 
industry, they used both public image and stakeholder support as their political resources to 
interact with legislators in an attempt to increase the probability of including the elimination 
proposal in the final Act.  Stakeholder support was the main complementary political resource 
these groups used during the legislative process of EISA07, followed by creating a positive 
public image for policymakers.  Different from the primary resources used under an adversarial 
mode of operation, stakeholder groups that used stakeholder support under an interactive 
relational approach often emphasized the overwhelming support from members of trade, labor, 
or nonprofit organizations.  Before the debates over H.R. 6 and the final votes were cast, Ron 
Gettelfinger, President of the United Autoworkers Union (UAW), declared, “The UAW strongly 
supports this [H.R. 6] historical bill.”  Considering the more than one million members (total of 
1,158,926 including both active and retired, UAW 2005) of the UAW, a mutually positive 
relationship was formed between the labor union and policymakers in Washington.  This positive 
relationship allows UAW to influence policymakers.  The same article additionally explained the 
rationale behind why their members supported this proposal for “The tax credits are fully offset 
by repealing more than $13 billion in tax breaks for U.S. oil companies over ten years, including 
subsidies provided by the 2005 energy bill” (The MiddleClass 2007). 
Besides union members’ support in the elimination of the §199 deduction credits for the 
oil and gas industry, Nick Rahall, a West Virginia Democratic Congressional representative and 
then Chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee expressed his optimistic prediction of 
a “very strong bipartisan support” to “repeal $7.7 billion in tax breaks for oil companies” 
(Efstathiou 2007).  Gaining the legislative stakeholders’ support in a public policy was definitely 
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a significant, supplementary political resource stakeholder groups desired since such support 
indicated a high likelihood that the tax subsidies would be eliminated. 
The adversarial mode of political strategy tends to portray a negative public image of 
legislators.  Under an interactive mode, stakeholder groups tend to praise and create a positive 
public image of policymakers.  Three articles illustrate the positive public creation techniques by 
praising legislators who supported the §199 deduction credit elimination for the oil and gas 
industry.  First, Kachan (2007) described the elected 110
th
 Congressional Democratic House of 
Representatives as a contemporary “Robin Hood” who was taking “some money previously 
allocated for oil and gas and reallocating it to renewable energy.”  This depiction created a 
positive public image of House members who intended to ‘take from’ the rich oil and gas 
industry and ‘give’ to the much underfunded renewable energy industry. 
An article by Efstathiou (2007) viewed the same Democratic House of Representatives as 
determined lawmakers who followed through on policy objectives set by the Democratic 
leadership.  Particularly, he described how Speaker Pelosi pledged to repeal the oil and gas 
subsidies approved by the Republican-controlled Congress as one of the six legislative actions 
newly elected Democratic representatives intended to “enact in the first 100 hours of Democratic 
control of the chamber” (Efstathiou 2007).  Finally, Andrews (2007) described the Senate 
Democrats as the policymakers who sought “a major reversal of energy tax” that had benefitted 
the oil industry.  Specifically using the word “reversal” in his news article, Andrews (2007) had 
created a positive public image for the Senate Democrats by hinting that the old energy tax 
policy was heading in the wrong direction.  All three articles explained how and why stakeholder 
groups had intentionally created positive public images for the Congressional members who 
 
 
136 
proposed the §199 deduction credit elimination and had used them as their complementary 
political resources to influence policy outcomes. 
Adversarial Mode 
 Based on my analysis of available data, it appears that appeals to expertise and expert 
knowledge were the most frequently utilized complementary resources when an adversarial 
mode of political activity was adopted.  Commentators and authors with opposing positions on 
this matter primarily relied on expert knowledge when weighing the pros and cons of the §199 
deduction tax credits for the oil and gas industry.  Expert comments came from both supporting 
and opposing groups published prior to and during EISA07’s relatively short eleven-month 
legislative process.  For example, Kachan (2007) criticized the view of a CATO Institute energy 
economist, Ronald Southerland, who used statistics provided by the U.S. Department of Energy 
to argue that the oil and gas industry had received less than one billion dollars since the inception 
of production subsidies.  Quoting study results comparing American and European oil and gas 
industry conducted by Greenpeace, Kachan (2007) countered Southerland’s conclusions that “the 
American oil and gas industry might receive anywhere between $15 billion and $35 billion a 
year in subsidies from taxpayers.” 
Another rationale used by stakeholder groups that opposed alterations to the existing IRC 
§199 was that such legislative amendments would discourage new domestic oil production, lead 
to U.S. job loss, increase energy cost to consumers, and deepen foreign energy dependency.  
Among the most vocal promoters, four API employees (Matusic, technical writer, Bisney, tax 
policy analyst, John Felmy, chief economist, and Red Cavaney, President & CEO) repeatedly 
condemned the proposed elimination of the §199 domestic production deduction credits as a 
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punitive tax policy.  In order to boost the claims, Bisney (2007) supported such claims with 
results conducted by the Congressional Research Service.  He argued that “between 1980 and 
1986, domestic oil production dropped by as much as 1.26 billion barrels and oil imports 
increased by as much as 13 percent” when “windfall taxes” were imposed upon the oil industry.  
Therefore, any proposed tax increases would have had the same deleterious effects as it did in 
the early 1980s.  Parallel to Bisney’s (2007) assertion on the negative association between 
increased oil taxes and reduced domestic oil production, Cavaney (2007b) used another study by 
the National Taxpayers Union to argue that “similar taxes in the past have simply reduced 
domestic oil production.” 
In repudiating claims by representatives of the API, Kachan (2007) quoted a U.S. Interior 
Department study (reported in the New York Times) that questioned the subsidies encouraged 
domestic drilling and energy production.  Contrary to arguments by the representatives of the 
API, an Interior Department analyst believed, “if they [the oil and gas companies] took that 
[subsidy] money, they could buy a whole lot more oil with it on the open market” than drilling, 
refining, and producing it domestically.  It appeared that both arguments could be valid 
depending on the sources they quoted or relied upon. 
Finally, both sides saw direct impacts on U.S. jobs if and when the existing §199 
domestic production deduction credits were amended, restricted, or eliminated.  The opposing 
groups believed that the repealing of the §199 tax credits would inevitably cause substantial job 
losses in the U.S.  For instance, the Council for Citizens against Government Waste sent a letter 
signed by various stakeholder groups to the House members predicting that “the repealing of 
Section 199 of the Internal Revenue Code as the current bill provides will drive American oil and 
gas companies overseas taking American jobs with them.”  Cavaney (2007b) made a similar 
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forecast that any changes to the existing tax credits allowed under §199 would “cause significant 
job losses.” 
In contrast to these dire predictions of massive job losses, the groups that supported the 
complete elimination of §199 credits to oil and gas industry believed the repealing of the 
domestic production tax credits would provide new jobs in the U.S.  The main rationale 
supporting this argument was based on the assumption that all the subsidized tax credits would 
be transferred to the alternative and renewable energy industry, thus creating “green jobs” that 
did not exist due to the lack of tax credit incentives for the existing renewable energy industry.  
Both sides of the arguments seemed to have merit, although the net result of the policy change is 
an empirical question.  Expertise was a significant complementary political resource that was 
used by all stakeholder groups during the formulation and passage of EISA07. 
V. Summary and Suggestions for Future Research 
The aim of this case study was to assess empirically the applicability and validity of 
Dahan’s (2005) conceptualization of his corporate political resource typology.  It responded 
directly to Dahan’s (2005, pp. 50, 52) call for “empirical validations of this conceptual 
contribution . . . through in-depth case studies.”  Specifically, this case study examined the 
discrete discourses throughout the brief, yet complex processes that took place during the 
formulation, revision, and the final passage of the Energy Security and Independence Act of 
2007 (EISA07).  Sitting in the core of the policy controversy was the proposed treatment of the 
IRC §199 on the domestic production tax credits.  Title I of the House sponsored and passed 
House bill H.R. 6 explicitly excluding the §199 tax credits granted to the five largest, 
consolidated U.S. oil and gas companies (nicknamed Ending Subsidies for Big Oil Act of 2007) 
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granted under Energy Policy Act of 2005.  However, the texts under Title I of the Senate’s 
version of the same proposed bill included no such explicit elimination and effectively kept the 
tax credit benefits afforded to the oil and gas industry intact. 
Given that prior research had predominately applied and expanded the Hillman and Hitt 
(1999) model’s political tactics employed by corporations during their legislative involvement 
and assumed corporations deployed tactics to create a positive relationship with legislators, this 
case study offered an alternative view to the HH model.  Instead, this study focused on how and 
why the various political resources, modes of relational approaches, and the combination of these 
two, as conceptualized by Dahan (2005), impacted policy outcomes.  Also, prior corporate 
political strategy research relied significantly on the archival methodology in their studies.  There 
appeared to be a need for a qualitative methodological approach to supplement additional 
knowledge on corporate political actions in the literature.  By conducting an in-depth case study, 
these results add additional knowledge on how and why stakeholder groups use the compilation 
of Dahan’s (2005) resource typology to argue and defend the final texts of the Title I tax 
provisions regarding the IRC §199 domestic production deduction tax credits as enacted in 
EISA07. 
 Based on Yin’s (2009) approach in conducting case studies, I collected a broad array of 
primary and secondary archived data in both archived and electronic formats throughout the 
discourses of EISA07.  In order to adequately provide relevant interpretations and insights to 
answer the four research questions in this paper, I conducted several iterations of data collection 
and analysis until either the available relevant data was exhausted or the additional data reached 
a stage of saturation that they yielded no further insights to answer the research questions posed 
in the current case study.  The results indicated that stakeholder groups, depending on their 
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modes of operation as Dahan (2005, p. 49) conceptualized and predicted, used different political 
resources and a combination or “bundle” of these resources to influence legislators’ opinions and 
voting patterns, and, ultimately, the final text of the tax provisions in question as enacted in 
EISA07.  Overall, results from this case study support Dahan’s (2005) typology and provide the 
empirical evidence Dahan (2005) called for to validate the typology’s theoretical assumptions. 
One notable exception, based on all available data analyzed, is that stakeholder groups, in 
general, did not use financial tactics as the complementary resources to approach legislators 
under the adversarial mode of operation.  One possible answer is the relatively short time span of 
EISA07’s legislative history.  Stakeholder groups may not have had a sufficient amount of time 
to threaten withdrawing financial support to legislator’s election campaigns.  The Senate voting 
rules also may provide an alternative answer to why no stakeholder groups used financial means 
as their complementary resources to pressure Senators in the 110
th
 Congress: Although the 110
th
 
Senate was controlled by 51 Democratic senators, in order to pass a legislative act, a filibuster-
proof vote would require 60 votes to pass the proposed Senate bill during bill reconciliation 
between the two chambers of the Congress.  With EISA07, stakeholder groups only needed to 
convince one Democratic senator to break with the party line to ensure the filibuster-proof vote 
on a particular version of the proposed bill would not be passed.  Instead of using an adversarial 
approach, the oil and gas industry was able to use campaign contribution incentives as their 
primary political resource to positively persuade senator Landrieu to request a “clout” vote and 
vote against the proposed elimination of the §199 tax deduction credits.  Therefore, it would be 
irrational for stakeholder groups to approach legislators with a negative mode of relational 
operation.  Additional research may be needed to specifically investigate when and under what 
circumstances stakeholder groups such as corporations and other interest organizations would 
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approach legislators under an adversarial mode of operation in order to alter the direction and 
outcome of a particular public policy. 
Results derived from the iterative data collection and analyses in this case study offers 
insights for corporate political strategic management, cautionary notes for public interest 
organizations, and additional implications for future research within the stream of corporate 
political activities and strategies.  By understanding the various modes of operation and the 
“bundle” (Dahan 2005, p. 48) of corporate political resources, corporate management may 
improve the effectiveness of their overall corporate political strategic planning, protect their 
corporate interests, reduce regulatory uncertainties, increase competitiveness, and avoid adverse 
policy outcomes.  On the other hand, these results may aid public interest groups in raising 
society’s awareness and in voicing their opposition on the unfair or unethical influence of 
corporate political resources over legislators and public policies that may further disadvantage 
the welfare of the certain minority or underprivileged sectors of the society.  Finally, findings in 
this study provided corporate political strategy researchers a less utilized, yet substantially 
rigorous framework alternative to mainstream political strategic models in investigating 
corporate political activities.  One potential future research to strengthen one result of this study 
is to obtain and analyze data on actual privately sponsored trips funded by the oil and gas 
industry and their supporting associations or coalitions during EISA07 once such data becomes 
publicly available.  Another potential future research, according to Dahan (2005), may be 
conducted either through additional case studies of different tax/public policies, large-scale 
surveys, and unscripted personal interviews with participants who had the first-hand experience 
during the various stages of a highly controversial policy setting process to detail the interactions 
through exchanges of political resources between stakeholder groups and non-market actors.  
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Such unscripted personal interviews of relevant participants will allow researchers to recognize 
the patterns of interactions combined with the array of corporate political resources to gain 
broader insights on how and why such interactions and resources affect the final outcomes of 
public policies that the current literature may find beneficial. 
 
 
 
143 
Tables 
Table 12 Historical Legislative Highlights of H.R. 6 and S. 1419, The Library of Congress/Thomas Legislative Database 
(http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR00006:@@@R|/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c=110) 
 
House (H.R. 6) Senate (S. 1419) 
Date Event Date Event 
January 12, 2007 Representative Nick Rahall of West Virginia sponsored 
with 198 co-sponsors. 
May 17, 2007 Senator Harry Reid of Nevada sponsored with no 
co-sponsors.  Order placed on Senate Legislative 
Calendar under General Orders.  Calendar No. 56.   
January 18, 2007 Passed/agreed to in House: On passage Passed by the 
Yeas and Nays: 264 – 163 (Roll no. 40). 
June 21, 2007 This bill as introduced was identical to Senate 
Amendment (S.A.) 1502, a subsequent Senate 
substitute amendment to H.R. 6.  Record Vote 
Number: 224. 
December 6, 2007 Resolving differences – House actions: On motion that 
the House agree with amendments to the Senate 
amendments Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: 235 – 
181 (Roll no. 1140). 
June 21, 2007 Passed/agreed to in Senate: Passed Senate with an 
amendment by Yea-Nay Vote: 65 – 27. Record 
Vote Number: 226. 
December 18, 2007 Resolving differences – House actions: On motion that 
the House agreed to the Senate amendment to the 
House amendments to the Senate amendments.  
Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: 314 – 100 (Roll No. 
1177).  Cleared for White House.   Presented to 
President. 
December 13, 2007 Resolving differences – Senate actions: Senate 
concurred in the House amendment to the Senate 
amendment to the text of H.R. 6, with an 
amendment (S.A. 3850) by Yea-Nay Vote. 86 – 
8. Record Vote Number: 430. 
December 19, 2007 Signed by President George W. Bush and became Public Law NO: 110-140. 
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Table 13 Support and Opposition of Stakeholder Groups on H.R. 6  
Tax Deduction Elimination for Oil and Gas Industry 
Support  Oppose 
Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers 
AFL-CIO 
Apollo Alliance 
League of Conservation Voters 
National Farmers Union 
Sierra Club 
U.S. Climate Emergency Council 
 American Conservative Union 
Americans for Tax Reform 
American Highway Users Alliance 
American Shareholders Association 
Council for Citizens Against Government Waste 
FreedomWorks 
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) 
Small Business and Entrepreneurship Council 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
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Table 14 Political Resources Based on Dahan (2005, p. 47) 
Political Resources Comments 
Expertise Expertise can be gained in several separate areas: 
technical/ 
technological, economic/managerial, social, 
environmental, 
legal, political/administrative 
Financial resource It can be both a direct political resource (through 
campaign contributions) and an indirect resource (through 
the financing of other political resources) 
Relational resource Including formal relations (e.g. the membership of a 
standard 
committee) and informal relations (interpersonal contacts 
with nonmarket actors) 
Organizational resource Either an internal resource (permanent office of 
representation, in house office of public affairs or 
regulatory monitoring, etc.) or an external resource 
(consultant under contract, offices of a trade association, 
etc.) 
Reputation with other non-
market actors 
— This concept is close to Yoffie and Bergenstein’s 
(1985) ‘political capital’, which stresses the idea of 
accumulation over time 
— A useful distinction could be made between the 
individual 
reputation of the firm’s leaders or advocates (e.g. chief 
executive officer, prominent lawyer, etc.) and the 
institutional reputation of the firm itself 
Public image This public image may be a moderating factor in the 
public decision makers’ reactions to the firm’s attempt at 
political influencing 
Support of stakeholders — The weight of this support is a positive function of the 
stakeholders’ number, unity of interest and diversity of 
origins 
— This support may be more or less formally organized 
(from a simple petition or demonstration to the creation of 
an association), and more or less durable (ad hoc versus 
permanent coalition) 
Recreational skill I include all kinds of recreational services supplied to 
public decision makers and journalists in order to gain the 
opportunity for a more informal, personal and perhaps 
favourable contact. These services are diverse: 
restaurants, hotels, ‘study’ visits, trips by planes, 
helicopters, etc. (usually all free of charge) 
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Table 15 Political Resources in Corporate Political Activities in Dahan (2005) 
Resource Role  Strategic Mode 
  An Interaction Strategy 
(positive) 
 An Adversarial Strategy 
(negative) 
     
Primary  Expertise and financial 
resources 
 Public image, political reputation, 
and stakeholder support 
     
Supporting  Relational resources, 
organizational resources, 
recreational skill, and 
political-administrative 
expertise 
 Relational resources, 
organizational resources, and 
political-administrative expertise 
     
Complementary  Public image, political 
reputation, and stakeholder 
support 
 Expertise and financial resources 
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Table 16 Summary of Database Sources 
Type of Archived Data  Data Source 
Committee Meeting Minutes  C-Span; Library of Congress; Congressional Research Service; 
Congressional Budget Office 
Financial Contribution/Lobbying  
Information on EISA07 
 Center for Responsive Politics; Govtrack.us; Implu Corporation 
Legislative History  Library of Congress 
Second sources, including trade articles, popular 
press articles, newspaper columns, and news 
broadcast 
 Publications of involved interest groups as identified in Table 13; 
Electronic databases including ProQuest, Business Index, LexisNexis, the 
Wall Street Journal Index; Major news media and corporations; Multiple 
web search engines such as Google and Yahoo! 
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Table 17 Total Trip Value in Dollar Amount Taken by House Committee on Standards of 
Official Conduct Members 
Office  Total Trips in Dollar Amount 
Chairman Richard "Doc" Hastings, R-WA  $70,000 
Rep. Howard L. Berman, D-CA  245,000 
Rep. Gene Green, D-TX  198,000 
Rep. Stephanie Tubbs Jones, D-OH  130,000 
Rep. Mike Doyle, D-PA  95,000 
Rep. Tom Cole, R-OK  78,000 
Rep. Judy Biggert, R-IL  60,000 
Rep. Lamar S. Smith, R-TX  39,000 
Rep. Melissa A. Hart, R-PA  29,000 
Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard, D-CA  22,000 
Total  $966,000 
(Source:  House Travel Disclosure Records between January 2000 and June 2005 as analyzed by 
the Center for Public Integrity) 
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Table 18 Key Findings of Power Trips: How Private Travel Sponsors Gain Special Access 
to Congress 
  
Key Findings 
1. From January 2000 through June 2005, lawmakers and their aides took at least 
23,000 privately funded trips with a total value of almost $50 million. 
2. Staffers, who often influence how their bosses view issues and vote, took almost 
three-quarters of the trips. 
3. Ethics rules require that such trips be educational or investigative, but many were to 
vacation destinations — at least 200 to Paris, 150 to Hawaii and 140 to Italy. 
4. Of the two dozen congressional offices on which trip sponsors spent the most 
money, 15 were Republican. 
5. Of the 25 lawmakers who each accepted more than $120,000 worth of travel for 
themselves, 17 were Democrats. 
6. At least 11 offices accepted more than $350,000 each in travel.  Top beneficiaries 
included the offices of Reps. Tom DeLay, R-Texas, and Don Young, R-Alaska. 
7. Ethics rules infractions involving travel usually go unpunished. 
8. If the aim is to enlighten the public about their trips, the disclosure forms filled out 
by congressional travelers leave much to be desired.  Many lack information that 
could be used to determine whether a trip was a serious fact-finding mission or 
simply a vacation in disguise. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
This dissertation consists of three separate, yet interconnected studies examining the 
stakeholder influence over the formation and management of public and tax policies through 
both quantitative statistical analyses and qualitative case studies.  The first study analyzed the 
tactics employed by TfL in the strategic management of relevant stakeholders over the policy 
reform known as the LCC and how and why these tactics affected the LCC’s formation, passage, 
and amendments.  Prior studies examining the LCC and issues related to this policy reform had 
significantly focused on the economic impacts before its enactment.  Simulated modeling on the 
impacts of a public policy is important to aid the feasibility assessment of a proposed policy, 
especially when such proposal has broad effects to the society.  However, very few studies 
looked beyond the apparent economic factors and discussed the ongoing policy management 
tactics employed by TfL to ensure the viability of the LCC.  Using the stakeholder typology of 
power, legitimacy, and urgency as a guide, results of available data demonstrated that TfL 
mainly focused on maintaining the LCC’s legitimacy to relevant stakeholders throughout its brief 
yet revolutionary policy history.  In addition to legitimation tactics, TfL also drew on legislative, 
administrative, and judicial power with a sense of policy urgency to convince stakeholders that 
the passage and subsequent amendments of the LCC were necessary and justified.  These 
findings provided important tools to policy makers to enable more efficient and effective 
strategic public policy management.  Furthermore, these results expanded the application of the 
stakeholder typology for future academic research. 
The second study aimed to broaden SET’s theoretical application and improve 
methodological precision in the tax-related corporate political strategy literature.  The aim is not 
to disprove findings of prior corporate political strategy research in accounting and taxation, but 
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rather to explicitly consider the complex relations with an extended methodological approach.  
Instead of the traditional multivariate regression approach used in prior literature, this study used 
the simultaneous equations modeling to analyze the publicly available data of voting outcomes 
and the amount of PAC contributions during the 110
th
 U.S. Congress concerning the EISA07. 
Statistical results demonstrated that, as SET postulated, legislators voted mainly along 
their respective political party affiliations for both chambers under OLS and the House under 
2SLS.  However political party affiliations alone was not statistically significant to influence 
voting in the Senate.  In addition to political party lines, the predicted amount of PAC 
contributions was statistically significant to influence voting in the House while no such 
significant results are found in the Senate.  Finally, stakeholders appear to significantly affect 
legislators’ voting in both chambers, albeit the direction was unexpected in the House.  The 
study’s results supported the interdependent relationship between corporations and legislators as 
proposed by SET.  This expanded relational view might potentially aid researchers in the field of 
corporate political strategy studies to consider such interdependence instead of the traditional 
unidirectional approach in conducting their research. 
The third study attempted to validate Dahan’s (2005) political resource typology through 
an in-depth case study.  Applying an established case study format, this study investigated the 
political resources used by both supporting and opposing stakeholder groups to demonstrate how 
and why these resources affected the final tax provisions embedded within EISA07.  Results 
provided empirical support that, depending on the relational approaches (interactive/positive or 
adversarial/negative), stakeholder groups used different political resources in their attempts to 
influence the outcomes of EISA07.  One exception to this typology based on the results of this 
case study was that both stakeholder groups preferred the interactive relational approach.  These 
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results not only validated Dahan’s (2005) typology, but also offered some cautionary notes to 
public interest groups that political resources as defined by the typology might unfairly benefit 
resource rich groups in the policy making process.  Moreover, this validation enhanced the 
typology’s future application in methodologies such as large-scale surveys and unscripted 
interviews of relevant stakeholders who had firsthand experience during controversial and hotly 
debated proposed public and tax policies for future academic research. 
Overall, the three studies within this dissertation build upon prior theoretical and 
empirical research to advance the corporate political strategy literature in accounting and 
taxation through both quantitative and qualitative methodologies.  These empirical evidence and 
findings all have important and practical implications as to how and why relevant stakeholders 
influence the formation and subsequent management of public policies. 
